

Aguinaldo : a narrative of Filipino ambitions / by Edwin Wildman.

Wildman, Edwin, 1867-1932.

Boston : Lothrop pub. co., [1901]

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
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
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A NARRATIVE OF
LUPPING AMBITIONS



LAWRENCE WILKINSON

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You are to blame for this,
Kronathelen

Faithfully yrs
Ludwin Wildman
Sept 4 1900.

To Mr. Eldredge T. Brooks,
—

AGUINALDO •



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AGUINALDO •

A NARRATIVE OF FILIPINO AMBITIONS

By

EDWIN WILDMAN

*Former Vice and Deputy Consul-General at
Hong Kong; War Correspondent during the
Filipino Revolt; Special Commissioner to
China during the Boxer Rebellion . . .*

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Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith
Norwood Mass. U.S.A.

A NOTE TO THE READER

As I think of the bullet-pierced bodies of our brave American boys prone on the wastes of Luzon's sun-beaten rice-fields, or sleeping their last sleep in the wilds of the jungle, it is difficult to write impassionately of the enemy behind the gun.

And yet, as I recall those fearful scenes across the trench, and see the ground strewn with silent brown forms, gaping with wounds, horrible in death, the victims of human cupidity and mistaken leadership, my heart softens with conflicting emotions.

For I hear again the rattle of musketry, the rumble of cannon, the whir of bullets, and I remember that this is the final arbiter in the destinies of races, — the tie that binds us immutably to the barbaric past and points significantly to the unwritten future; then sorrow displaces passion, despair tramples on sadness,

A NOTE TO THE READER 6

—sorrow for the victims of strife, despair of the signs of progress.

The realities of war and its horrors are fresh within me. The vivid scenes of the battlefield are engraven forever upon my memory. So, to those who follow these lines I would say, my pen is earnest, and my purport sincere. It is but a narrative I tell; not as an attorney gathers up the thread of evidence, not as a preacher espouses a cause, but only as a witness and student of things and their meanings, full of sympathy for the vanquished, impartiality toward the victors, and unprejudiced by racial conditions, political considerations, or personal ambitions.

If this spirit is manifest through the narrative, I have succeeded in my efforts; if it is lacking, I have failed utterly. The reader must judge.

EDWIN WILDMAN.

NEW YORK,
June 15, 1901.

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AGUINALDO •

AGUINALDO

I

AGUINALDO has taken the oath of allegiance. He has sworn to defend the Constitution of the United States. He is eligible to hold official position in the Philippine Islands. He may some day cast a vote for the electors of the President of the United States.

It is time, therefore, that we cease to joke about his gold whistle and gilded collar and take him seriously. Aguinaldo has always taken himself seriously. It is a Malayan characteristic. The Malay is not much of a joker. He is not given to being funny. He never saw a comic paper until Spanish newspaper men cartooned him in a Manila publication. He saw nothing funny in being represented as a monkey. He did not laugh when the Americans took up the joke and an American officer said that the Filipinos were all right in their place,

but that they had descended from the trees three hundred years too soon.

Aguinaldo took himself and the ambitions of his people so seriously that he convinced himself of the possibility of Filipino Independence.

He even carried on for nearly three years the machinery of the Filipino Republic; for over two years he refused to surrender, outwitting the combined military and naval forces of the United States in the Pacific, and though besieged in the mountain fastness of the Caraballo range, surrounded only by a few faithful followers, cut off from his compatriots in arms, he still maintained his "government," issued orders to his scattered guerillas, and eluded the army of the United States. He was an example of the most marvellous conceit in the world's history. But conceited men are usually devoid of humor. They take themselves seriously.

Aguinaldo is a Malay. His is the type of Filipino that will concern us permanently. Aguinaldo is ours — and "we are his'n." Let us make the most of each other. Let us understand each other. To know Aguinaldo we must know the Malay. To know the Malay we must live with him, employ him, trade with him, associate with him, — and be deceived by him.

Aguinaldo commands the consideration of all

who have taken the trouble to study his character and watch the trend of events of which he is the central figure. There is something in this little Tagalog that inspires respect, — something that commands attention. There is quality out of the ordinary in a man, born in the wilds of an outlying island, uneducated, uncultured, untravelled, who possesses the power to inspire men to heroism and self-sacrifice; who mustered an army out of men who never fought but with the knife, bow, and arrow; who held in check the violent passions for revenge, plunder, and destruction in a race accustomed to cruelty and oppression from the white man. In the nineteenth century there has not been a more unique figure among the native races of the earth than this Tagalog patriot — or rebel; call him what you will. Philosophers call silent men wise; superficial people call them ignorant. Aguinaldo is wise among his people; ignorant among Europeans. He is not a Napoleon or a Washington; neither is he a Tecumseh or a Sitting Bull. His name suggests no metaphor.

Yet the Aguinaldo known to fame is not the real Aguinaldo. The real Aguinaldo has a personality and character quite different and apart from that of popular conception. The

Aguinaldo of fame is a name; the Aguinaldo of reality is an ordinary appearing little Malay who has been quick to learn and clever to utilize the gifts God has given him. In the revolution against the United States Aguinaldo played a peculiar and difficult part. Accredited with the ability apparent in the manifestoes, letters, and proclamations that have borne his signature, he possessed the cleverness to assume their responsibility and maintain the dignity of such an exalted position. Aguinaldo is not ignorant; neither is he the intellectual strategist his writings would make him appear. He does not possess the genius the natives accredit him with, nor is he the nondescript ignoramus pictured by his detractors. He is shrewd enough to know his limitations, and has ability sufficient to promote his ambitions. These qualities alone are formidable ones, and it is well to realize them, for Aguinaldo will be a factor in Philippine affairs as long as he lives.

Aguinaldo was born some thirty-two years ago (about 1869) in Cavite Viejo. His father was a native of the farmer class, whose principal employment consisted in selling vegetables to the Spanish and native inhabitants of Cavite. Being a man of more than average ability, and possessing considerable force of character, he rose to

some little local prominence among his townsmen, and was thrice elected mayor of his native borough. Aguinaldo's mother was a Mestiza, her father being a Chinaman, of whom I have heard it said, he was a descendant of a Mandarin of considerable influence and power in China. From this celestial lineage Aguinaldo probably inherited his craft and stoical demeanor. His parents baptized him in the Catholic faith, calling him Christmas-box — or gift, the literal meaning of the Tagalog word "Aguinaldo." It might be presumed therefore that the future chieftain of the Tagalogs was born on Christmas, although some records give March 22 as his natal day.

His early life was spent on the farm or running about the streets playing with the native children of the neighborhood. He never learned Spanish sufficiently to converse fluently. When he became of suitable age he attended the Tagalog school at Cavite, where only the most meagre rudiments of education were taught. With this limited preparation he went to Manila and spent part of three years taking a secondary course of instruction in the Jesuit school of Santa Thomas, "without any benefit to himself," said Archbishop Nozelada in speaking of Aguinaldo. The reflection, how-

ever, may be applied, I think, with equal justice upon the school, for Aguinaldo showed himself quick to learn, and there was no school under the Spanish system in which a Filipino, unless a rich half-caste, was encouraged to perfect his knowledge. Popular education was discouraged. Ignorance was at a premium. The Spanish denied the Filipino the remotest semblance of equality. It was many years before a Filipino dared to put on shoes or stockings, to wear his shirt inside his trousers — even to learn Spanish. Aguinaldo, therefore, may be forgiven for not taking a degree in the Manila University. Besides, other influences cut him off from a career of letters, had his ambitions run in that line.

The death of his father caused his return to Cavite. Funds ran low, and he was compelled to take up his father's occupation in order to support himself and his mother.

Aguinaldo showed himself to be a young man of more than ordinary spirit. Hardly was he of age before he became Captain Municipal of Cavite. This was in 1893. In the Spanish civil list of 1895 I also found his name registered as Captain Municipal of Cavite. So he twice took the oath of office under the Spanish. I am told that the second appoint-

ment was given him in order to wean him over to the Spanish rule, for he began to show strength as a leader, and his connection with the secret Katipunan Society became known.

The Katipunan, or Kalaastaasen Kagalang-galang Katipunan — very exalted and honorable union — had become very powerful. It was the outgrowth of the native masonic lodges. The organization amalgamated the lesser so-called masonic lodges of Manila, Cavite, Bulacan, the Camarines, and other provinces, and in 1896 numbered over thirty thousand. Its chief founder was Andres Bonifacio, a schoolmaster of Cavite. The object of the league was the extermination of the friars and the Spanish officials. The *Pacto de Sangre*, or blood compact, a rite of the ancient chieftains of the Island which involved the drawing of blood from the breast of a candidate, was revived and made a part of the ceremonies of the Katipunan.¹ By this rite the first treaty with Magellan was sealed in 1521.

Freemasonry was established in Manila by the Spanish, and being frowned upon by the

¹ This ceremony was memorialized in a celebrated painting by Juan Luna, a brother of the Insurgent General Antonio Luna. The picture hung in the Government Palace at Manila until the revolution broke out, when it was removed by the Spanish.

Church, existed under the utmost difficulty. In a moment of incaution, or for considerations best known to the Spanish members, a number of prominent Filipinos were taken into the order. The mystery, secrecy, and masonic symbols employed, appealed strongly to the untutored natives, and there sprang up like mushrooms a degenerate form of masonry throughout the Islands. The leaders quickly realized the power of such combination, and the ignorant native, confused by the mysticism, became imbued with the belief that the spurious order conveyed supernatural powers. Although the friars opposed the organizations with relentless violence, arresting, torturing, and banishing "suspects," the natives became all the more certain that masonry was a potential force that made the possessor of the various symbols a person to be feared. Confusing and confounding the signs of the order with the various cabalistic signs of the Church, the Filipino mixed religion with his masonry, and despite the priest and friar, the two, though radically separated, became hopelessly confused in the mind of the native.

From this state of things grew the *Anting-Anting*,—a mystic concoction of hog-Latin and Spanish, illumined with crude pictures of the

Virgin Mary and the Saints. Originally this charm was burnt or tattooed on the skin of the person. Remarkable stories are told of the power of the *Anting-Anting*. One who possesses it is supposed to be invulnerable. Neither bullet nor steel can injure him. He may undertake most perilous journeys without fear of harm. He may go into war with perfect impunity.

Aguinaldo was accredited with the power of the *Anting-Anting*. It is said he always wore one of these medallions which gave him a charmed life. It is even told that upon one occasion, a doubter having questioned his invulnerability, he, William Tell-like, posed while a squad of six sharpshooters took aim at his heart and fired, the bullets (?) passing off from him without harm. This is a tale frequently heard among the ignorant Filipinos.

The shrewd insurgent leaders whose fortunes were allied with Aguinaldo, encouraged a general acceptance of the tale, and thus Aguinaldo was believed to be immune to American shot and shell, and the *Anting-Anting* charm became the universal accompaniment of the Tagalog soldier. I took several from the dead bodies of the Insurgents. Other Americans carried away hundreds of them because of their curious inter-

est. In the walled city, at Manila, when the Filipino prisoners were searched, before being sent to the bastions where they were confined, thousands of these symbols were found on the necks of natives or burned on the chests, arms, and legs of Igorrotes and Negritos, the bolo and arrow men.

It was the Katipunan that first claimed Aguinaldo's attention. He, like thousands of other superficially educated natives, was charmed with the secrets of the mystic organization. But Aguinaldo went a step farther in his ambition. He aspired to lead where others were content to follow. In this aspiration he was led and encouraged by his old schoolmaster, Andres Bonifacio, the chief of the Katipunan. In Cavite Viejo, where Aguinaldo lived, the Katipunan plots were formulated. It was a perfect nest of revolutionary schemes, and there, more than in any other place in the Archipelago, the Spanish authorities had great difficulty in repressing the insurrectionary spirit.

Although numerous arrests were made and "suspects" tortured, the conspiracies against the government grew, rather than diminished. Aguinaldo was one of the foremost of the incorrigibles. The Spanish governor employed spies and the friars to obtain incriminating evidence


against him, but they failed in ferreting out and proving their suspicions against him and the men whom they believed to be the heads of the insurrectionary element.

In Cavite at that time there lived a pretty Filipino girl, a sister of one of the leaders of the Katipunan. It is said that she cherished a secret passion for Aguinaldo, but was also loved by a Spanish officer of the police, — one Sergeant Seville. As it did not appear that Aguinaldo reciprocated the passion, she, piqued by jealousy, feigned to be enamoured by the Spanish sergeant. Aguinaldo was a frequent visitor at the house of her brother, and there she learned of a plot, in which the five Katipunan leaders proposed to organize an expedition, sack the Cavite convents, secure the arms hidden there by the priests, and arouse the people to revolution. In a fit of jealousy she revealed the plot to her Spanish lover. He appeared to show little interest in the affair, but so gratified was he to be the possessor of such important information, that he immediately proceeded to celebrate in Spanish style, and soon became intoxicated. The Filipino maiden was much provoked at his hilarity and threatened to leave him, whereupon, emboldened by his cups, he taunted her with the fact that if she left him she would have no

other lover to go to, as by morning her adored Aguinaldo and all his associates would be in the dungeons of Fort Santiago, and before the rise of another sun they would be shot in the back as traitors to Spain.

Although terrified at what she had done, the girl did not lose her wits. She laughed, and promised not to leave her Spanish lover. He regained his good nature and continued to drink, encouraged by the little conspirator, for now her eyes were opened to the danger to which her jealousy had exposed Aguinaldo and her brother. Finally, the sergeant was overcome by wine, and the girl stole away and ran to her home where she confessed what she had done, and the nature of the sergeant's threat. Her brother hastily assembled the conspirators, and a council was held. When the story was told, Aguinaldo is reported to have said: "No one knows of our plot but Sergeant Seville. Before he can communicate with Manila he must die. We will draw lots to determine who must kill him." Instantly the plan was carried out, and Aguinaldo drew the decisive number. In the morning Sergeant Seville was found dead, stabbed to the heart.

The friars, however, were Aguinaldo's deadly enemies, as they were irrevocably against the



REMINERS OF SPANISH CRUELTY

I. — Extorting Information II. — Friar lashing a Suspect III. — Torturing a Member of the Katipunan



Katipunan. A trap was set, and he was arrested as a "suspect." But before they were able to initiate him in their methods of extracting information and administering punishment, he escaped incognito to Hong Kong, where, passing himself off as a Chinaman, he enlisted in the Marine Police, a body of harbor guards made of Chinese subjects of the English colonial government.

Against the powerful Katipunan organization the friars pitted the confessional, proclaiming that the vows of the order were anti-Christian, and could not be reserved in the confession. But so vicious and cruel was the persecution that followed, that the Tagalog, though Catholic in faith, defied the edict of the archbishop and clung to the vows of the Katipunan. The friars employed the confessional to frighten women into betraying their husbands, and enlisted native spies to join the order and learn the secrets of the priests. In this manner they succeeded in informing themselves of the intentions and movements of the organization, and shrewdly attempted to arouse religious natives against the order, warning them that to join the Katipunan was to insure their eternal damnation. But all their threats and machinations were in vain. The organization grew in num-

bers and power, the friars implored the officials to take active measures against it, and arrests and tortures followed, the friars being ever ready to administer the punishment.

At this juncture Aguinaldo, emboldened by the growing power of the Katipunan, and anxious to return to his native land, determined to sail for Cavite. The Spanish authorities became thoroughly aroused at the trend of events, and were exercising every effort to apprehend the ringleaders, executing hundreds of "suspects," on the Luneta, the public common near the Walled City of Manila. Bonifacio advised caution, and urged the leaders to abandon their immature plans to overthrow the Spanish authority. He was the father of revolutions, but did not think the time ripe to strike the blow; whereupon, it is told, Aguinaldo secretly assassinated him, proclaimed himself the legitimate successor to leadership, and ordered instant attack on the priests' houses and outlying army posts.

Thus the outbreak of 1896 was precipitated before the Spanish militia could intervene. Aguinaldo, ably aided by his cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, swept through Cavite province, being reënforced by native Spanish guards who revolted. Thousands of Filipinos, armed with

bolos, bamboo spears, and bows and arrows, eagerly joined in the raid to avenge their wrongs, punish the friars, and share in the plunder of war.

Following up his first victory, he captured the villages of San Francisco de Malabon, Novelete, and Silan, and established headquarters at Imus. The Spanish general Aguirra, with two companies of infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two field-guns, attempted to dislodge him, but was successfully repulsed with considerable loss. The young chieftain then took affairs into his own hands, and organized and equipped an army with remarkable rapidity.

To trace further the causes that led up to this bold stroke on the part of the Filipinos, it seems hardly necessary to go into the details recorded to the everlasting dishonor of the friars of the Philippines. Their untimely persecution, their lecherous practices, and depraved Christianity; their lust for money and their ambition for power, led them into crimes that blacken the page of history. The revolt of 1896 was the natural result of long-suffering and outraged humanity. Had the Spaniards profited by the lesson and sought to alleviate the causes that produced the rebellion, the soil of the Philippines would have been spared its

baptism of blood. But the corruption and persecution of Church and State brought on the revolution; the Filipinos experienced their first taste of power; vanity, and self-conceit took possession of them, and, aroused by their leaders to aspirations and acts beyond the range of their strength or ability, the blood of the Indian asserted itself, and the Philippine Islands were plunged into a turmoil that ravaged the land and turned back the wheel of civilization a century.

II

FOREMOST among the Tagalogs at this critical period was the adventurous and romantic figure of Dr. José Rizal y Mercado. Like most of the half-caste Filipinos, he showed marked mental superiority over the native races. It was his thoughts, writings, and teachings that crystallized the latent issues of discontent, and gave the Filipinos definite aspirations. Rizal, though perhaps not the first to realize the result of consanguinity, was sufficiently gifted by mental endowment to take up the psychological aspect and make a demonstration upon his conclusions. His influence upon the people was quickly recognized by the friars, who realized in him a leader and teacher of doctrines incompatible with their practices. Dr. Rizal became a freemason, and it was he who perceived in that form of organization a method by which Filipinos could assert the position he believed should be theirs. The agitation culminated in 1886 in a demonstration against the

abuses of the friars, and a great petition called the "Expulsion de los Frailes" was prepared and addressed to the queen regent of Spain. Whether the paper ever reached her or not is problematical. No attention, at any rate, was paid to it, except by the monks, who retaliated by increasing their persecutions and extortions until open revolt was threatened. The natives in various parts of the Luzon grew emboldened and flatly refused to pay further tribute. General Luna, who was implicated in the movement, was deported, together with his relatives, and Dr. Rizal was banished.

But this act made him twice a hero in the eyes of his countrymen,—a refugee, because he dared to call the Philippines his patria; because he dared to think for himself and write upon the evils that were choking out the life-blood of his people. Romantic and imaginative by nature, he pictured the woes of his country in sensational novels. In this way he brought home to the native the lesson of the relationship between the peasant and the priest, and the priest and the government. The wide gulf that separated the Indian from the white man was broadened by Rizal's teachings. He made plain the impossibility of aspiration, and the future of his people he painted in the language of despair.

“I have sown the seeds; others are left to reap,” were almost his last words. Though never able to share personally in the revolutionary activity that he fomented, Rizal, more than any other Filipino, set in motion the spirit of discontent. His intellectual sword was double-edged. It severed the cords of ignorant superstition that bound the natives to the friars, and it tore the mask from the friars and put them to defensive activity against the natives. Rizal was not an open apostle of independence. He did not advocate revolt against Spain, but he agitated the dumb intellect of the Tagalog, and aroused him to resist his oppressors. Though a Catholic, he questioned the right of the friars to their benefices; he denied their titles to great landed estates, and he protested against their unchristian practices, their immorality, and their abuse of the confessional. Rizal maintained that intellectual attainment was the true test of social and political equality, and protested against the restrictions of caste which excluded the colored man from official representation and religious equality.

Born in the obscure town of Calamba, on Laguna de Bay, a score of miles from Manila, of parents whose ancestry was still more obscure, Rizal early manifested a high order of intellect

and ambition. He was taken in hand by the Jesuit priest of the parish, and made such great progress that his father, Thomas Mercado, sent him to the Jesuit college. The Jesuits have always been at variance with the other monastic orders of the Philippines, and it was undoubtedly under their tutelage that Rizal developed his asperity toward the Augustinians, Recollets, Dominicans, and the other orders dependent upon the public treasury.

Having passed through the early course at the Jesuits' school, Rizal was not satisfied with the customary régime of the provincial student who indulged his vanity in personal exploits and dandy dressing, but evinced a desire to study abroad and travel. Through the generosity of the Jesuits and the assistance of his father he embarked for Madrid. After a course at the Royal University at the capital he graduated in medicine and philosophy. He then went to Paris and Germany, and by observation and study he broadened his vision and increased his knowledge of political equality and individual liberty. In Europe he found the equal rights of man the primary principle of good government. Comparing these conditions with the oppression and corrupt rule of his native land, he resolved to devote his energies

to the relief of his monastic-ridden country. The first step in that direction was his novel, "Noli me Tangere," an exposé of the licentiousness of the friars. Though other works both preceded and followed, this was the book that aroused the ire of the monastic orders and turned the attention of the public to the misrule in the Spanish colonies.

Hardly conscious of the commotion he had aroused, Rizal determined to return to Manila. Arriving there, he found himself the object of most violent attack. Undaunted, however, by the persecution of the friars, claiming the right of a loyal subject of Spain, he continued his campaign, and by placing himself at the head of the anti-friar sentiment, brought down upon himself such an avalanche of opposition that his life was imperilled. He then realized fully for the first time the utter incapability of the Spanish officials to free themselves, had they so wished, from the influence of the friars. Rizal determined, therefore, to operate where the air was free to breathe, and where his actions were not subject to the inspection of spies. For the second time he returned to Europe, but at last, resolved to throw his lot among his own people and with them conquer or perish, he returned in 1893 to Manila. Upon landing at

the Custom House his baggage was seized, and he was charged with possessing seditious proclamations and literature. It has been claimed that these alleged seditious documents were surreptitiously placed in Rizal's baggage by spies of the friars, and that they were printed in the convents at Malabon, where the type was discovered set in forms. However this may be, Rizal was arrested and taken before the Governor General Despujals, who banished him to Dapitan, an eastern port of Mindanao. Here he built a hospital, and in enforced confinement sought to do what good he might. He took up the practice of his profession, and it was in this way that he became acquainted with Josephine Brackin Taufer, whose spirit and fortitude have made her a Joan of Arc in Filipino history. In July of 1899 I sought out this picturesque girl. She was living in a little house in Calle Bulambuyan, in Manila, and through her I obtained many incidents of Rizal's career. As she remained with him the last years of his life, her story is full of interest.


Josephine Brackin was the daughter of an Irish sergeant of the Fifteenth Regiment, stationed in Hong Kong. When the Fifteenth Regiment departed for England, her mother having died, her father left her with Mr.

Taufer, an American friend, who adopted and educated her. In 1894 her adopted father, who was suffering from trouble with his eyes, went to Manila to consult with Dr. Rizal, whose fame as an oculist was known; but when they arrived in Manila they learned of Dr. Rizal's banishment and followed him to Dapitan, where they remained for some months. Rizal fell deeply in love with the blue-eyed Irish girl, and asked her to marry him, but the officials refused to permit the marriage, giving as a reason that Josephine was an English subject. Dr. Rizal, however, solicited her to remain in his company until he could secure the proper authority to marry. For two years and four months she remained in Dapitan. Though the place was destitute of business, Dr. Rizal built a fine house and hospital. He taught all the children who came to him English and Spanish and the elements of education, and continued his practice as an oculist.

When the revolution in Cuba broke out, Dr. Rizal requested several times, through the local governor, an appointment in the Cuban army as a surgeon, but the application met with a refusal. One day when Josephine was in Manila there came to her a Philippine doctor by the name of Valensuela, who asked if he could

return to Dapitan with her, as he had two blind men he wished to take to Dr. Rizal. Without the slightest suspicion, Josephine gave him permission to accompany her with the patients. When Dr. Rizal examined the men he found that they were not blind, and therefore knew that they were spies sent by the friars to watch his movements. In the evening, Valensuela engaged Dr. Rizal in conversation, and endeavored to get him to commit himself to the ideas of independence. But Rizal told him that he did not believe in independence, that it was impossible for the natives, who could not even govern their own houses, to govern the country.

So the spy returned by the steamer to Manila. When next the mail came the governor, Dr. Ricardo Carnicero, told Rizal that Governor General Blanco had given him an appointment as a doctor in the Cuban army. When Rizal arrived at Manila he was detained aboard ship. Josephine was sent ashore. Rizal was taken aboard the *Isla de Panay*, which departed for Spain. After he left, Josephine was subjected to many indignities; her house was forcibly entered and searched, and some of her family and Rizal's friends were made prisoners. In Spain he was charged with conspiracy and sedition, and returned to Manila, a prisoner,



JOSÉ RIZAL THE EXECUTION OF DR. JOSÉ RIZAL
Patriot and Martyr At Manila, December 30, 1897



upon the *Cristobal Colon*. He was confined in the Santiago fort, where Josephine visited him and brought him food, but always in company of a guard. Rizal's cell was a small dark room with a door so low that he had to stoop to enter. He protested that he was not a conspirator against Spain. A court martial was then held at the governor's house, and Rizal was tried for treason. He argued that he should not be punished for the books he wrote, as they were not directed against the State, but that if he was guilty of offences against the government proof should be established. Aguinaldo had already begun the revolution, and an effort was made to show that Rizal was the instigator of it and a party to it, but proof could not be secured. Nevertheless, the judge ordered that Rizal be shot. Rizal told the governor that if he were shot, in less than ten years the Philippines would not belong to Spain. Josephine, who was present at the trial, announced that she would devote her life to the purpose of ending Spanish rule in the Island, and was ejected from the house. She begged her brother-in-law, Ponciento Rizal, to join the revolution; and that day he went to Imus and pledged himself to Aguinaldo.

The night before the execution Rizal sent

for Josephine. "I came to the palace and was conducted to an altar where I found him waiting," is the story the martyr's widow told me. "He said: 'Ah, dear, my time has come to be united to you but separated forever.' He begged me to forgive him the sorrow he had caused me, and told me that in the little cooking machine he had hidden a paper for me — the last message to his country. Then we parted forever, for the Spanish officers refused to let me talk with him again. I went home and put on a black dress and went to the place of execution on the Luneta, as he bade me. He saw me and moved his hand. The soldiers asked him where he wished to be shot, and he told them 'straight in the heart'; but they answered that it was impossible as he was a traitor. And Rizal replied, 'Shoot me in the back, then, as all cowards do.' Eight shots were fired, and he fell. Then another shot was fired as he lay prostrate on the ground. This was the 30th of December, 1896. I ran to him, but the Spaniards pushed me away. I followed Rizal to the cemetery, but they shut the gate in my face, and I cried out, 'Vive Filipinos and death to Spain.' After a week's time I tried again to go to Rizal's grave, but again the soldiers guarding it refused; and I told them that

A FILIPINO JOAN OF ARC 37

they might shoot me but I would go, and then they let me pass. On the 3d of January I left Manila on foot, and after three days and three nights travelling over the hills and through the jungle reached Imus. Every one allowed me to pass when I told them who I was, and when I arrived I met Aguinaldo and told him that I came to help him in the revolution. I took a rifle and went into the field and led a charge against the Spaniards in Zapote, killing one Spanish officer with my own rifle. It was Aguinaldo's fault that the Spanish then took Imus and drove us back. He was in a house disputing with his men when the attack was made, and quibbling over little matters of money. Then we fought at San Francisco de Malabon, and I took part in the engagements, but the Spanish drove us back thirty-two miles, and I had to swim the rivers and travel by foot. Then I was taken very ill with fever on account of passing days and nights without food and suffering the hardships of the march. As we were low in ammunition, and were unable to get word to Manila, I volunteered to undertake the journey, and arranged for a supply.

“My brother-in-law, Ponciento, who was in charge of the forces, objected to my taking the risk; but my will triumphed, and I left Talisay

on the 8th of April. I passed from town to town on foot, and every one welcomed and greeted me with honor when I told them I was the widow of Dr. Rizal. Several Spanish officers stopped me, but I gave them a few dollars and they let me pass. When I arrived in Manila, as I was the adopted daughter of an American, I went to the American Consul and sought his interest in our cause and his protection. He told me to report my presence to the governor general, and tell him the truth of the situation. I went directly to the governor, and he asked me if I had come for pardon. I told him that I had nothing to fear, and that I lived at Calle Escaraga, No. 3; he could find me there at any time. Every day the governor sent for me to question me, and set spies to watch my movements. Finally the governor banished me to Hong Kong and gave me \$200. My money soon disappeared. The Filipinos in Hong Kong neglected me and left me to starve, so I went into the Civil Hospital as a nurse."

The recital of Dr. Rizal's widow reveals two interesting facts: The influence of Rizal's teachings and martyrdom upon the revolution, and the absolute ingratitude of the Filipinos who ignored the claims of indebtedness to the faith-

ful girl, the wife of the most eminent factor in their aspirations, and a potent inspiration in the first battles waged against the Spanish. Josephine became embittered against the Insurgents and, having married again, became the centre of an influential circle in Manila who welcomed the sovereignty of the United States. She is now a teacher in the public schools.

III

THE revenge the clerical party took upon Rizal incensed the Filipinos everywhere. He was their idol and their teacher. His ignoble death, witnessed in triumph by the friars on a fête day, was the insult to their manhood and their cause that aroused the members of the Katipunan throughout the Archipelago to open revolt. Aguinaldo and Ponciento Rizal drove the Spaniards out of Rizal's native province, seized large quantities of provisions, arms, and munitions, and succeeded in holding possession of the larger part of Cavite province.

The vicious cruelty of the Spanish officials, the wholesale slaughter of "suspects," and the inhuman tortures practised upon prisoners and families of Insurgents, for a time daunted the spirit of the natives, and produced a quietus in affairs, and the new governor general's proclamation offering amnesty to all who would lay down arms was not without effect. Aguinaldo, however, moved his forces to the northward, and

REVOLT OF NORTH LUZON 41

enlisted the support of most of the Filipinos as far as Pampanga. The marauding bands of the discontents in adjacent provinces gradually joined his standard, and armed with spears, bolos, and what rifles they could plunder from the convents, almost the whole population of the north of Luzon formed a movement aimed at the priests and against the government. Friars were murdered or driven to the hills, property was razed to the ground. Victims were singled out among the friars who had inflicted tortures upon the natives, in the past, and revenge was wreaked with unsparing hatred. Spanish garrisons were attacked by overwhelming numbers of natives, and arms and ammunition seized, strongholds and public property confiscated and burned, and riot and incendiarism was rampant throughout Luzon.

No less vicious were the Spanish troops. Large detachments were sent out of Manila and routed the insurgents, bayoneting the prisoners and non-combatants, and murdering the population without regard to age or sex. The Spaniards pushed the Insurgents as far north as Nueve Ecija, and in the heaviest engagement of the insurrection, succeeded in temporarily repulsing Aguinaldo's forces. The Spanish general Nunez was carried off the field severely wounded.

At this juncture of affairs the rainy season interfered with further operations, and the Spaniards decided to resort to other methods. They found their force inadequate, and the loss of life and property enormous. They therefore decided upon different tactics in which they were counselled by the religious orders, who were enormous sufferers by the conflict.

A proclamation was issued by the captain general, Primo de Rivera, placing the entire Archipelago under martial law, forbidding all persons within rebellious districts to leave their towns without a military pass, and compelling all inhabitants having such passes to account for time spent during the possession of them. Every inhabitant was required to secure a *cédula personal*, or identification paper. The document also invested in the military officers the right to collect a fee for these certificates, and the result of the edict was that thousands of Filipinos joined the revolutionists to avoid taxation and be free to come and go. The revolutionary government promptly responded to the Rivera proclamation by an address to the Filipinos, calling upon the people to resist the Spanish soldiers, and exhaust them by guerilla warfare until their declining resources compelled a compromise. They argued that the Cubans had been success-

ful in this method of warfare, and stated that the former governor, Polavieja, had resigned because Spain could not send him the twenty thousand men asked for, that Spain's credit was exhausted abroad, and it must be but a matter of time when she would be forced to yield to their demands. These were: the expulsion of the friars and the return of land that they had occupied; parliamentary representation in the Cortes; freedom of the press; equality in treatment and in pay with the Spanish officials; abolition of the power to banish citizens; and legal equality of all people in civil and criminal proceedings.

Aguinaldo then issued a manifesto setting forth his first cry for independence and demanding the expulsion of the friars from the Islands.

Nothing decisive resulted toward the suspension of hostilities, although manifestoes followed in rapid succession. The insurgents were stubborn in their demands, and a harassing warfare was carried on in the provinces. Aguinaldo had made his headquarters in Biacnabató, a mountain retreat in the province of Bulacan, sixty miles from Manila. He exhorted the Katipunans to extend its membership in all parts of the Archipelago, and showed such ability as an

organizer that the Spanish officials began to cast about for a means of checking his power.

Pedro Alejandro Paterno, a Filipino half-caste of Manila, was singled out by Rivera to accomplish what Spanish arms were incapable of. Paterno is a rich Mestizo, a dilettante, litterateur and politician, a Filipino in blood and aspiration, a Chinaman in commercial instincts, and altogether a talented, ambitious man. He was well known to the Spanish government, having mediated between it and the Filipinos in previous troubles, and being awarded the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic for his services. Paterno visited Aguinaldo at Biacnabato, and was made his legal representative. A peace settlement was arranged, by which reforms were to be granted, arms and ammunition were to be turned over to the government, and Aguinaldo and the leaders of the rebellion were to leave the country until permitted by the governor general to return. One million dollars (Mexican) were to be paid the leaders, and sums amounting to over half a million were to be applied for pensions to persons and families suffering as a result of the war. In fact, according to the testimony of several of the leaders of the revolution, with whom I

have talked, Rivera promised to grant the following reforms:—

1. The expulsion, or, at least, the secularization of the religious orders and the inhibition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration.

2. A general amnesty for all rebels and guarantees for their personal security and from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests after returning to their homes.

3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration.

4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing.

5. Representation in the Spanish parliament.

6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects.

I sought among the archives at Manila, and among the prominent Filipinos conversant with the situation at the time, for a copy of the *Pacto de Biacnabató*, and was assured that a copy was obtainable, and that the *Pacto* existed; but my efforts were fruitless, for none was forthcoming. The authentic terms of peace, therefore, are missing, and in view of the rapid change of affairs are hardly essential to this narrative, although the document, if such a one was ever agreed upon, would be interesting, insomuch as

it would show to what extent it was violated by both sides.¹

¹ In Aguinaldo's True Version of the Philippine Revolution, published at Tarlac, September 23, 1899, of the Biacnabato treaty, he says:—

Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno came several times to Biacnabato to make propositions of peace which, after five months of lengthy deliberations, was concluded and signed on the 14th of December of the said year, 1897, on the following basis:—

Firstly. I was to be free to live abroad with the companions who were willing to follow me; and in Hong Kong, which I had decided on as a place of residence, the payment of \$800,000 indemnification money was to be made in three instalments, \$400,000 on receipt of all the arms that were in Biacnabato, \$200,000 when the number of arms delivered up should amount to 800, and the remaining \$200,000 on the total number of the same reaching 1000, when, as a thank offering, the Te Deum should be celebrated in the cathedral of Manila. The last two weeks of the month of February were fixed upon as the final term for the delivering up of the arms.

Secondly. The money was all to be delivered to me personally, and I was to settle without interference with my companions and the other revolutionists.

Thirdly. Before the Philippine revolutionists should evacuate Biacnabato, Captain General Don Primo de Rivera was to send me two Spanish generals who were to remain as hostages till I and my companions reached Hong Kong and the first instalment of the indemnification, that is, \$400,000 had been received.

Fourthly. It was also agreed to suppress the religious societies in the Islands, and that political and administrative autonomy should be established, although by request of General Primo de Rivera these latter conditions *were not put down in writing*, owing to his assertion that otherwise the treaty would be in too humiliating a form for the Spanish government, while on the other hand he guaranteed on his word as gentleman and officer the fulfilment of the same.

The government accepted the compact, whatever it was, and an agreement was signed by Rivera, and Paterno as mediator, stating that the peace protocol was approved by the government at Spain, and specifying the manner of paying over \$1,700,000; \$400,000 payable in Hong Kong to the leaders of the rebellion; \$400,000 to be paid on condition that the agreement was fulfilled, and the balance to be paid to the families of those who were not rebels in arms, but who suffered the evils of war; the entire sum to be paid when peace should have become an accomplished fact.


In December, 1897, Aguinaldo, Gregorio del Pilar, Vito Belarmino, Mariano Llaneros, Antonio Montenegro, and other leaders, forty-two in number, left their mountain retreat at Biac-

General Primo de Rivera paid the first instalment of \$400,000, while the two generals were still detained as hostages.

On our side we, the revolutionists, fulfilled the condition of delivering up the arms, the number of which exceeded one thousand, a fact that was known to everybody and published in the papers of Manila. But the captain general failed to carry out the rest of the conditions, namely, the payment of the other instalments, the suppression of the friars and the reforms agreed upon, although the Te Deum was sung. This caused great grief to me and my companions, grief which changed into despair on receiving the letter of Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, nephew of the captain general, and his private secretary, informing us that neither my companions nor I could ever return to Manila.

nabato, and embarked at Calumpit for Sual, and thence were transported to Hong Kong on a Spanish steamer in company with the governor general's nephews and a number of Spanish officers as hostages.

Peace, however, was of short duration. At Madrid the ecclesiastics brought their influence to bear upon the queen regent, and a number of priests were sent on from Madrid to be installed in places left vacant by the deaths of friars during the rebellion. General Primo de Rivera suspended the publication of the *Diario de Manila*, the Insurgent organ, and the Spanish soldiery took revenge upon the Filipinos now helpless in their power. It was at this point that the *Junta Patriotica* was formed at Hong Kong by the banished leaders. Riots soon broke out again, and the spirit of discontent spread over the Islands with renewed vigor. The Spanish volunteers were accused of the most heinous offences. Houses were raided and disturbances were daily occurrences in Manila. The disaffection spread to the southern islands; five thousand natives attacked Cebu, and a reign of terror prevailed. In Luzon the new rebellion grew with tremendous force. A spirit of revenge inspired the Filipinos, and incensed at what seemed the selling out of their liberties



THE EXILES OF '97
Departure of Aguinaldo and Filipino Chieftains from Calumpit for Hong Kong
December, 1897



by their former leaders, united with the fact that no reforms alleged to have been promised took effect, they pillaged and murdered with savage fury. A large portion of the steam railway was torn up, and the engines and trains seized for their purposes. The cable was cut at the different stations throughout the Islands, and the lighthouses destroyed. General Rivera had sent back to Spain seven regiments, and the force under his command was totally incapable of handling the situation. Priests were assassinated by the Insurgents and Spanish garrisons raided. Rivera was recalled, and General Basilio Augusti succeeded him as governor general of the Philippines. The reforms said to have been recommended by Rivera were shelved by Sagasta, who was under the domination of the friars; while Spain, in the throes of internal dissension, was incapable of either comprehending or coping with the situation in her colonies.

In the middle of the discord Paterno emerged, again ready to throw his influence upon the troubled waters in consideration of various propositions now boldly brought to light. Paterno, who set himself up as the arbiter of the destinies of the Filipinos, the Prince of Luzon, and the possessor of an estate rendering an income of \$25,000 a year, aspired to the title of the Duke

of Castile, and a seat in the Cortes to represent the Filipinos. In a letter that bristled with egotism and self-praise Paterno set forth his claims to one of the most ancient titles of Spain. In conclusion he enjoined upon his friends at court to amplify and enlarge upon his modest appraisal of his virtues; incidentally, in order, he claimed, to bring the value of the title to a full appreciation by his people, and thus proportionately exalt his own importance, he requested that the Spanish government should make him a free gift of \$1,000,000.

But Paterno counted without his host. Had his application gone across the water earlier, there is no telling what folly Spain might have committed to secure the peace of the Islands. In the shift of affairs that rapidly followed, the Philippines had no need of a representative in the Spanish Senate. When Rivera arrived in Spain he denied the alleged treaty of Biacnabato, and thus stripped the Insurgents of their last claim to the rights they had clamored and fought for. Rivera branded Paterno and the revolutionary leaders as liars and betrayers of their people.

If Aguinaldo needed an excuse to return to the Islands, the provocation was ample. However, Aguinaldo and his associates were plan-

ning to return to the Philippines long before the publication of Rivera's letter.

The second instalment of funds was not forthcoming, and Aguinaldo and a chosen few migrated to Singapore and lived incognito to escape the rigor of the Hong Kong courts, where the disgruntled forty-two leaders were suing each other and Aguinaldo for a division of the original \$400,000 paid over by Rivera's representatives as a price of peace. Aguinaldo set up a Junta at Singapore, and there, with the counsel of English sympathizers, plotted to return to his native country and again assume the rôle of head-man. Paterno in the meantime was using his influence to effect a new settlement with the Tagalogs. He still hoped for his reward, and sought to placate the revolutionists and restore in them confidence in Spain. His influence in Manila was not without effect, but in the interior the revolution was beyond his control, and his efforts were fruitless.

Though there had been spasmodic periods of peace during two years, battles were of daily occurrence and the hospitals were full. Prisoners were shot without trial, and Manila was under martial law. The Insurgent army was within ten miles of Manila, and was being

armed and drilled, daily increasing in numbers and efficiency. The rebels secured and captured arms, and in numbers exceeded the Spanish force a hundred to one. The native regiments deserted the colonial forces. The Spanish shot the Filipino prisoners before open graves, or incarcerated them in the black-hole dungeons in the walls of old Manila, so placed that with the rise of the tide they were drowned, and old men, women, and children were tortured. The only church permitted was the Roman Catholic, and its interference with the government, its intolerance, immorality, and despotism increased, maddening the natives and arousing them to violent activity, the more so because the officials and priests who were in authority used money, influence, and cunning to hold the half-caste element in Manila passive.

Spain's ascendancy in the Philippines was tottering before Dewey sailed into Manila Bay. Goaded into a revolution by the barbarities of Spanish priests and colonial officials, encouraged by the success of the Cuban revolution and beginning to realize the power of armed organization and superiority of numbers, the natives, half-castes, and Filipinos throughout the Archipelago were united in their determina-

tion to crush the clergy and overthrow the priest-ridden government. Success had rewarded their efforts in many parts of the provinces, and Manila and the garrisoned cities of the coast were the goals they aspired to reach.

IV

THE Filipinos were following on the heels of their Cuban brothers. The corrupt officialdom of Spain aroused the natives of Cuba to resistance. The same Weyler and the same Blanco who terrorized Cuba had contributed to the seeds of discontent in the Philippines. While Maximo Gomez and Calixto Garcia were disputing with Spain the possession of her western colony, Aguinaldo and his associates were fomenting revolution in her eastern possessions.

But the wrongs of the Cubans were thrown into the lime-light of publicity by our "sensational" newspapers, and the American public demanded intervention. Having no such powerful neighbor, the Filipinos were attempting the struggle single-handed.

Our war with Spain was for the avowed purpose of putting an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries in Cuba, to restore peace and a stable government, and

to terminate the intolerable conditions that disturbed our commercial relations with the Island, and made property unsafe, and filibustering expeditions a constant source of annoyance to the United States. By private contributions several hundreds of thousands of dollars had already been sent to the relief of starving *reconcentrados*. Spain was unable to subjugate the natives, and the Cubans were unequal to the task of crushing out the power of Spain. The destruction of the battleship, *Maine*, in the harbor of Havana on the night of February 15, 1898, from exterior explosion, aroused the American people to a state of frenzy, and produced a universal demand for intervention. A declaration of war followed.

On April 20, upon recommendation of President McKinley, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring the independence of Cuba, and demanding that Spain withdraw her land and naval forces from the Island. The resolution further disclaimed any intention on the part of the United States to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the Island, except during the period required for pacification and restoration of order.

Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic squadron, was at Hong Kong, thanks

to the foresight of Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, who ordered him to proceed to the Philippine Islands, and destroy the Spanish fleet assembled in Manila Bay. On the 1st of May, Dewey electrified the country by annihilating the entire Spanish fleet of eleven ships and destroying the land batteries of Corregidor and Cavite. The victory was one of the most sensational episodes in American history. The people went wild with enthusiasm. Dewey's name was upon every lip, and a cry for the retention of the Philippines went up from Sandy Hook to the Golden Gate.

Thus, with hardly a moment's warning, an American fleet of whose existence the public little knew, wiped out the power of Spain in the Orient, and opened to the American vision a new era of territorial and commercial possibilities.

The enthusiasm that inspired every American at home was felt tenfold by those in foreign parts. America had in the twinkling of an eye become a world power. Our navy instantly commanded the respect of every foreign power, and was the idol of the people at home.

Great activity among our officials on the Asiatic coast followed Dewey's sweeping victory. The American consuls at Singapore,

Hong Kong, and Manila, fully conversant with the situation in the Philippine Islands, sharing the public's zeal, and imbued with the spirit that caused the war, quickly realized the value of establishing friendly relations with the Insurgents, who, like the Cubans, had driven the Spaniards to their citadels and forts.

The banished Insurgent chieftains in Hong Kong clamored for an opportunity to return to the Philippines. The balance of the sum promised upon their deportation had not been paid.

Ever since their arrival in Hong Kong the air had been thick with plots. Neither Aguinaldo nor any of the Insurgents kept faith with their promises to the Spanish officials. Hardly had they become settled in the English colony before they began to communicate with the former leaders of the insurrection in Manila. Buencamino was one of the chief agitators, and no sooner was the \$400,000 placed in the bank, than negotiations were opened with dealers in arms and ammunition, and filibustering expeditions were attempted.

The rumors of the possibility of a war between the United States and Spain reached Hong Kong, and the Junta began to besiege the consul general (Rounsevelle Wildman) and other

Americans in the colony, begging them to use their influence to prosecute the war and to allow them to return, in such an event, to Manila in an American ship.

When the American squadron anchored in Mirs Bay, preparatory to its departure for Manila, wealthy Mestizo refugees offered to put up large sums of money to defray the cost of purchasing arms and ammunition if the consul would intervene for them and secure the admiral's permission for them to accompany the fleet. Mr. Wildman conferred with Admiral Dewey, and it was arranged to allow two of their number to return to Manila with the American fleet.

The refugee chieftains assembled in the American consulate to discuss with Mr. Wildman and Admiral Dewey's flag-lieutenant, Mr. Brumby. Sandico was the spokesman for the Filipinos. They were anxious to go to the Philippines, and yet they feared the wrath of their own people, many of whom looked upon them as bribe-takers. Lieutenant Brumby assured them that they would be protected by the American fleet. He pointed out to them that time, arms, and ammunition would be given them to further their aims. Mr. Brumby, in the enthusiasm of the moment, fired their ambitions

perhaps more than he intended, and Mr. Wildman made it plain to them that they could make no mistake in fighting the Spaniards with the encouragement, protection, and consent of the American authorities. So Theodoro Sandico, José Maria Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialeita, Andres E. de Garchitorea, Manuel Malabar, Mariano Llanza, and Salvatore Estrella bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized warfare and place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey, if they were permitted to return to Manila.

On the evening of the 27th of April, Mr. Wildman took on the tug *Fame* Alejandrino and Garchitorea, accompanied by Sandico, to the *Olympia* in Mirs Bay. When the little fellows scampered aboard they began to lose heart and make excuses. Alejandrino wanted to go ashore to get a fresh supply of clean collars, and Garchitorea suddenly remembered that he had left his duck suits behind, or excuses of an equally trifling nature.

The truth was that they were doubtful of their reception among their countrymen. Consul Wildman assured them that they would be under the guns of the American fleet, and some of the officers would lend them clean linen, so they plucked up courage and decided to go.

The arrangements having been completed, they prepared and sent over to Cavite by an English mail steamer a manifesto which reached the hands of some of the faithful and was distributed over the Islands. The Junta took it for granted that our intentions toward Cuba applied also to the Philippines, and they therefore wrote to their compatriots that divine providence was about to place independence within their reach, and that the Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, would extend their protecting mantle over their country. They urged the Insurgents not to be induced to fire upon the Americans, but, rather, to blow their own brains out than to fire a shot or treat as enemies those who are liberators, and assured them that they would probably have more than sufficient arms; because the Americans had arms and would find means to assist them.

When Alejandrino and Garchitorea were set ashore at Cavite by Admiral Dewey, they immediately made a tour of the provinces, and called upon the Insurgent leaders. They were accompanied by two American naval officers. The object of the trip was to prepare the revolutionists for Aguinaldo's return to Cavite. There

still existed a feeling of uncertainty about Aguinaldo's disinterestedness of purpose, but the assurance of his couriers that he had acted in good faith and had carried out his part of the Biacnabato treaty, that he had not used the \$400,000 in the Hong Kong bank, which he would devote to the Insurgent cause, and that he would return under the protection and with the coöperation of the Americans, reëstablished confidence in the minds of the Insurgents, who prepared for his coming.

While this drama was being enacted, Aguinaldo was not idle in Singapore. He secured an interview with Consul General Pratt, and requested permission to accompany Dewey to Manila. Mr. Pratt cabled Mr. Wildman, who conferred with Admiral Dewey, and Aguinaldo was requested to come to Hong Kong as soon as possible.

Although we were not thinking much about what Aguinaldo's policy was, being too much occupied with our own, he evidently had one all cut and dried, if the *Singapore Free Press* of May 4th, is to be believed. That paper said that Aguinaldo's policy embraced the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be

desirable temporarily on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. Other features were the reform of the present corrupt jurisdiction and freedom of the press, right of public meeting, religious toleration and the expulsion of tyrannical religious fraternities, the development of national resources, roads, and railways, and all Spanish officials removed and returned to Spain.

This was certainly sweeping, and had Aguinaldo himself made the avowal, it is doubtful if he would have gone back to Manila on an American warship. I doubt, however, if Aguinaldo ever dictated such a document. The scheme of government was probably the production of a white man's brain — one of those early "friends" of Aguinaldo's who did his thinking and writing for him, and dreamed of profit and power should Aguinaldo become the head of a Filipino Republic.

Then, and as long as the funds held out, there gathered around Aguinaldo and the Hong Kong Junta a swarm of adventurers, press agents, and sycophants, who kept the associated press

and the magazines full of Aguinaldo literature. These refugees and adventurers were so extravagant and profligate, that in the end they discredited the cause they were hired to champion; and the colonial government, Consul General Wildman, and the police of Hong Kong made it so hot for them that they were forced to change their base of operations, and go to Shanghai, Macao, Amoy, or wherever they could operate. The story of the operations and ramifications of this gang of Insurgent hangers-on will never be fully appreciated or written. Had General Otis heeded the advice of the consuls and other Americans, long resident in the Orient, and recommended or taken official cognizance of their existence and operations, the entire gang could easily have been put to flight.

Every colonial governor in Asia would have gladly responded to an official request for the apprehension and banishment of one or more of these indefatigable enemies of American interests in the Philippines, but the request was not officially made. Strict watch was kept on the operations of the revolutionary Junta, and many interesting facts were developed, though it would accomplish no purpose to expose the names of these adventurers who aided the Filipinos after the outbreak of hostilities. They are fortunately

well known in China, and even now their operations are watched. I regret to say that three of their number were American citizens.

When funds ran low there was nothing to which they would not stoop to raise the necessary cash to support their profligacy and vices.

Upon one occasion one of their number came to me. "I am an American citizen," he said, "and I have had occasion in my business — I am an insurance agent — to meet some of the members of the Filipino Junta. I know something of their intentions, and would like to have a confidential talk with you."

I readily consented to the conference, and met him in his room in the hotel. He opened his satchel, taking out some advertisements for an insurance company upon which were printed his name.

"Oh, never mind identifying yourself," I said, "for I know who you are." I knew better than he thought.

He looked at me quizzically and continued:—

"The Junta here is trying to ruin the reputation of Consul General Wildman. They propose to bring suit against him for the money placed in his hands by Aguinaldo. Now I hate to see anything like this happen. It would create a big sensation in America, and would ruin the

consul and disgrace the country. From my talk with members of the Junta I think I know a way to avoid the scandal. If the consul will divide up now with the agents of the Junta here, they will use their influence with Aguinaldo to have the whole thing hushed up. I am not in any way connected with them, but these facts coming into my possession, I thought I would just warn you. Being a good American, I would not like to see Mr. Wildman disgraced."

I thanked my generous informer, and asked him if he would think it an impertinence if I should return the compliment and warn him that, for an American citizen to be seen in the company of and associating with the enemies of the United States, was commonly considered treason. I then bade him good day. A short time afterward he took passage on an English ship for Manila, registering under an assumed name. The cable, however, travels faster than China sea boats and Consul General Wildman informed General Otis of his embarkation. General Otis promptly had him met with an escort, and upon his person were found official letters to Aguinaldo. After some months in Bilibid prison he was returned to America in a transport. The rest of the gang were more fortunate.

But I am anticipating my narrative.

To properly understand the activity of the American consuls and the action of Admiral Dewey in encouraging the Filipino revolutionists, it must be remembered that in April, 1898, the idea that American sovereignty would ever exist in the Philippines was hardly in the minds of the most imaginative. That we would ever hold Manila was anticipating American policy. Englishmen in Hong Kong and Singapore said that we must hold the Philippines. Aguinaldo was alarmed lest we should not take the Islands. Before leaving Singapore he stated to Mr. Pratt that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow its inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which the Filipinos would desire American advice and assistance. Even this possibility was scouted. Dewey himself did not anticipate such a policy. Nevertheless, he saw the desirability of a coöperating land force, in case the bombardment of Manila and the occupation of the city should be a military necessary.

We were not at war with the natives. On the other hand, we sympathized with them at that time. We received them on friendly terms. We were fighting for them in Cuba. Why not

in the Philippines? They impressed us favorably. "They were more capable of self-government than the Cubans," said Dewey.

Whatever our subsequent experience taught us, let us be honest with our point of view in 1898. We used the Filipinos to further our ends, to help drag our chestnuts out of the fire. Admiral Dewey publicly admits it, and we all know it to be a fact. The expediency of war demanded it, and the country echoed the praises of Dewey and Wildman for making Aguinaldo and the Filipinos our friends. What the expediences of war demanded subsequently is another thing. The wisdom of the policy in April, 1898, is beyond cavil — the one thing that gave us the Philippines. Had Consul Wildman, Consul Pratt, and Admiral Dewey remained dumb to the entreaties of the banished Insurgent chieftains and Aguinaldo, they would have been weaned back by Spain, and the American flag would not be floating over the Philippines to-day; for we should not have attempted to fight Spain on Philippine soil had the Filipinos joined forces with their former masters. The destruction of Cervera's fleet at Santiago relieved us of such a necessity, and Spain would not have sold out so willingly could she have relied upon the coöperation of the Insurgents. The

sacrifice of the Philippines would not have been demanded. Let us not blind ourselves to this historical incident and forget the service of the men to whom we owe the existence of the American flag in the Orient. These men saw farther ahead, perhaps, than the wiseacres at Washington.

V

A WEEK after the American fleet left Mirs Bay, Aguinaldo and suite returned from Singapore to Hong Kong under assumed names. Aside from the most trusted members of the Junta, not even the banished chieftains were permitted to know his hiding-place, which was in a section of Hong Kong known as Wild Dell, where rooms in a secluded house occupied largely by poor Portuguese and Chinese were set aside for him. His meals were served in his room, and he went abroad only at night. Aguinaldo had good reason for his secrecy. The suit of Artachio, his Ilocan rival, was still pending in the Hong Kong courts, and Artachio hated Aguinaldo as a Malay hates. It is a kind of animosity that among natives ultimately culminates in a bolo thrust. Aguinaldo, therefore, desired to keep out of Artachio's way.

Besides, it was a critical moment for Aguinaldo. Much squabbling was going on among

the chieftains. Nothing had yet been heard from Alejandrino, and the refugees were uneasy. They, too, were at variance over questions of chiefship. Discussions also arose as to what course they would pursue when they were once more reinstated as leaders of the insurrection. Some favored applying to the Americans for annexation; others were outspoken for independence, and shrewdly advocated turning the assistance of the United States to their advantage. All these facts were unknown to us at the time, but the capture of their correspondence subsequently revealed that their motives were quite as undetermined and unsettled as ours. They were waiting to see which way the wind blew. Aguinaldo was unpopular with some of the chieftains because of his departure from Singapore. He was even accused of intending to desert them and go to Europe and with the prize-money live in luxury, his signature alone being good at the Hong Kong bank. Furthermore, he had held the purse-strings so tight that the refugee leaders had been denied the fruits of their banishment. They had been compelled to live in cheap Portuguese boarding-houses, and their pocket-money had been so restricted that it was with difficulty that they were even able to raise cigarette money,—a

really critical situation among Filipinos, who are inveterate cigarette smokers.

The effect of Aguinaldo's financial policy was that his compatriots chafed under the restraint, and considerable opposition was offered to a continuance of his leadership. Artachio was a hereditary chieftain of the province of Ilocos, and one of the most powerful men in the first revolution. He was a diplomat, cunning, and reputed to be honest and fearless. Had he won his suit, Aguinaldo's leadership would have ended, at least for a time.

Both factions told their troubles to Mr. Wildman and sought his interference and assistance, daily assembling outside the consulate or accosting him in the streets. Finally, Mr. Wildman told them that he would not be a party to their squabbles. That they must retire and decide the matter among themselves, away from the consulate. This they eventually did, and Aguinaldo triumphed over Isabello Artachio.

Theodoro Sandico was the spokesman and go-between of the refugees. He could speak English fluently, and it gave him tremendous prestige with the Filipinos. After the vote was taken and the question decided, Mr. Wildman asked Sandico how it had happened that Aguinaldo was chosen. Sandico replied that Agui-

naldo led a charmed life. Because of this fact the chieftains decided that he was the man best able to control the people, who looked upon him as a demigod.

When this all-important question was determined, Artachio accepted the inevitable, and Aguinaldo ventured from his hiding-place and called upon Mr. Wildman. He told the Consul that he was anxious to become an American citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowed to return to the Philippines and place himself under the orders of Admiral Dewey. He related the story of the tyranny of the friars, and expressed his desire to fight until his people were free from oppression. He made no demands for independence, but said he hoped the Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but would annex the Philippines and protect them against the Spanish. He promised Mr. Wildman that he would fight with the Americans and not attempt to foment a revolution against the United States. His highest expressed aim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and that once accomplished, he would abide by the decision of the United States as to the ultimate disposition of the Philippines. In fact, several of the leading members of the Junta, including Sandico and several wealthy refugee families,

actually signed a petition to become naturalized citizens, and presented the same to Mr. Wildman.

Had Aguinaldo evinced in his conversation any intention of resisting the United States forces, or dictating terms to Admiral Dewey, does any sane man imagine that he would have been allowed to return to the Philippines on an American warship?

Consul General Wildman's acquaintance with Aguinaldo was limited to interpreted interviews. He accepted him in good faith. A subsequent knowledge of the Filipino's acts revealed some characteristics in his make-up which, if the American had foreseen, would have weakened Mr. Wildman's trust in Aguinaldo's promises.

Anxious to aid Admiral Dewey and strengthen our military position in the Philippines, Mr. Wildman took Aguinaldo and his aide, Pio del Pilar, in company with Sandico, and put them aboard the despatch boat *McCulloch*.

On this trip an incident occurred, which, though insignificant in itself, is important in its bearing on the study of Malay character. For any attempt to penetrate into the central meaning of the Filipino movement, at least in the form which has confronted the United States, will be impossible until one understands the peculiar cock-sparrow vanity, the ineffable toy

dignity, of the strange little, grave little brown man, whose character was the hinge on which the door of the revolution swung.

Better, perhaps, than anything of record is the conceit of Aguinaldo, illustrated in the incident that occurred on this occasion. It is hardly just to call this a fault in him. It is not a thing to be criticised or condemned, but it is a fact to be seen and understood simply as a fact. The explanation of this curious vanity is that Aguinaldo is a Malay.

Mr. Wildman realized keenly the responsibility of his undertaking, and saw that great care was taken to insure secrecy. It was quite possible that the governor of Hong Kong would interfere to prevent a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. So the Consul General solemnly warned Aguinaldo and his friend to disguise themselves in the most humble attire, and to give no hint of their going to any one, and to go to the wharf where the consular tug would meet them at midnight. He also instructed them to be as inconspicuous as possible, and to do nothing to attract the attention of the police or of persons who might be in the neighborhood.

The test was too great for Aguinaldo's character. When Mr. Wildman reached the wharf at midnight, to his horror he saw Aguinaldo ac-

accompanied by his friends with enormous Filipino hats on their heads, strutting majestically up and down with an air of solemn greatness that was fully explained by the gorgeous republican cockades set in their hat gear. The Consul General was panic-stricken. Whisking the monstrous hats from the heads of the astonished Filipino generals, he hustled them on board with sharp words of indignation.

Presently the tug swished its way out into the darkness beyond the soft shimmer of the harbor waters. It was a dull night, with soft dark blurs across the sky. Aguinaldo and Pio del Pilar sat on a bench on the forward deck beside the Consul General and Mrs. Wildman, who was interested in the adventure and accompanied the party. There was little speech. The lateness of the hour, the all-pervading darkness, the mysterious nature of the Malays, the desperate importance of the mission to Admiral Dewey, the intense interest in the events that were about to happen but could not as yet be even guessed at, — all these suppressed speech. Suddenly Mrs. Wildman gave a little startled exclamation and held her hand up to the Consul General. A large diamond had disappeared from her ring. Mr. Wildman became excited. Mrs. Wildman was very much aroused. Even

General Pio del Pilar took a languid, far-away sort of interest in the matter; but Aguinaldo remained unmoved. He looked neither to the right nor the left. His face was like a saffron mask. The Consul General's wife had lost a costly jewel, and lost it while rendering service and extending courtesies to the Filipino leader. But the matter was beneath the elevated contemplation of Aguinaldo. His eyes were fixed upon the dim stars, not upon mere material baubles. The Consul General and his wife got down upon their knees on the deck, lit matches and carefully searched for the lost diamond. Yielding to the sharp expostulations of Mr. Wildman, General Pio del Pilar condescended to take part in the hunt for the missing gem. But Aguinaldo! He had not moved an inch. He had not even lowered his eyes.

"Now see here, Pio del Pilar," said the Consul General, indignantly, "I think that the least Aguinaldo could do would be to make an attempt to help us. He doesn't even seem to be interested."

Pio del Pilar stood up. It was only thus that the little great man could be addressed. He translated what the Consul General had said. Not a muscle in Aguinaldo's face moved. He threw his chest out a little more, and cocked his

head with a little more dignity. If there was a struggle going on in his mind between his vanity and his sense of gratitude and obligations, he gave no sign of it. Then he spoke, in slow, icy tones, like a chancellor delivering an opinion :

“Ask Mr. Wildman what the value of this diamond is,” he said haughtily, without even looking at Pio del Pilar.

“Oh, no, that won’t do at all,” said Mr. Wildman. “Tell Aguinaldo that I think the least he can do is to get down here on his knees and be a good fellow.”

The little leader grew more dignified every moment. His manner was lordly. He still looked at the sky.

“Tell me how much the diamond is worth,” he said, as though he were addressing something in the air.

“Three thousand five hundred dollars,” replied Mr. Wildman, thinking to arouse his interest by placing the value high.

Aguinaldo folded his arms across his chest, elevated his chin, and spoke portentously :—

“If the diamond is not found, General Pilar,” he said calmly, “see that \$3500 is paid to Mrs. Wildman.”

Not another reference did Aguinaldo make to the diamond. The fact that the stone was

found before the launch reached Mirs Bay did not evoke a congratulatory word.

This characteristic incident explains the peculiarity of Aguinaldo's character, which baffled all attempts to interest him in considerations of compromises of all kinds. He is the sort of a man who does not search for things on his knees. The slights that General Otis and others gave him afterward simply intensified his purpose to press on the revolution. This exaltation of conceit buoyed him up in the assurance of success.

But most of us misunderstood the character of the Malays, and in the end perhaps it is as well that we did. Had we been acquainted with their misdeveloped natures, their cunning deception and unreasonableness or lack of reasonableness, our eyes would have been blinded to their better qualities and their possibilities. So our ignorance of their character and their ignorance of ours gave grounds for the misunderstandings that quickly followed the establishment of Aguinaldo in his patria.

At any rate, we were not out in the Pacific to study the character of the Malay. We were there to punish a degenerate nation for maltreating and oppressing a population of natives, not dissimilar in traits and character to the

Filipinos. The object of Admiral Dewey was purely naval, and war existed. An enemy had to be dealt with.¹

The position taken by Consuls Wildman, Williams, and Pratt was that the Philippines, like Cuba, were dominated by the revolutionary forces; the natives were ripe for conquest, plunder, and loot, and the arrival of the American fleet and the destruction of Spanish power would lay the city of Manila and the entire Spanish population in the power of the revolutionists. It would take time for us to assemble an army in the Philippines. Our fleet might destroy Manila, but it could not occupy it. Burning for revenge, incensed by the cruelties of the Spaniards, and bearing a deadly hatred toward the religious orders, thousands of armed Insurgents were ready to pour into Manila and wreak a vengeance that would have turned the victory of Dewey into a curse. In Aguinaldo and the banished leaders of the revolution, Consuls Pratt and Wildman and Admiral Dewey realized a power that would hold the revolutionists within the bounds of civilized warfare.

Had we not arranged with Aguinaldo to cooperate with us, he would have returned to the Islands of his own accord, and undertaken inde-

¹ See Appendix.

pendent operations, which might have caused us serious embarrassment at the time. Admiral Dewey and Consuls Wildman and Williams believed that the Insurgent leaders were a necessary factor, and that if Aguinaldo were placed in command, and should prove acceptable to the Insurgents as their leader, the American commander would have as an effective ally some one whom he could hold responsible for any excesses. The other alternative was to allow the entire Islands to be overrun by small bands bent upon revenge and looting.

On May 19, 1898, Aguinaldo and his staff arrived at Cavite aboard the *McCulloch*. Admiral Dewey received him aboard the *Olympia*, after which he was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army, for the avowed purpose of strengthening the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy.

On January 31, 1900, a letter was published in an American paper, signed by Aguinaldo, claiming that Admiral Dewey made specific promises to him upon this occasion. An attempt was made to read this letter in the Senate, which caused the admiral to write a letter, in which he said: "The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, so far as it relates to me, is a tissue of falsehoods. I never promised him,

directly or indirectly, independence for Filipinos. I never treated him as an ally, except so far as to make use of him and his soldiers to assist me in my operations against Spain. He never uttered the word 'independence' in any conversation with me or my officers. The statement that I received him with military honors, or that I saluted the flag, is absolutely false."

I called on Admiral Dewey in Washington, in January, 1900, personally to interview him on this subject. The admiral said: "When Aguinaldo came to Cavite he never thought of independence. That was an idea that came into his head later. His one desire was to be allowed to fight, that he might destroy the power of the friars. I allowed him to go ashore, but he was very uncertain as to the kind of a reception he would get. He was so timid that I had to urge him to remain after he got there. The assertion that I made Aguinaldo any promises is a pure fabrication. Why, at that time, Aguinaldo never thought of asking, much less demanding, promises, or presuming to dictate terms of any kind. He is not a smart fellow in a general sense, but the shrewd half-castes in Manila made use of him to further their ambitious schemes, for Aguinaldo was

supposed to bear a charmed life. The natives believed that he possessed the power of the *Anting-Anting*, that he was impervious to a bullet. Gonzaga, a little fellow who worked on the railroad, used to paddle down the bay in a banco at night and tell me about the movements of the Insurgents. They had a large force, but not many arms. If we could have had five thousand men there early enough, there would not have been any trouble — we could have controlled them absolutely. The unfortunate part of the whole situation was that the importance of Aguinaldo at that time was enormously magnified, and he soon realized it. His advisors, Mabini and his associates, were also quick to understand and take advantage of it. I have seen Mabini's statement that I asked Aguinaldo if he could control the Island, in which case I offered to arm his forces. I never asked him any question of the kind, nor made him offers and promises. Most of Mabini's assertions are absolutely false, and what truth he writes is misleading."

Previous to Aguinaldo's arrival, Major Gonzales, the Insurgent leader of Cavite, reported to Consul Williams and Admiral Dewey that the Insurgent army consisted of thirty-seven thousand troops surrounding Manila. They

possessed thousands of rifles taken from the Spaniards, and asserted that having destroyed the railroad and cut off all sources of supply by land, they could soon starve Manila into surrender.

A member of the revolutionary cabinet visited Consul Williams and assured him that the natives would cheerfully follow our flag, but no one asked them to ally themselves with us. We were not contemplating the responsibility of taking over the Philippines. The naval victory was won. Spain was shaking in her shoes, anxious but not daring to surrender because of a political split in the Empire. Aguinaldo and the Insurgents of the Philippines played a small part in our calculations.

In their little world, however, important matters were going on, and great events were shaping their course. Aguinaldo did not lose a minute. He established himself at Cavite, in quarters under the protection of the guns of our fleet, and began to organize his bare-footed army. He turned loose upon Cavite, looted the city, burned many of the buildings, established a cartridge factory, and began the manufacture of ammunition on a large scale. He took possession of many stacks of arms found in the Spanish arsenal, and organized and drilled his

forces with an agility that would do credit to a commander educated in West Point. The revolutionists accepted him as their supreme leader, and obeyed his orders without a murmur.

A number of native regiments, equipped with five thousand Mausers by Spain, mutinied and placed themselves under his command. With this effective army he drove the Spanish out of the Cavite province and captured five thousand prisoners, eight thousand Mauser rifles, and two Maxim guns. On May 24, Consul Williams executed a power of attorney from Aguinaldo to his representatives in Hong Kong to pay for three thousand stand of arms bought there and landed at Cavite. Thousands of Filipinos flocked to Cavite and enlisted in Aguinaldo's army.

Manila was in a desperate state of siege, Admiral Dewey's squadron maintaining a strict blockade, and the Insurgents pressing upon it from all sides on the land. The Spaniards carefully planned a *coup*, and secretly sent emissaries to Aguinaldo with propositions, compromises, and pledges. A Consulting Assembly was formed, made up of prominent Manila Filipinos, and Señor Paterno addressed a manifesto to the Filipinos. He asserted that Spain was their true friend, and that America only

sought their aid ultimately to absorb them and make them slaves under the evils of a new colonization. "Let us help our old ally, our old friend, Spain," Paterno said, "and realize with her more quickly our aspirations. Under Spain our future is clear. Under American rule our future is cloudy; we shall certainly be sold and lose our unity; some provinces will become English, others German, others French, others Russian, or Chinese. Let us struggle, therefore, side by side with Spain, we who love the Philippines, united and free."

The archbishop also issued a pastoral letter telling the natives that to turn the country over to foreigners would be to lose all the ends they cherished. He warned them that their altars would be desecrated, their churches would become temples of heresy, and that vice would become rampant. Aguinaldo promptly issued a decree to the Filipinos forbidding them to take any part in the proposed Consulting Assembly, and warning them that any Filipino associating himself with or assisting the Spaniards would be considered a traitor to his country, and be hung by the neck in a public place for a period of two hours, with a label attached identifying the body and bearing the statement that he was a traitor to his country.

To Paterno's appeal the revolutionists responded by denouncing him and warning the Filipinos to beware of Spanish duplicity. The outrages committed by the friars were cited at length, and the whole period of grievances was gone over with great detail. Paterno's claims of personal sacrifices were ridiculed. His decoration of the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic was pointed to as a convincing argument against his patriotism, and his entire connection with the Biacnabato treaty was called a bungling affair. "But remember, Señor Paterno," the document continues, "we make war without the help of any one, not even the North Americans; but no! we have the help of God, who is the eternal ally of the great and just causes such as that which we defend against Spain—our beloved independence!!!" The manifesto then called Paterno's attention to the fact that the revolutionists were aware of the Monroe Doctrine, "which prohibits the absorption of territory outside of America."

On the 12th of June, 1898, Aguinaldo called together a council of state and organized a formal government. American officials were invited to attend, but refused to do so, lest their presence should be a tacit recognition of the revolutionary government. Aguinaldo visited

Consul Williams, after the formation of his government, and told him that all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America. He then issued a proclamation in which he called upon Filipinos to restrain themselves from any act that would sacrifice the high conception of them formed by the American nation, such as pillage, robbery, and every kind of outrage against persons or property. The lives and property of foreigners, those of the enemy who shall surrender their arms, and medical establishments, persons, and effects connected therewith, shall be respected, said Aguinaldo. He proclaimed himself dictator and president of the Philippine revolutionary government, and commander-in-chief of its army; and on June 18 issued a decree in which he said he was called upon to assume the rôle of Dictator, and in the face of the whole world proclaimed that the aspiration of his life was independence, because independence meant redemption from slavery and tyranny, recovery of lost liberty, and admission to the concert of civilized nations. The decree instructed the inhabitants of each town to overthrow the Spanish power, and treat all prisoners with humanity in accordance with the practices of civilized nations. Then Aguinaldo ordered

an election of "headmen." The military chiefs of each province were instructed not to take part in the administration, but to form a civil government with a military auxiliary dominant only when menaced by an enemy.

On the 23d of June, 1898, Aguinaldo issued a sweeping document aimed to abolish the inveterate vices of the Spanish administration, and substituting a more simple and expeditious system of public administration. A consultation of the revolutionary government was outlined, "to prepare the country for the establishment of a real republic." A cabinet consisting of four secretaryships was created: 1st, Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Trade; 2d, War and Public Works; 3d, Police, Public Order, Justice, Education, and Health; 4th, Finance, Agriculture, and Manufactures. The constitution contained thirty-three Articles relating to various functions, penalties, and regulations to govern the army and the inhabitants.

These and previous proclamations were sent by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey, who transmitted them to Washington. Accompanying the declarations of the revolutionary government was a request from Aguinaldo that Admiral Dewey would send copies also to the British Consul, for distribution to all foreign

powers. Admiral Dewey was aware of Aguinaldo's receipt of three thousand rifles and a great amount of ammunition, which the Insurgents had bought in Hong Kong, but he treated the Insurgents as friends, opposed to a common enemy. Dewey kept advised of Aguinaldo's progress, and allowed him to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Admiral Dewey advised him to conduct the war humanely, but did not consider that the United States had been bound in any way to assist the Insurgents by any act or promises, or that Aguinaldo was committed to assist us.

On June 23 Aguinaldo issued his first message to the Philippine revolutionists. In it he proclaimed that the Philippine people were justified in resorting to violent means to recover sovereignty naturally theirs. Citing the fact that the Spanish constitution of 1812 gave the Islands representation in the Spanish parliament, Aguinaldo asserted that through the conspiracy of monastic orders their rights were abolished. The Filipinos therefore protested, and revolt was followed by open revolution. Filipino presentations were scoffed at by the friars, and the only course left was to resist by

force. "Now, however, Filipinos ask, not for assimilation, with the Spanish constitution, but for independence," said Aguinaldo; "nothing else could be expected from a country which has proved by its long-suffering and courage in tribulation and danger, and industry and studiousness in peace, that it is not made for slavery. . . . The country has energy and resources sufficient to free itself from ruin and abasement into which the Spanish government has thrown it, and to claim a modest, though worthy, place in the concert of free nations."

It is hardly necessary to read between the lines of the Aguinaldo-Mabini manifestoes, documents, and proclamations, to understand the ambition that had taken form or was already crystallized in the minds of the revolutionists. An article published in a British colonial newspaper, which frequently gave its space to articles and editorials expressing views from Filipino standpoints, casts a little light upon the attitude taken by the revolutionists. The article was written by a man close in the confidence, if not the pay, of the Filipino Junta at Hong Kong. Under date of June 8, the writer says: "America has not yet conquered the Philippines — not by a long way — but will occupy them with the assistance and good-will

of the Filipinos. Without the good-will and assistance of the inhabitants I must beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other nation could ever hope to take the Philippines, except with an army of two hundred thousand or more. . . . When the time comes I am inclined to think the inhabitants will have their say in this question, especially after the events of May 30 to June 1, last. . . . Let those who are greedy for a slice of the Archipelago ponder well . . . before burning their fingers . . . the only possible solution of the Philippine question is an independent government, under American protection, and this is the policy I recommend General Aguinaldo and his compatriots to accept, and which will no doubt be carried out."

VI

IT became evident to apparently every one but those it most affected, as is frequently the case, that there were some very smart men in the Aguinaldo crowd. Aguinaldo is smart; but the sort of smartness that was arguing us out of our position, placing before us legal barriers based upon international law, producing scholarly though flowery manifestoes, and presenting a scheme of government, a constitution, and a code of procedure, was not the kind of smartness we expected of Aguinaldo. These things increased and grew in volume, and the country was flooded with pamphlets and posters issued from the Filipino press. We were astonished. The Tagalogs swelled with pride and admiration for their own leaders.

It was a long time before we were undeceived. I don't think this generation of the Filipinos ever will be. The solution of the wonder gradually unfolded itself. There was a syndicate at work. Aguinaldo y Famy, the individual, we

knew. He was not a personage whose mind ran in academic channels. "Aguinaldo," the signature at the end of manifestoes, proclamations, and letters addressed to the Filipinos, to Generals Merritt, Anderson, and Otis, was a "composite" including the brightest minds of the half-caste Filipinos who lived in Manila. These men found "Aguinaldo" a potent name to utilize. It was a demigod to the people, and it was known to represent leadership to the United States officials. It was a name trusted where any other name would have stood for naught. Besides, it was a convenient mask, for there were those among the rich and influential half-castes of Manila who were not yet willing to totally sever allegiance with Spain, for we had not yet proclaimed American sovereignty. Some of these men are now famous. Some of them are dead. Some of them threw their fortunes with Aguinaldo; some deserted his camp at the first shot across the trenches. And thus gradually, during the vicissitudes of a bloody war, the real Aguinaldo was shorn of his borrowed plumage, and stood out intellectually naked in the lime-light of discovery.

At this period of affairs, July, 1899, we were dealing with Aguinaldo, the syndicate of academic warriors. Let me separate it into

its parts. First, there was Dr. Pardo de Tavera, one of the ablest Spanish Mestizos the Islands have produced. Tavera is the foremost Filipino physician in Manila. He is a highly educated man, a scholar, and a gentleman. In looks he is every inch a Spaniard. He is a brother-in-law of the late Insurgent General Luna. He was the editor of the leading revolutionary newspaper. He is the author of several books. He was the champion of Philippine independence until he realized the futility of such efforts. He opposed a conflict with the United States, and after using his best efforts for the national freedom of the Filipinos, and becoming convinced of the impossibility of such a dream, he abandoned the fight, attempted to wean over the "incorrigibles" to the idea of American sovereignty, setting the example by resigning from the Philippine Congress, returning to Manila, and subsequently heading a party favoring the recognition of American sovereignty. He became the editor of *La Democracia*, an organ devoted to the cause of reconciling the Filipinos to American rule.

Another member of the Aguinaldo syndicate was Cayetano S. Arellano, attorney for the archbishop, ex-judge of the Supreme Court,

writer of Aguinaldo letters, constructor of legal arguments, scholar, lawyer, and publicist. Arellano was the ablest legal mind in the Aguinaldo "composite." If there had been more men like him, our path would not have been strewn for the past three years with dead bodies. But Arellano was a man of peace; was against obstructing American occupation by force of arms, and keenly realized our legal title to the sovereignty of the Philippines. He, like Tavera, refused to be a party to bloodshed, and was a strenuous advocate of moderation. After exhausting every argument known to law and logic, he withdrew from the cabinet and retired to private life. He is now chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, and writes over his own signature.

The third great mind of the Aguinaldo bureau was Apolinario Mabini. Mabini was the leader of the party of "incorrigibles." He is a man well along in years, has always been an obstructionist and agitator, and a consistent foe of foreign rule, — a revolutionist by nature and profession. According to his own testimony he belonged to the pure native race, and has never been out of his country since infancy. Though one of the most brilliant men of his race, he possesses the tenacious characteristics of the Malay.

He, probably more than any other man, as subsequent events reveal, was the moving spirit of the insurrection and the unalterable opponent of American occupation. His manifestoes, which would fill a volume in themselves, display a tremendous intellectual vitality and marvellous command of stinging invective. He knew how to arouse the native and blind him to any consideration that did not include the absolute independence of his country. He was "the brain of the revolution." Guam may shut him off from his fatherland, but it will take generations to eradicate the creed he preached largely over the name of Aguinaldo.

The fourth member of this "Poo-Bah" Aguinaldo was Pedro Alejandro Paterno, the "Riche-lieu" of the Philippines. Spain gave him the "Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic," and the Filipino University at Manila an LL.D. Failing in his enterprises to secure a seat in the Spanish Cortes and the title of the Duke of Castile, he joined the revolution. On Calle St. Roque, in the new Manila, is Paterno's spacious house. It occupies a large section of the block, and it was there that I had a most interesting visit. On the frescoed walls hangs a life-sized painting of his mother, a Chinese Mestizo.


Paterno, therefore, like nearly all of the Filipino leaders, is a half-caste. Facing the three long parlors of his house is a bronze bust of Paterno, sculptured by Berllure of Madrid. Paterno lived like a duke, even though he failed to receive the title.

Despite his open dickering with Spain, and his public acceptance of money from the Spanish government, the childish faith of the natives was not entirely shaken in Paterno. They rejoiced in his Spanish-given honors, and pointed to him as the most eminent living Filipino. He has published several novels and books of poetry, and is the acknowledged authority on Filipino lore. He controlled Aguinaldo, wrote many of his bombastic pronouncements, and was the head and spirit of the revolution. The Paterno family own large steamships and plantations, and are holders of much real estate. Had the Philippine republic succeeded, the Paternos would have been the Rockefellers of the Archipelago.

Paterno realized all this, and committed himself to the cause. He became president of the Congress, and followed Aguinaldo's standard until, worn and exhausted by the strife, he was, after over a year in the jungle, brought home to Manila at the point of death. Paterno pos-

sesses a brilliant mind, and though not as radical as Mabini, nor as warlike as Luna, he clung to the hope of Filipino independence until illness left him helpless to continue the struggle.

These four men comprised the intellectuality falsely attributed to Aguinaldo. General Luna, perhaps, should be added to the list, but to use Luna's own words: "I am a soldier, not a diplomat. I obey orders, others give them." Luna was a writer of considerable power, and was at one time the chief of the staff of the editors of *La Independencia*. He was primarily a man of arms, and his exploits in Manila and Madrid are well known in both capitals. He was a notable specimen of the Mestizo class. Of good birth, wealthy, and intellectual, he aspired to be the leader of his people. He was a brother of the celebrated Juan Luna, an artist of European renown, whose paintings adorn the palace at Madrid. Another brother was a violinist of more than Philippine fame. By profession, Luna, like the eminent Rizal, was a chemist. He was educated in Madrid and Paris, and while abroad published a book, "Impressions." He returned to Manila in 1894, and gained the confidence of Governor General Blanco. When the insurrection broke out he openly denounced the



EMILIO AGUINALDO
General and President

FILIFE AGONCELLO
Ambassador

ALEJANDRO PATERNO
President of Aguinaldo's Cabinet



GENERAL ANTONIO LUNA 99

movement, but nevertheless was arrested as a conspirator. Through the intercession of Blanco his sentence of death was moderated to one of twelve years' imprisonment, and he was sent to Spain. Eventually he was pardoned and returned to Hong Kong. When hostilities broke out between Spain and the United States, Luna returned to Cavite. It was there that Aguinaldo offered him the command of the army, but Luna for a time refused, though later he accepted the post of minister of war in the Malolos cabinet, with the rank of a general of a division. Luna reorganized the Insurgent army upon European methods, which he had carefully studied abroad, and the discipline and military tactics displayed by the Insurgents so often to our surprise were due to his skilled hand, abetted by the ex-officers of the Spanish native guard. In battle he displayed a reckless valor and ability that soon made him a hated rival to Aguinaldo, who found himself obliged to raise Luna to the rank of commander-in-chief of the army. Had Luna lived, it is probable that the cause of the Filipinos would have been staked in one decisive battle, and the Filipino war would have ended with some credit to native valor. Luna was never thoroughly trusted by Aguinaldo. "He wants a pitched



battle with the Americans," Aguinaldo is reputed to have said, "and my policy is to draw them into the mountains, harass them, and exhaust them."

It was not surprising with this brilliant galaxy of minds pooling the work of their brains under the *nom de plume*, *Aguinaldo*, that both the Americans and the Filipinos were misled into the belief that Aguinaldo was a gigantic military, intellectual, diplomatic, and legal wonder.

But I have not named all of those who contributed to Aguinaldo's fame, and made his name the greatest, next to Rizal, in Tagalog lore.

Let us hastily glance over the type of men who united in the attempt to form a republic. They all surrounded Aguinaldo and raised him to his exalted position. Not one of them inspired the full confidence of the natives. Not one of them, though he were a thousand times more brilliant and scholarly, more brave and more capable in the field, could have held the people enthralled as did Aguinaldo. They one and all realized this, and only sought to control the man who controlled, by that mystic power, the people. The galaxy of names that have shifted across the Philippine kaleidoscope and filled the public press of America, would fill a



directory. I shall therefore deal only with those who are more or less familiar to the public.

First in activity and notoriety was Theodoro Sandico. Sandico, though invaluable to the Filipino chieftains when they were at Hong Kong, early fell from grace, having expressed a belief that a Filipino republic would be the "victim of the European powers," while "protection and annexation by the United States would be for the lasting benefit of the people." Sandico was too honest to please the conspirators, and his doctrine was very distasteful to Aguinaldo. He therefore "disappeared" from time to time, and never achieved the prominence due him. Sandico knew too much and had lived too long in Hong Kong to be carried away by the dreams of Independence. A native of Pampanga province, he was educated in Manila and became a school-teacher at Malolos until he lost favor with an Augustinian friar who threatened him with decapitation. Sandico preferred life to a martyr's death and, disguised as a Chinaman, escaped to Hong Kong, thence sailing for Madrid, spending several years in European capitals studying French, German, and English. Returning to Hong Kong penniless, he went to work in a bicycle shop where he earned his living until the Filipino refugees

enlisted him in their cause. Aguinaldo, in one of his moments of confidence, made him Secretary of the Interior, and a deputy and colonel on his staff.

But the first rival of Aguinaldo was Isabello Artachio, whose sudden disappearance after returning to Filipino soil caused much dissension among the northern tribes of Luzon, making a breach that was never wholly healed. He never fully committed his people to the schemes of Aguinaldo, and when the differences of opinion as to leadership and the disposition of money became a controversy that refused to down, Artachio "disappeared," not to breathe the free air again until General Lawton liberated him from a dungeon at Los Piñas in June, 1899. From there he escaped, disguised in woman's clothes, to Manila, and delivered himself up. He soon made his identity known and was permitted to go to Hong Kong, where he applied to Consul Wildman for naturalization papers.

I saw Artachio directly after he was liberated, and asked him if he had changed his views of Aguinaldo. "He is a bad man," replied Artachio, "cold and cruel at heart, and cares for nothing but the accomplishment of his own ambition. Aguinaldo ordered me shot, but my

Ilocos brothers shielded me. For a year I have been dragged from convent to convent, and allowed a penny's worth of rice and a fish a day. They tried to starve me, and I had often to defend myself from a treacherous bolo-thrust in the back."

Baldomero Aguinaldo, formerly a lieutenant in the Spanish forces, is a second cousin of Aguinaldo. He is a half-caste, and to him Aguinaldo intrusted the campaign in the Cavite-Batangas provinces. He was known as the "fighting Aguinaldo," although, true to his reputation, he amassed considerable money by exorbitant taxation, and his entire career has been one of coercion and cruelty. He has pressed unwilling natives into service, and practised all manner of extortion upon them. At one time he tried to escape to Singapore with his blood money, but was circumvented and remained to continue the struggle.

Tomas Mascardo was one of Aguinaldo's best fighters. Before the revolution he, too, was a school-teacher in Cavite, but cast his lot with the Insurgents, and after returning from Hong Kong, was made a captain in Aguinaldo's army. For "brilliant feats at arms, having been thrice wounded," he was made a briga-

dier general. He eventually surrendered his command to the American troops, but not until two months after Aguinaldo's capture.

Artemio Ricarte before the revolution was engaged in the peaceful occupation of teaching the young idea how to shoot, at San Francisco de Malabon, in the province of Cavite. He, however, deserted the birch for the rifle, and joined the revolt against Spain, later transferring his talents to the present revolution. He proved himself a stubborn fighter, and made our progress in the south expensive. He was in the possession of a great quantity of arms, being the commandant of the Spanish *Melicas Territoriales*, and when war broke out between our troops and the Insurgents, he found himself fully equipped to meet the emergency. As brigadier general he was in command of the south division, including Cavite and Batangas. He is a graduate of the college of San Juan de Letran and the Escuela Normal in Manila.

Serverino de las Alas is a name that was frequently heard of in Filipino councils. He is an elderly man, and was one of Aguinaldo's chief advisers. He took no part against the Spanish, but reserved his talents as a lawyer to point out the untenability of American occupa-

tion. Many of the high-sounding documents issued over Aguinaldo's signature, after the resignation of Arellano, quoting international law, emanated from his brain. He was Secretary of the Interior of the Paterno cabinet.

José Ignacio Paua was a unique figure in the Insurgent army. His presence in some of the engagements led to the belief that the Chinese were assisting the Filipinos. Paua, though a Chinaman, has a dash of Filipino blood in him, and was probably born in Cavite, where he was first heard of as one of the proprietors of an iron foundry. His specialty was the repair and manufacture of "Lantaka" guns. In the first revolution he, with Pio del Pilar, and twenty-seven men forced a regiment of Spanish troops under Colonel Salcelo to retreat from their stronghold at Imus. Paua returned from Hong Kong, where he found the climate and association agreeable after the treaty of Biacnabato, in June of 1898, and cutting off his pigtail joined the revolutionists. For this act of abnegation, and in consideration of his previous record, he was made a brigadier general and sent to the Camarines, the extreme south of Luzon. There he distinguished himself by driving out the English planters and confiscating Spanish property. He was said

to be a cousin of Aguinaldo and did not surrender until after the capture of his chief.

The career of Francisco Roman y Valesquez partakes of romantic elements. He was a member of one of the most distinguished Filipino-Spanish families in Manila. Young, dashing, and gallant, he began a brilliant career as editor of *La Commercial*, the leading Spanish newspaper in Manila. He belonged to the set of which the Lunas were the central stars in wit, wealth, and talent, and when General Antonio Luna joined the Insurgents, Roman deserted home and business and became a colonel on his staff. Though a former volunteer officer in the Spanish troops that fought against the Insurgents in the first revolution, he was welcomed to their ranks as a friend of Luna. He followed his general in all of his engagements, — and retreats, — and when the relations between Aguinaldo and Luna became strained, Roman sided with his chief and gained the fatal hatred of Aguinaldo.

Vito Bellarmino was the press agent of the Aguinaldo army. He was one of the original promulgators of information upon the policies and intents of the Filipinos. He was the pioneer of Filipino newspaper men, and the following editorial, the key-note of Aguinaldo's policy,

made its appearance in Vol. 1, No. 1, of *La Independencia*, published then, October 5, 1898, in Manila.


“We defend the independence of the Filipinos because that is the aspiration of a country which has arrived at its maturity, and when a people arise as one man to protest, shoulder to shoulder, against a policy of oppression and injustice, they show sufficient vitality to live free. In the short period of three months departments of administration and justice have been organized, and there exists coöperative order in the midst of an international war. We treat our prisoners as would the most cultured and civilized nations. Our army has fought, inspired by international laws and those of humanity. A people who can do such things is able to rule and govern itself.”

Having thus delivered himself, Bellarmino went on throwing out sugar-coated hints to America, and greetings to the world at large. Day by day *La Independencia* strengthened its hints with threats and finally made itself so obnoxious that it became convenient to ship its headquarters to Malolos. Bellarmino went with it and for his eloquence was made a brigadier general. Seldom has a newspaper man won such instant military preference. He con-

tinued the work, and that he possessed vivid imagination and a versatile pen may be judged from his brilliant descriptions of the Insurgent "victories." The following from the revolutionary organ illustrates the epistolary feats he was able to perform :—

"The advance lines continue to engage the enemy, not permitting the Americans a moment's rest to recuperate their forces, which are almost at their last gasp. Persons who have been through the enemy's lines have been witnesses to the great battles fought by our renowned generals. Pio del Pilar and his heroes have won for themselves a foremost place in the annals of the present generation. Through the wilds of Malapatnabato his intrepid bolo men showed for once and all their undoubted efficiency at a time when musketry is powerless to make an end of the enemy. General Pio del Pilar, with marvellous intuition, sent his bolo men against a mass of American troops, as a huntsman lets loose his hounds to drive out the wild beasts trying to hide in the depths of the woods. The episodes of the last few days have been so brilliant and so numerous, that it is difficult to find a parallel in history in great military achievement."

His genius for converting defeat into victory



ANTONIO LUNA

ARTINIO RICARDO

PANTALEON GARCIA

JOSÉ PAUA

AGUINALDO'S LEADING GENERALS



was unquestioned. General Bellarmino learned his trade as a schoolmaster in Cavite.

Francisco Makabulos Soliman was also a brigadier general in command of the forces in Tarlac. He harassed General MacArthur's forces, and showed more willingness to meet our troops than the majority of his colleagues. Makabulos is a native of Pangasinan. He won his spurs in the first revolution, and when the Biacnabato treaty was signed, stuck by his guns and refused to emigrate to Hong Kong. He was therefore distinguished among his people, and was made a brigadier in the revolution. Though he was very reluctant to join Aguinaldo, the glare of the gilt star and red trousers proved too much for him to resist.

Another brigadier general of the north is Mariano Llanera. He is a native of Nueva Ecija, and was captain municipal of San Isidro under the Spanish rule. He started a little revolution of his own, and succeeded in ousting the Spanish from Nueva Ecija, but joined the Hong Kong emigrants.

Mariano Trias was the ex-governor of the province of Cavite; for a long time he showed a decided willingness to establish an armistice until, as he said, "the Americans had settled with Aguinaldo;" but General Lawton's advance

on Paranaque and Imus compelled him to fight or run, and he struck a happy middle course by doing a little of both, eventually becoming "amigo," and later returning to the enemy. He is related by marriage to the La Garda family of Manila, and through them General Hughes for a long time was able to keep Trias quiet. He was one of Aguinaldo's many secretaries of war.

The list would not be complete without a mention of Filipe Agoncillo, a half-caste of good education, large wealth, and considerable shrewdness. He was sent by Aguinaldo to Paris, and instructed to secure recognition at the Peace Conference. Failing in that, he went to Washington and attempted to get a hearing with President McKinley, but at the outbreak of hostilities was forced to make a hasty flight to Montreal, whence he returned to Paris, where he established a Junta. He was made high commissioner and envoy plenipotentiary of the revolutionary government. He spent his time and money in Paris, and though recalled by Aguinaldo, refused to give over his post to Dr. Appacible, the newly commissioned incumbent. Agoncillo kept the wires hot with reports of Insurgent victories, and was the despatch agent of the revolutionary government. He promptly

transmitted to Aguinaldo and the Insurgents every indulgent opinion and sympathetic remark published in the American press. He encouraged the Filipinos in the belief that the majority of American citizens favored Philippine independence, and it was his work undoubtedly that led General Lawton to express his opinion, as he did in his letter, now famous, to Mr. John Barrett, that if he were shot it might as well be by one of his own men, as the insurrection held out because of those Americans at home who encourage the Filipinos in the hope of our recognition of their independence.

These are the leading men who surrounded Aguinaldo, became his generals and cabinet members, and espoused the cause of the revolution. Others of Aguinaldo's supporters who were officials in the revolutionary army were ex-conductors and station masters of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad, or clerks from the Spanish factories, stores, law firms, and chemist shops of Manila and interior towns. Associated with him were many wealthy and influential Filipinos in Manila, including the Rosarios, the Lagardas, Torres, Abren, Ocampo Yanceo, Genatos, and others; men representing large tobacco factories, importing and exporting businesses, electric lighting and street railway cor-

porations ; in fact, the richest half-caste element of the Philippines. These men in the beginning gave their financial and moral support to the republic until the war element secured the control of affairs and ignored their councils. Thus, in its early stages, every Filipino and half-caste of importance favored the establishment of a Filipino republic.

Under these conditions it was little wonder that the whole population took up the cry of Independence or Death, particularly in lieu of any official protest or discouragement on our part. In fact, our officers liked the little Filipinos, our privates chummed with them, were entertained by them, and visited their capital, were present at their concerts, and generally indulged them in their aspirations. All this was very natural at the time when not even we, who were on the spot, believed that the United States would hold the Philippines. What then should become of them? Surely Spain could never retake them. Thus our attitude was accepted as tacit consent to their aspiration, and misunderstandings quickly followed.

The American government was not disposed precipitously to formulate its policy toward the Philippine Islands. The destruction of the Spanish fleet, the occupancy of Cavite and

Manila, were military necessities. The political problems were left to the Peace Commission which was to meet in Paris and settle all questions relating to our war with Spain and the disposition of conquered territory. It was therefore anticipating government policy to give pledges of any nature. The Insurgents failed either to comprehend the situation or purposely sought by aggressive means to force the issue and commit our commanders to a definite position. Aguinaldo had a large army of Tagalogs, half-castes, and semi-civilized natives. Almost within their grasp lay Manila, with its well-stored shops, its palatial residences, and its immense wealth. It was a prize the Insurgents coveted. Questions of law and rights of sovereignty were problems in which they were but superficially schooled. Having received encouragement from us in their campaign against the Spanish, which had been successful throughout Luzon, they believed themselves fitted for a national existence, and irrespective of our yet undetermined status and final rights in the Philippines, the revolutionists demanded the immediate recognition of their independence in consideration of the part they had played in crippling the power of Spain in the Archipelago.

VII

THE two months from the formation of the Filipino government to the signing of the peace protocol, August 12, 1898, was a period of tremendous activity with the Insurgents. While the American government was engrossed in the war with Spain, the revolutionists in the Philippines were organizing an army, prosecuting a campaign against the Spanish, and formulating a government in accordance with their desires and aspirations, the motive and scope of which they frankly communicated to the public. Emboldened by our avowed policy toward Cuba, and carried away with their own ambitions, the Filipinos became aggressive and dictatorial. Interpreting our non-interference as passive acquiescence, and encouraged by their success at arms, they proceeded to demand from us and other powers a recognition of their belligerency. Receiving no response, they asked for a statement of our intentions.

Aguinaldo, Mabini, Luna, and Pilar, having

secured undisputed sway over the revolutionary government, addressed a letter to General Anderson, communicating the fact that Aguinaldo had proclaimed a dictatorship, and that they hoped the United States government would look upon the struggle for independence with favor. General Anderson notified Aguinaldo that he was there simply in a military capacity, and had no authority to recognize Aguinaldo's assumption, and that as far as he could ascertain, the independent status of the Filipinos was not recognized by any foreign power. "Your intellect must perceive that happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy," concluded General Anderson, "I cannot without orders recognize your civil authority."

This was a blow to the Filipinos' aspirations that caused heated sessions at Malolos. Taking their cue from General Anderson's letter, an appeal was issued to foreign governments. A letter signed "Aguinaldo" stated that the revolutionary government dominated the fifteen principal provinces of Luzon and the capital of Manila, maintaining therein good order and administering laws according to the regulations of the constitution; that the revolutionists had nine thousand prisoners of war and thirty thou-

sand combatants on a war footing; that the chiefs of fifteen provinces proclaimed independence and requested the revolutionary government to entreat and pray the foreign powers to acknowledge the belligerency and independence of the Philippines.

Accompanying this appeal to the foreign powers was a statement calling attention to the "brilliant feats of arms of the revolutionists and the admirable—and more than admirable—the wonderful deeds performed by them in exercising political functions and carrying on warfare in a humane manner." They asserted that they exercised a self-control that found no parallel, conducting themselves as became a noble and humane people, shunning the savage life for the arm of peace, giving proof of their ability to make laws in harmony with the march of time; that they knew how to respect and obey law—an indication that their national habits were inclined to progress, and that they were not ambitious for power, honor, or riches; that they were solely influenced by a just desire for liberty and self-government, which they stood ready to defend until death, and would not recede from any obstacle that might oppose their progress. In virtue of the above statement, the chieftains proclaimed "before the

whole world" the independence of the Philippines and acknowledged Emilio Aguinaldo as president of the revolutionary government.

The statement was signed by Emilio Aguinaldo, Leandro Ibarro, Secretary of the Interior, and one hundred and eighty chiefs. Baldomero Aguinaldo was Secretary of War; Mariano Trias, Secretary of Agriculture. Cayetano Arellano was invited to hold a portfolio, but excused himself on a plea of ill health. Pardo de Tavera was Director of Diplomacy; Benito Legarda, Director of Finance; Tomas G. del Rosario, leader of the cause of Church Charity; and Florentino Torres, leader of the party of self-government. Luna was in command of the forces north of Manila, and Pilar of the south zone.


It became evident that the assumptions of the Filipinos were developing perplexing questions. The Insurgents evacuated the town of Cavite, but occupied St. Roque, just across a narrow peninsula from our naval base, and were in possession of the entire province as well as some of the suburbs of Manila. They established military headquarters in the principal towns in the vicinity of the capital. Aguinaldo requested General Anderson not to land American troops upon Insurgent territory without first

consulting him, and the hitherto apparently friendly relations of the two forces became strained. American officers and privates passing through the Insurgent lines were arrested, though invariably released upon request. The Insurgents lost no opportunity to give the Americans to understand that they considered themselves the rightful conquerors and possessors of the territory they occupied. Consul Williams visited Aguinaldo and explained to him that his was not a government that the United States or any other power would recognize. He entreated him to part with his too ambitious schemes, and prove himself an ally of whom the Americans might be proud. Aguinaldo replied that the matter would receive the attention of the council, and on August 18 Aguinaldo asked Consul Williams: "Why not recognize the revolutionary government in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals, and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive?"

Then he sent a letter to Consul General Wildman, in which he said: "Why should America expect me to outline my policy for the present and future and fight blindly for her interests


when America will not be frank with me? Tell me this. Am I fighting for annexation or independence? It is for America to say, not me. I can take Manila, as I have defeated the Spaniards everywhere, but to what use? If America takes it, I save my men and arms for what future has in store for me. Now, good friend, believe me, I am not both fool and rogue, but the interests of my people are as sacred as yours." Mr. Wildman replied: "If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces, and do not allow any small differences of opinion and fancied slights to keep you from the one set purpose of freeing your Island from the cruelties under which you claim it has been groaning for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are greater prizes in the world than being mere chief of a revolution. Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be, you can trust to the United States that justice and honor will control all their dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let anything interfere with this."

In their little revolutionary world Aguinaldo and the Insurgent leaders were plotting night and day to force the situation. Every move and every act of the American government or



the American commanders, he believed, was influenced solely by the situation in Luzon. While Dewey was preparing for the possibility of another naval battle, for Camara's fleet had reached the Suez Canal, the Filipino commander-in-chief was importuning him because he refused to permit the Filipino flag to float in Manila Bay; while General Greene, General Anderson, and General Merritt were engaged in the organization of the American forces in preparation to attack Manila, Aguinaldo was contesting every inch of ground they required, was disobliging on the question of supplies, and was bending every effort to force the Americans formally to recognize his government. Self-important, grandiloquent, and vain, the president of the revolutionary government and his associates published and distributed high-sounding decrees, and aroused distrust and animosity, preparing his people for a conflict which he threatened unless the independence of the Filipinos was recognized and their government guaranteed protection by our army and navy.

The conceit and assumption of Aguinaldo annoyed Admiral Dewey. There popped up everywhere Filipino flags, until every little *banco* in the bay carried from one to three or more



revolutionary emblems. It was, it seemed to Dewey, something of a reflection on his supremacy to find these little flags thrust under his nose from every side. The admiral felt quite capable of protecting life, at least in Manila Bay, and he considered it something of an affront on Aguinaldo's part to litter up the landscape inside the American horizon with so many evidences of a growing presumption. Finally, a number of Insurgent junks decorated with the flags of the rising sun literally rubbed noses with the *Olympia*. Becoming provoked, the admiral sent out a launch, gathered in the Tagalog skippers, and had them lined up on the deck of the *Olympia*. After giving them to understand that the Filipino flag was not recognized, and that their presence in the vicinity of the warships was not desired, he dismissed them and told them to go back to their junks. One of the natives, however, resented the entire proceedings, and, as he turned from the presence of Dewey, muttered something in Tagalog and shook his head menacingly. The incident did not pass unnoticed by Dewey, and he quickly asked for an explanation.

"He says, sir, he will get even with you," the interpreter replied. The admiral, without a second's hesitation, called his orderly, and in an

impulsive tone said, "Throw that man overboard!"

The command was no sooner given than executed by a brawny American sailor, and Dewey walked across the deck, never once turning his head as the splash of the irate native greeted his ears, nor did he afterward inquire after the health of the Tagalog warrior. When the incident was reported to Aguinaldo, he treated it as a terrible affront to his "navy."

"Aguinaldo's ignorance was simply staggering," said Admiral Dewey to me aboard the *Olympia* in Manila Bay. "One day I told him we had taken Guam.

"'Guam!' queried Aguinaldo.

"Yes, Guam," replied Dewey, "one of the Ladrone Islands.

"'The Ladrone Islands?' said Aguinaldo, apparently more in the dark than ever.

"So I got out the map," said the admiral, "and showed him where Guam was. It seemed to be his first lesson in geography."

General Wesley Merritt, commander of the Department of the Pacific, had arrived on July 25. He was instructed by the President to occupy the Islands by the American land forces; the powers of the military to be supreme and immediately operate upon the political condi-

tion of the inhabitants. General Anderson was in command of the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, with General Greene and General MacArthur commanding brigades. General Anderson requested Aguinaldo to permit the American troops to take a position between the Insurgent lines which surrounded Manila and remove his troops to the right across the Pasig River. This enabled our forces to form part of and complete the cordon around the city.

On August 7, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt sent to the Governor General Jaudennes a joint note notifying him to remove from the city within forty-eight hours all non-combatants, as operations against the defences of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that time. A reply was received the same day to the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick women, and children now lodged within the walls. On the 9th day of August a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent to Jaudennes. The demand called attention to the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards, pointing out that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bombard-

ment under such circumstances. Jaudennes replied that the council of defence had declared that the demand could not be granted, but that he would be willing to consult his government if allowed time to do so. Admiral Dewey and General Merritt declined, believing that it would only indefinitely postpone the struggle. Our troops were suffering under the exposure to the unaccustomed heat and rains, harassed in their trenches and poorly protected and inadequately fed. Decisive action was therefore necessary to compel the enemy to give up the city and bring to an end the intolerable conditions.

General Merritt issued, August 9, a general order, copies of which were sent to Aguinaldo, as Aguinaldo had not called upon him nor offered his services in any way. The order was an appeal to the honor and pride of the Insurgent army to conduct themselves as became representatives of a higher civilization, that the inhabitants might be impressed with the lofty motives of the mission of the Americans in the Islands. It also cautioned all American soldiers against committing any act of pillage or violence, and was a tacit hint to the Insurgents to follow suit.

Aguinaldo requested of General Greene that

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his troops should enter Manila with the Americans. On August 12 he repeated this request, through a staff officer, to General Anderson. Night after night the desultory firing continued from the Spanish trenches, and one by one our men were being needlessly sacrificed. General Merritt and Admiral Dewey therefore decided to move jointly upon Manila the morning of August 13. Admiral Dewey would have preferred the presence of the *Monadnock*, as the commanders of the German battleships in the bay were showing an unconcealed sympathy for the Spanish. The English cruiser *Immortalité*, however, significantly took a position between the *Concord* and the German flagship *Kaiser*, and set at rest in the minds of the Americans the likelihood of German interference. Our squadron ranged itself along the front of the walled city and the shore, and shelled the old fort at Malate and the Spanish trenches. The land forces immediately moved upon the Spanish, and in a quick, decisive charge routed the Spanish and pushed forward to the walls of the old city. A preconceived plan, arranged by M. Andre, the Belgian consul, was then carried out, and the white flag was raised on the walls of Manila. The battle caused considerable loss of life, but the Spaniards refused to surrender without a

shot of resistance in order to save their "honor" and presumably the necks of the officials when they returned to Madrid.

Early on the morning of the 13th Aguinaldo was notified by General Anderson not to let his troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander, and that on the south side of the Pasig, Insurgent troops would be under fire. Aguinaldo replied that it was too late; his forces had already been ordered into action. He further stated that his troops were forced by means of violence to retire from positions taken, and that he had given strict orders to his chiefs to respect the American forces and aid them in case they were attacked by a common enemy. The Insurgents mixed freely with our troops, doing fighting whenever it was possible, sometimes side by side with the Americans, sometimes at the head of a charge, and sometimes in detached companies. Several thousand succeeded in entering Manila. They plundered many houses in the suburbs, and occupied several convents and churches and many private residences.

On the evening of the battle, General Anderson had notified Aguinaldo that trouble was threatened between the two forces, and requested him to try to prevent it, and that the Insurgents

should not force themselves into the city until the Americans received full surrender, after which negotiations would be in order. Colonel Hale arrested and disarmed a company of Insurgents who were trying to force their way into the city. Believing them innocent of hostile intentions, he released them, but retained their rifles.

The Insurgents were greatly disappointed in not "sharing in the plunder of the city," and Aguinaldo wrote General Anderson that the Insurgents, who had so long been besieging Manila, had always been promised that they could appear in it, and that for that reason he did not deem it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed. He requested that his troops be allowed to occupy Manila, as they had many times given proofs of their friendship, ceding the positions requested by General Anderson. Buencamino was sent to Manila to represent Aguinaldo and hold a conference with General Anderson. After a parley of several hours, Buencamino promised to have the Insurgent troops withdrawn from Manila. The promise was not kept. General Merritt, on the 14th of August, issued a proclamation addressed to the people of the Philippines, in which he stated that the United

States had not come to wage war upon the Filipinos, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights; that the existing laws would be administered by the officers of the United States; that the ports would be open to trade, and that all people, so long as they preserved the peace and performed their duties toward the representatives of the United States, would not be disturbed in their property, except in so far as it was found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines. In forming this proclamation, General Merritt consulted with Aguinaldo's commissioners, and modified the original document to conform somewhat to their suggestions and wishes.

The Filipinos held the waterworks and pumping station, and the water was turned off, putting the hot sweltering city into terrible straits. Aguinaldo demanded that if his troops were withdrawn from Manila, he should hold Paco and Malate, two of the most important suburbs; that he should hold certain convents in the city; that we exercise sovereignty over the city only; that General Merritt should consult him about all civil appointments; that the Filipinos should have the right at all times to enter the river and

harbor ; that the arms taken from the Filipinos be returned to them ; that Filipino officers be permitted to enter the city with or without arms ; that the Filipinos be permitted to share in the bounty of the captured city, that all negotiations be put in writing and confirmed by the commander of the American forces.

General Anderson referred the demand to General Merritt, who conferred with Admiral Dewey. The situation was becoming critical, and Dewey cabled to Washington for instructions. The President replied that there must be no joint occupation of Manila ; that Insurgents and all others must recognize the authority of the United States, and that any means must be used necessary to that end.

General Merritt thereupon replied, August 20, to Aguinaldo, announcing that the Filipinos must withdraw from Manila and all its suburbs ; they must repair the pumping station and turn on the water, for which service they should be paid ; they would be given free navigation of the Pasig ; Filipino officers would be permitted entrance and departure to and from Manila with or without arms ; but as the major general had taken for his own use the palace at Malacañan, it could not be turned over to the Filipinos ; the convents held by the Insurgents at Malate,

Ermita, and Paco must be evacuated; civil offices were to be filled by Americans, but recommendations of Filipinos for appointments to subordinate offices would be gladly received; American soldiers without arms must be permitted to pass through the Filipino lines; and the hundred and fifty arms taken from the Filipinos would be returned.

General Merritt's reply was not satisfactory. Aguinaldo adhered to his demand that Filipino ships should be permitted and protected in the river and bay and waters controlled by us. He also asked for the assurance that in case the Americans should return the city to Spain, the Insurgents should be left in the possession of the positions they then held.

General Merritt replied that the protection asked of the American squadron was entirely within the jurisdiction of Admiral Dewey; that a joint occupation of Manila was impossible, and that Aguinaldo must withdraw his troops from the remaining positions in which he had left detachments. He also told Aguinaldo that as a military representative, it was impossible for him to make any promises in the event of a conclusion of a treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, but that he could rely upon the beneficent purposes of the United States.

Aguinaldo realized that he was losing ground, and that his demands had not been effective. He wrote General Merritt to that effect, and called his attention to services rendered in the siege of Manila. He admitted that a dual occupation was not desirable, and promised to withdraw the Insurgents from the city and most of the suburbs, but requested that Admiral Dewey give free navigation to his boats and that we restore the positions he had relinquished, in the event our treaty with Spain resulted in a recognition of her dominion in the Philippines.

Not a moment was lost by the Insurgents in strengthening their positions, and large supplies of arms reached them. The Junta at Hong Kong had not been idle. Arms and war munitions were sent to Dagupan and conveyed down the railway to the Insurgent headquarters at Malolos, for the Insurgents had repaired and taken possession of the entire line from Dagupan to Caloocan, just outside of Manila. Manager Higgins was permitted to continue in the direction of the railroad, but guards of Insurgent soldiers were placed on all the trains, and the road was operated for the benefit of the Insurgent government.

Aguinaldo had kept together his army of from thirty thousand to forty thousand men,

had equipped them from all possible sources; had taken up the reins of the Spanish government and controlled the Island of Luzon, outside of Manila; had complete telegraphic communication with the chieftains of the provinces; had uniformed his troops and established a revolutionary government, which was apparently acceptable to the Filipinos of the Island. It is perhaps futile to speculate upon what might have been accomplished at this period had the American government been represented by diplomats instead of soldiers in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had, however, complied with our demands; he had opened a passage for us through his troops, laid siege to Manila, and assisted materially in expediting its surrender. The services of the Insurgents were valuable; they made our victory over the weak colonial forces of the Island easy, and therefore deserved, at that time, more consideration than they received. Had Aguinaldo and his coterie of generals been bound to us by gratitude and allied to us by a recognition of "part of the rights of a friendly people," war might have been averted; the revolutionary government might have expired of ennui, and instead of an angry and suspicious population pitted against us we might have had a large number of loyal troops, local governors,

OTIS RELIEVES MERRITT 133

and petty Tagalog officials to assist us in controlling affairs in the Philippines. The crisis was at hand and our diplomacy was not equal to the occasion. It was of an order below that exercised by the Filipinos themselves. Thrown upon their own resources, ignored by the American authorities, they became obstreperous and sullen, unreasonable and assertive. This was the situation that confronted Major General E. S. Otis, who relieved General Merritt on the 29th of August, 1898.

VII

AGUINALDO did not officially offer to place himself under the command of American generals. He refused to remove his troops from Manila unless such conditions as he had named were granted, and in his attitude and letters he contended for and defended his position. While apparently desirous of preserving our friendship, he demanded that his relations be of a national character, including official recognition of his government. The Filipinos were nominally in control of vast tracts of land which had been filched from them by the religious orders, who had held them largely by squatters' rights, although in some instances the chieftains had conveyed titles under the pressure of the Spanish officials, and occasionally during the periods of religious fervor. For the use of their lands the Filipinos had been compelled to pay a small annual rental. It was known to the Filipinos that the religious orders had turned over many of their

titles to Spanish syndicates, who proposed to hold them as corporate bodies. Seven-eighths of the best farming land and real estate in the middle of Luzon and in the city of Manila was owned by the holy orders. The friars often demanded half—the best half—of the rice or other crops produced, and, backed in their claims by the Spanish government, were able to collect the extortionate rent. The Recollects owned nearly a million acres of the best land of the Laguna de Bay province, and the Dominicans were said to have nearly half a billion dollars in the English banks in Hong Kong.

Another order held much of the best business property in Manila. The archbishop refused to confer upon the Filipino curés the full religious status enjoyed by the Spanish priests, and issued an encyclical letter “silencing” them, and withdrawing his sanction to their clerical functions. These conditions and grievances were vital questions with the Filipinos, who were devout Catholics, and fervent in their religious practices. They clamored for the recognition of native priests. The policy of the American government toward the Spanish clergy was unsatisfactory to the Filipinos, who demanded their exclusion from the Islands.

This question, therefore, became a source of great agitation among the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo's ascendancy over the Filipinos was reënforced by his statements that he had received certain promises from United States officials. The letters of Consuls Wildman, Pratt, and Williams, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson, were cherished and displayed as evidences of official recognition. These communications were subsequently published by the revolutionary government and sent to the members of Congress at Washington. They contained nothing new to the American government, and were not considered as in any way committing the United States to pledges or policy, being largely personal in their nature. The importance of these communications was vastly exaggerated by the revolutionists, not only to substantiate their claims, but to afford them a basis for an appeal to foreign powers, and to justify their demands on the United States.

Aguinaldo wrote to General Merritt that his people had been treated with great injustice, particularly in not being allowed to occupy Manila, which, he claimed, would never have been taken by our troops except in ruins, had it not been for the siege sustained by his forces, and that on account of the position taken by

our officials, with regard to the joint occupation of Manila, it was difficult to hold his people in check. He then demanded that we must recognize "part of the rights of a friendly people," in order to quiet the complaints of his chiefs and soldiers.


When General Otis took command, he told Aguinaldo that the recognition of belligerency was a government function, and not a military one; that only his government could do that, and that unless the Insurgent forces were withdrawn from Manila, its suburbs and defences, he would be obliged to resort to forcible action.

Aguinaldo sent two commissioners to treat with General Otis and request that he withdraw the letter and issue another eliminating the threat to use force, claiming that the letter as written would incite the Insurgents to open hostility. General Otis refused to withdraw the letter, but acceded to the commissioners' desires and wrote another requesting the Insurgents to withdraw their troops. Aguinaldo replied by stating that he had given orders that troops should be withdrawn from "some of the suburbs and to a point where contact would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict."

The fight between the conservative and radical elements of the Malolos cabinet threat-


ened to break into an open row. Mabini, Buen-camino, and Pilar were anxious to precipitate hostilities with the Americans, while Arellano, Tavera, the Rosarios, and Sandico believed that diplomacy would accomplish for them what war would fail in utterly. Aguinaldo executed a coup, dismissed his cabinet, and guided by the skilled hand of Paterno, secured a new cabinet with Paterno as Prime Minister.

Aguinaldo's removal from Bacoor to Malolos was celebrated like a Roman triumph. The day was made a great fiesta. Filipino national airs were played, and dignified ceremonies, orations, feasting, and jollity prevailed. Thousands upon thousands of natives assembled to honor Aguinaldo. The towns en route and beyond Malolos were decorated in gala attire. Triumphant arches were erected and singing, dancing, and feasting were the order of the day. At San Fernando a sumptuous banquet was given. Numerous American officers were invited and attended. Aguinaldo presided. During the dinner he was unusually silent. Despite many efforts it seemed impossible to arouse his interest or inspire a flicker of enthusiasm on his countenance. Toasts went round. Several Americans made guarded speeches. Aguinaldo remained impassive. Finally Major Byrnes, who spoke



AGUINALDO REVIEWING THE REVOLU-
TIONARY FORCES

From the Capitol at Malolos, January 23, 1899



BACOLOR
ARCH

Designed by Aguinaldo



Spanish and some Tagalog, arose and made a very warm speech praising the valor and loyalty of the Filipinos. Still Aguinaldo sat unmoved. Major Byrnes continued, and just at the close of his remarks, referred to the generous intentions and disinterested purposes of the United States in the Philippines. Suddenly Aguinaldo's face was wreathed in smiles. Without a moment's warning he jumped on his chair and gave a yell like a college boy. "Champagne, champagne, champagne!" he cried out, reaching over and shaking Major Byrnes's hand. It is about the only incident on record in which Aguinaldo exhibited a spontaneous and warm regard for American occupation, although it is possible he misconstrued Major Byrnes's remark to please himself.

The unofficial opposition that existed in the United States to the demands made by our Paris commissioners for the Philippines aroused great excitement in the Filipino camp. Every speech that bolstered up the Insurgents' aspirations was transmitted to Hong Kong and sent over to Manila, receiving publication in the *Republica Filipina* or *La Independencia*. All expressions complimentary to Filipino character, industry, and ability were like dewdrops to the thirsty. The Filipinos were unaccustomed to

flattery, and under its seductive charm, blossomed and grew in self-appreciation and conceit, until they became intolerable to the Spaniards, who foresaw the end, and amusing to the Americans, who considered them children.



On September 24, Aguinaldo said to the Hon. John Barrett, who was in the Philippines: "Please inform the President, Congress, and the American people, that we are true friends of the Americans. We trust them to save us from Spanish misrule. All allegations of treachery toward the Americans are unfounded and unjust. I have never given an order, nor taken a step, that could be called treacherous. The only reason we are slow to evacuate our positions around Manila is because we are fearful Spain may yet try to occupy the same. The articles of capitulation say the Americans will retain the arms of the Spaniards when either force leaves. America interfered in Cuba for humanity's sake. For the same reason it cannot retain these Islands. It is a mistake for the Americans to think we wish to fight them. All our hopes and plans are centred in opposition to Spanish rule. Many untruthful stories have been published. Will the Americans please be charitable and hear both sides before condemning the Filipinos?"

Aguinaldo was both willing and anxious to avoid hostilities, at least until the decision of the Paris conference was known. Into all parts of Luzon and to the principal ports of the southern islands he sent small detachments of Tagalogs. His relatives were given important positions. Baldomero Aguinaldo was made commander-in-chief of the south zone. His nephew was given an important command in the Cayagan province to the north, and his cousin, General Paua, was put in command of the Camarines. Proclamations declaring the Filipinos independent were distributed throughout the Archipelago. Civil governments were established recognizing the Malolos presidency, "the military to take precedence in the case of war." The skilful aid of General Luna was brought into requisition. He organized the Insurgents upon an army basis. He gave command to Filipinos who had held petty offices under the crown forces, and soon succeeded in converting a disorganized horde of armed natives into a disciplined and carefully distributed force. Luna was a radical element from the start, and eager to test the efficiency of his organization.

The *Philippina*, a merchant ship captured from the Spanish, which figured in the Subig

Bay incident, was armed with two 3-inch guns; she visited the various ports of the Islands, and distributed companies of Tagalog soldiers to insure the allegiance of the natives, collect funds, and establish the Filipino government. The telegraph lines destroyed during the insurrection of 1897 were rebuilt, and a postal service was created. A set of stamps was printed, and a stamp tax enforced. The season was an especially prosperous one for the Filipinos. The foreign merchant ships were permitted to carry on an unrestricted trade, and free from the severe Spanish revenue taxes took active advantage of the opportunity. The Filipinos, relieved of the burdens imposed upon them by the friars and the Spaniards, realized the full benefit of their industry and the sale of their products. The Insurgent government levied a small export tax, but its principal source of revenue at that time was from contributions of the rich half-castes and the Chinese merchants. Large amounts were also taken from the friars, and sympathizers in Manila secretly contributed to the cause.

The revolutionary government was universally recognized throughout the Islands, except in Manila and seaports still held by the Spanish.



THE ANTING-ANTING STAMPS OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
 The Filipino's Charm against Death
 1.—Postage, Telegraph, Newspaper, Document 2.—Government and Provisional 3.—Seals of the Katipunan Society

Smarting under the bitterness of defeat, the Spanish soldiers, officials, and friars bore deep enmity to the Americans, and did much to poison the Filipinos' minds against us. They told the natives that Americans were not the friends of the black races; that we had mercilessly slain and exterminated the Indians and stolen their soil; that our war of 1861 was to put down the revolt of the negroes who demanded freedom, and that though many of the negroes were brutally treated and shot, they conquered in the end and secured the recognition of their rights.

Other influences were at work, each of which contributed its share toward alienating the Filipinos, and fed the fire of discontent.

The big-hearted, good-natured American volunteer, a giant in strength and stature, did not take seriously the pretensions or gravity of the Filipino officer who visited Manila, spick and span in a new uniform of blue and white drilling, very vain in his bearing and solemn in his dignity. The volunteer smiled good-naturedly, rallied him upon his newly acquired decorations, and jostled him a little if he occupied too much of the sidewalk. The Spanish officer, stripped of his side arms, back in pay, and a pensioner on his friends, of two evils chose the lesser and

hobnobbed with the American volunteer, whispering sneers in his ears at the Filipino, ridiculing the "cochero-general" who now tucked his shirt in his pants and wore stockings. The boisterous American laughed at the pretensions of the Filipinos, adroitly pointed out by the Spaniard, and thus the erstwhile greeting, "Americano-Filipino-equal," became a byword instead of a token of friendship.

Between the two armies arose numerous questions of variance, Aguinaldo protesting against the use of territory within his lines for a hospital, provided we garrisoned it, and Pardo de Tavera maintaining the right of the Insurgents to hold their position close to Manila pending the decision of the Americo-Spanish conference at Paris, and demanded the retention of the old Spanish line of fortifications, including fourteen blockhouses extending around the city. Aguinaldo continued to increase his forces in the vicinity of Manila, claiming that the Filipinos were only preparing themselves to protect their positions in case of American evacuation. General Otis refused to accept this view, and the Insurgent troops were forced to withdraw on October 25 from suburbs in which Aguinaldo had left a detachment when previously ordered to withdraw from Manila. Another issue of dis-

cord was the Spanish clergy and members of the religious orders held in captivity by the Insurgents. General Otis advised their release upon the ground that their retention was not according to the laws and usages of civilized warfare, but the Aguinaldo bureau replied that it had only taken as prisoners Spanish priests (*sacerdotes religiosos*), who, he maintained, did not come under the exemption of clerical bodies, as they had held civil positions and had taken up arms against the Filipinos by order of General Augustin, and arrested defenceless citizens, women, and children, thrown them into prison and submitted them to indescribable tortures to accomplish their ends and their submission to Spanish rule. In the Spanish penal prisons and penitentiaries were hundreds of Filipino prisoners who were deported during the revolution of 1896-1897 by the Spanish government through the "arts and malicious customs of the priests, called ministers of peace," who, so an Aguinaldo letter claimed, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish government, had robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty, while the Filipino priests were spurned by the Vatican. Aguinaldo refused to release the friars and the civil officials unless the deported Filipinos were returned and the Filipino clergy

should be recognized by the Pope. General Otis replied that the expressed intention of holding the Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force the Vatican of Rome into certain acknowledgments with appropriate action he could not conceive to be well founded in law, custom, or precedent, and that the position was untenable.

Considerable correspondence followed, in which the astute and learned Arellano undoubtedly dictated the opinion for Aguinaldo, but the release of Spanish prisoners and priests was not effected. Arellano quoted liberally from historic precedent supporting the attitude of the revolutionary government, citing cases of retort in the American war of independence, and defending his position with ability and vigor.

Many conflicting reports were circulated regarding the treatment of the friars. If the stories told me by one of them who escaped are to be believed, they were seized and thrown into prison, their sacerdotal robes torn from their bodies. No clothing was given them save a pair of the thinnest trousers and a small jacket and coat. Once captured, they were not left long to meditate in their cells. Provided with their scant clothing, they were set at work in

sugar-cane fields in the hot sun. Guards were placed over them, who compelled them with the utmost cruelty to work, whether they were physically able to do so or not. Their food for an entire day, which was handed them at night, consisted of a handful of rice and a little water. If they asked for more, they were tortured and cruelly abused. At night, when they returned from the fields, they were compelled to sleep on the bare floors of the prisons, with not the slightest covering for their aching bodies. Some were thrown into dungeons, while others were taken into open squares and publicly beaten. Though the natives of the better class showed every disposition to help them, they were powerless to do so, for they were threatened with death if they rendered the least assistance. Food was forbidden to be brought into the jails, but a Franciscan friar succeeded, on one occasion, in smuggling some food into the prison; upon being discovered, he was taken into an adjoining field and lashed to a post, where he died from the effects of heat and starvation. If priests asked for meat, the Insurgents would cut the flesh from their arms and other parts of their bodies and compel them to eat it. Scores of unfortunates were crucified and tortured to death in various ways. From an Englishman

who was within the Insurgent lines for a long time, I heard that four hundred friars and priests were deported north to La Paz, a fever-infected district, the most unhealthy spot in Luzon. There they were forced to act as servants to their guards, and to perform the most menial services. They were given the scantiest food, which barely sustained life, and when ill were left without medicine or attendance. The fate of these priests has not been revealed. My informant told me that La Paz was known as the place where the population changed every six months, implying, he said, that the ravages of fever, malaria, and dysentery brought the mortality up to fifty per cent of the population.

Numerous parleys subsequently took place between the American commander and Aguinaldo and between Spanish commissioners and the Insurgent leaders, but Aguinaldo clung to his demands: money for the Spanish soldiers, recognition of the native curés by the Vatican for the Spanish clergy. The first was impossible and the second scorned, so nothing was accomplished.

Directly following this controversy the famous cipher letter dated, "Revolutionary Government of the Filipinos, Office of the President, Malolos, October 25, 1898," and signed "I-I-

9-6-1 M," was sent to General Diego Rios, commander of the Spanish troops in the Philippines. It contained proposals and conditions whereby General Rios might yet save the "shipwrecked sovereignty of Spain in the Philippines."

To do justice to the writer of the letter, it must be remembered that the Spanish troops still held most of the principal parts of the Islands. Sovereignty of the Archipelago had not been given up by Spain. The letter assumes that Spain was yet undecided to whom she should surrender, if at all. "I am informed that you are considering surrendering the place to us or to the Americans," said the anonymous correspondent. And continuing, "The way to make the surrender is to join us and proclaim the federation of the Filipino republic with the Spanish republic, recognizing the chieftainship of our honorable president, Señor Emilio Aguinaldo . . . and in the meantime we will fight the Americans together. . . . If you join us, you cause the liberation of the nine thousand Spanish prisoners in our hands. . . . This is all I can say at present, and I hope that you will tell me that you agree with me,—then I shall be able to present this to my government, and obtain from it an agreement to what I have written as a private individual."

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To do justice to the writer of the letter, it must be remembered that the Spanish troops still held most of the principal parts of the Islands. Sovereignty of the Archipelago had not been given up by Spain. The letter assumes that Spain was yet undecided to whom she should surrender, if at all. "I am informed that you are considering surrendering the place to us or to the Americans," said the anonymous correspondent. And continuing, "The way to make the surrender is to join us and proclaim the federation of the Filipino republic with the Spanish republic, recognizing the chieftainship of our honorable president, Señor Emilio Aguinaldo . . . and in the meantime we will fight the Americans together. . . . If you join us, you cause the liberation of the nine thousand Spanish prisoners in our hands. . . . This is all I can say at present, and I hope that you will tell me that you agree with me,—then I shall be able to present this to my government, and obtain from it an agreement to what I have written as a private individual."

Senator Spooner in presenting this letter to the Senate, in May, 1900, argued that "M," the letter at the end of the signature, is the first letter in the word, "Miong," and that "Miong" in the Philippine cipher is "Emilio." I should, however, be inclined to think that the letter was written by Paterno, who was on intimate terms with the Spanish officials; it was he who conducted negotiations of the Biacnabato treaty, and wrote the public letter to the Filipinos, directly after the return of Aguinaldo to Cavite, in which he said: "Let us help our old ally, Spain, and realize, with her, more quickly our aspirations. Under Spain our future is clear; under American rule our future is cloudy."

In November, 1898, I visited Aguinaldo at his capital at Malolos. I was laboring under the popular delusion as to Aguinaldo's greatness, and judged him largely from the documents that bore his name, although I was in possession of some information which aided me in understanding somewhat the situation at Malolos. I was well acquainted with a number of revolutionary sympathizers, and several members of Aguinaldo's cabinet who resided in Manila, and considering their views and the positions they held, I was somewhat surprised at the open manner in which they depreciated

Aguinaldo's ability and deplored the prominence accorded him, even while they themselves admitted that his name was the only one that held the natives in check and united in the aspirations for independence. It was humiliating to them that Aguinaldo, instead of one of their number, held the confidence of the people.

I shall not soon forget my first pilgrimage to the Filipino Mecca. Those were the palmy days of the Republica Filipina, and Aguinaldo's name was on every one's lips.



There was a cordon of Insurgent soldiers around Manila, and to pass this line one must needs have a pass signed by Aguinaldo. I boarded the diminutive train on the Manila Dagupan Railroad, and in company with twelve carloads of bare-footed natives was soon speeding along the little narrow gauge toward Malolos. In half an hour we had passed the cordon, and I and my Filipino companion were landed on the Malolos platform, which was patrolled by a half-dozen or more Filipino soldiers, who strutted up and down and, it seemed to me, looked upon me with suspicion. I greeted their looks with an affable smile, — we all did then, — and they withdrew their stare and passed on.

After the little train puffed out of the station I pushed my way through a crowd of palm-

extended beggars, trading upon deformed limbs and leprous faces, and reached the opposite side of the station, where lingered beneath the shade of some scraggly palms a half-dozen caromettas, attached by crude hemp harnesses to ponies, long strangers to *sacati* and *pali*.

Though naturally merciful to the animal kingdom, I was prevailed upon by Malolos "hackmen," augmented by the persuasive rays of the midday sun, to take a seat in one of their crude carts, and was soon bumping and joggling over the occasionally planked road toward the pueblo.

It was *tiffin* time, and I knew better than to disturb any Filipino gentleman at midday. For a siesta follows *tiffin* with as much regularity as a demi-tasse does dinner in America. My Filipino friend and myself therefore repaired to a public house and partook of a native meal which was washed down by native drinks—the combination fitting one for any crime. After visiting the church, the public square, and the town pump, I presented myself at the *casa* Aguinaldo. The *Presidente* made his headquarters in the second story of a large convent, or priest's-house, as it is called, adjoining the Malolos church, which was utilized to accommodate the sessions of the Filipino Congress. Two Maxim guns protruded



AT MALOLOS
January 23, 1899

1. — Triumphal Arch Erected in Honor of Aguinaldo's Inauguration 2. — Arrival of Aguinaldo for his Inauguration



from the windows of the convent, and the entrance was guarded by a patrol of Filipino soldiery.

We passed this gantlet without challenge and ascended the convent stairs. At the top extended a long, broad hall. On either side of this passageway were stationed Aguinaldo's body-guards armed with halberds. Diminutive Filipinos, almost comical in their toylike dignity, were ranged along the wall, giving themselves an extra brace as we passed. The halberds were cheap imitations of those customarily used in the palace of the governor general at Manila upon state occasion.

Our cards were sent in. The *Presidente* would receive us. Would we wait for a brief space? The dapper but brave little insurgent general, Pio del Pilar, was pleased to greet us.

The *Presidente* knew of my coming. Had it been telegraphed to him when we crossed the line? Ah, *señor*, the *Presidente* knows everything. He desires to protect Americans when they do him so much honor. But did one need special protection in Aguinaldo's country? No, *señor*, but there are Spaniards who yet hope and hate. Too much caution cannot be exercised. Would we look at the council room — and so on.

I early learned that if one wished to get in-

formation from a Filipino one must not ask it. Aguinaldo's council chamber was interesting. Down the centre of the hall were parallel rows of chairs, Filipino style, facing each other. Here sat the dignitaries of state like rows of men awaiting their turns in a barber shop. The walls were hung with creditable paintings by native artists. A large Oriental rug covered the mahogany floor.

On bambo pedestals around the rooms were miniature wood carvings representing Filipino victims undergoing tortures of various descriptions at the hands of friars and Spanish officials for refusing to divulge the secrets of the Katipunan. One showed a native suspended on tiptoes by a cord tied around his tongue, while a Spanish hireling slashed his back with a knife. Another represented a native of the province of Nueve Ecija falsely accused of hostility to the Spanish, so I was told. A cord passed through his nose, as if he were a beast of burden. A Spaniard was cudgelling his bare shoulders with a bamboo stick. Another showed a Filipino hung up by his feet with a big stone bound to each shoulder. Still another represented a native with his back bent backward, a pole passing under his knees, a cord around his chest holding him bent over in a most pain-

ful position. And others equally terrible. All these were actual cases. I was told the history of each one.

Finally Aguinaldo was ready to receive us. The red plush curtains that separated his private room from the council chamber were drawn aside by guards, and we entered the holy of holies. The little chieftain was already standing to receive us.

His spacious room was adorned with Japanese tapestries. Around the walls were handsome Japanese vases, and emblazoned high on one side of the room was a shield of ancient Japanese and Mindanao arms. On another side of the room was a huge Spanish mirror. Back of Aguinaldo's desk hung from its staff a handsome Spanish flag. I jokingly asked Aguinaldo if he would present it to me as a souvenir of my visit. "Not for twenty-five thousand pesos," he replied. "I captured it at Cavite, my native town. The Spaniards have offered thousands of pesos as a bribe for the restoration of that flag, so I keep it here."

Aguinaldo is short. His skin is dark. His head is large but well poised on a rather slight body. His hair is the shiny black of the Tagalog, and is combed pompadour, enhancing his height somewhat. On that day he was dressed

in a suit of fine piña-cloth of native manufacture, and he wore no indication of his rank.

Through my Filipino friend, as interpreter, I had an extended conversation with him. He told me that he hoped to avoid a rupture with the Americans, but that his people felt that they had been wronged and slighted, and that they were becoming turbulent and difficult to control. He said that his government was thoroughly organized. That throughout the provinces, where insurrection had been incessant for years, all was quiet, and the peaceful pursuits of labor were being carried on. "I hope these conditions will not be disturbed," he added, not without meaning. I asked him if the charges were true that the Spanish friars were maltreated, and if women, also, were imprisoned. He replied that he was not responsible to any one for the treatment of his prisoners, but that if an accredited emissary of General Otis would call upon him, he would permit him to visit the places where the Spanish prisoners were confined. As to the women, he said that they were "wives" of the priests, and voluntarily shared captivity with them. As I left the room he spoke to my Filipino friend, calling him back. Being somewhat curious at this not altogether polite act, I later asked the reason.

My friend smiled, and told me that Aguinaldo wished him to make a purchase in Manila, and requested him to attend to it. "But what did he want?" I said. My friend again smiled, and said:—

"You know he is vain. He wants me to get him another large mirror like the one in his room. He desires it to be the finest plate glass, and the frame, also, Spanish style, to be set with mirrors. He wants, too, some other decorations and knickknacks for his room. He is fond of finery, — like the rest of us, you know."

I saw that great French plate-glass mirror several months later. It was removed from the Aguinaldo sanctum, however, and braced up against a mango tree in front of the "palace" headquarters. A big, swarthy Kansan was taking his first shave before it after the capture of Malolos, March 31, 1899.

VIII

THE period from our military occupation of Manila up to the outbreak was one of the most interesting and complex in the trend of events. At Malolos the keenest minds in the Filipino race were bending every effort to extend and solidify the power of Aguinaldo throughout the Archipelago. Three thousand miles of telegraph wire was in control of the Insurgent government. Swift runners brought and carried messages into the most remote part of the Islands. Captured launches and Chinese junks plied between the various ports and islands, and proclamations, orders, arms, and ammunition were distributed. The revolutionary government was recognized by the Filipinos and native races, in some instances willingly, in others by force. Police and civil guards were established in the principal towns, and the railroad was utilized at will by the Insurgent officials. The Filipino farmers were taken into the army, drilled and organized and sent back to their crops. The women

worked in the fields in the enforced absence of their husbands, and preparations were made, stores were husbanded, and munitions brought into the Islands preparatory to a military campaign. In Manila secret agents of the Insurgent government raised large sums, sometimes by voluntary subscription, sometimes by intimidation. The wealthy Chinese in Manila and throughout the Islands were induced to contribute largely to the revolutionary cause. Paterno, the mediator, the publicist, the rich steamship owner and planter, who had cried out with equal fervor, "Viva los Filipinos," and "Viva la España," was again in the fold and installed as president of the revolutionary congress, which voted Aguinaldo a salary of \$25,000 a year and \$50,000 for expenses. Aguinaldo gratified his love of pomp and display by gorgeous decorations and trappings. More parades at Malolos and San Fernando were given, banquets were held, and dances followed. Enthusiasm was rampant. The Filipinos, anxious to impress the Americans, invited them freely to witness their ceremonies. They were received with great cordiality and enthusiasm, and given places of honor at dinners and social functions. The hospitality of the Filipinos was boundless and their pride limitless.

The simple, industrious, and romantic people we had known and who impressed us so favorably upon our first acquaintance suddenly became vain, pompous, and boastful. I saw hundreds of Spanish prisoners degraded to the positions of servants and burden bearers. Dejected, haggard, half-starved, and crushed in pride and spirit, the outraged soldier of Spain was forced to black the boots of the Tagalog official. It was a spectacle with which the American soldier, though so recently his enemy, was not in sympathy. It was the relic of the savage, and a living commentary upon the claims of the Filipinos to higher civilization.

At one of the Filipino banquets a Spanish soldier, serving as a bottle-washer in Aguinaldo's kitchen, put poison in the soup; and but for the fact that a native waiter tasted it, the indignities and cruelties practised upon the prisoners would have been avenged. Aguinaldo's escape was attributed to the power of the *Anting-Anting*, and the incident added lustre to his fame as the Invulnerable.

Aguinaldo's presence upon any occasion was marked with the utmost ceremony and parade. The people worshipped him and covered his path with flowers, the children dropped on their knees at his approach, and the natives doffed

their hats in reverence. Their love of feasts, music, and dancing was given full rein, and Aguinaldo made triumphal tours in the cities along the railroad line, his appearance arousing the Filipinos to a fervor resembling religious frenzy. Triumphal floral arches were erected, mass meetings of enormous proportions were held, and the prettiest girls in the village, dressed in the colors of the Filipino flag blended with the stars and stripes, were hailed and cheered with delight, for the Filipino leaders assured the inhabitants that the Americans sanctioned their government. So generally was this accepted that in one instance a governor of a northern province, upon learning in December of the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Paris, disbanded the Insurgent militia and proclaimed a civil government.

The spirit of liberty dominated the hearts of the people, and the vanity of power took possession of Aguinaldo and the Filipino leaders. Our advice and friendship, our indulgence—even the presence of Americans at their functions—were construed as a recognition of their Independence.

The universal sentiment of the Insurgent officers, civil and military, and of leading townspeople proved to be virtually the same. They

all declared they would accept nothing short of independence, but desired the protection of the United States at sea.

Aguinaldo had an organized military force in every province of the north. Insurgent soldiers were everywhere, arms were plentiful and ammunition abundant. There were rifles enough for all, principally Remingtons, but many Mausers. In every quarter there were at least as many rifles as soldiers in the garrison. Ammunition was so plentiful that the native used it freely in hunting for deer. Colonel Tirona claimed that two hundred thousand men from all the Islands could be put into the field well armed; and several other Insurgent officers, independently questioned, gave the same figure. Every officer carried a Spanish sword and revolver constantly, but regarded them with contempt, preferring the bolo at close quarters. The military spirit pervaded the north where every town and barrio had organized companies, even enlisting the children, who were drilled every day.

Arms and ammunition continued to find their way into Luzon. On the 27th of August the *Abby*, alias *Pasig*, flying the American flag, having received American register at Canton, arrived at Batangas. It was commanded by an American, and delivered to the Insurgents about

500 rifles, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, two Maxim guns, and 2000 rounds of Maxim ammunition. Accompanying the expedition was another American whose purpose was to instruct the Filipino in the use of the rapid-firing guns. Admiral Dewey, through information received from Consul General Wildman, sent the *McCulloch* to Batangas in September, and seized the *Abby*, but not until her cargo was landed. Arms even found their way into Manila Bay on merchant ships, and were landed under false labels. Funeral processions became so numerous in Manila that they aroused suspicion, and not without cause. In a number of instances caskets in hearses were found to be filled with Mausers, destined ostensibly for a suburban native cemetery.

The north of Luzon was ready for war. The revolutionary government controlled the old Spanish fortifications, and enlisted in its cause the wild tribes of the mountains.

On October 5, 1898, *La Independencia*, the organ of the Filipino Republic, was started in Manila. General Luna was its editor-in-chief. Associated with him were Marciano V. del Rosario, Vito Bellarmino, and other members of the revolutionary congress. *La Independencia* began its career by hurling defiance to all who opposed the "final aspirations" of the

Filipinos. "Governing all Luzon, we wish to show all nations that we are capable of governing ourselves," said *La Independencia*.

"We salute America, that powerful country with which we unite the bonds of sincerest friendship. Together we have fought, and in days of extreme danger we have felt our hearts beat in unison. Having declared war against Spain in the name of humanity, and being designated the champion of people oppressed by the Spanish government, she does not come here to make war against any party, nor to seize one strip of territory; her mission is greater and more generous, being inspired always by the Monroe Doctrine. Our cause should have her sympathy, that due to a young people who aspire to independence, having confidence in their own efforts, and nobleness of their cause. Our highest aim should be received with generous sympathy by the free nations. The independence of the United States met with the help and sympathy of the generous French.

"We salute the foreign nations, especially those who hold interests in the Philippines, expressing to them our strongest desire to continue in peace on the basis of our independence. We salute also our president, Citizen Aguinaldo, the

life and soul of the revolution, and the government whose policy is the attraction for worth, honesty, and justice, also our valorous and suffering army whose chiefs and soldiers have fought and will fight to gain their nationality. We send our respects to the press of the Philippines and foreign parts, recommending ourself to their acquaintance."

This publication had a large circulation, and day after day was an ardent champion of Filipino independence. Its office was the gathering-place of the Filipino leaders, and its editorials and correspondence were prepared and gone over with the greatest deliberation and painstaking.

Published within the American lines and circulated freely in the city, it excited the people and aroused the Spanish residents to a point of frenzy. After several weeks General Otis suppressed the publication. Its offices and plant were thereupon removed to Malolos. *La Independencia* played a very important part in the revolution. Driven from town to town, it clung to life with a doglike tenacity. It served as an official gazette and a newspaper, and carried into the farthest island the tidings of alleged Insurgent victories at arms. Of this publication and its contents I shall give a more detailed account in a later chapter.

The Manila sympathizers told the revolutionists that the American commander was a Catholic, and was in daily communication with the archbishop; that the Church of Rome kept him in power, and that it was his aim to restore the old régime of Catholic orders in the Islands; that through Archbishop Nozeleda he had won over Arellano who was the attorney for the archbishop, and that the Church and State were in league as of old. Further, that the American army chaplains were Catholics, and held services with the Spanish priests in the cathedral.

Another point of discord was the coming of Chinese coolies, who flocked to the Islands by thousands to take places as servants and day laborers, and to profit by the high prices and disturbed conditions. The industrious and cheap-living Chinaman had always been a cause of irritation to the Tagalog, and his presence in the Island was never wholly acceptable to the Filipino. General Otis, therefore, to solve the problem and conciliate the Filipinos, issued an order enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Act, excepting only previous residents of Manila who had migrated during and just preceding the American occupation of Cavite and Manila. The Filipino laboring classes took advantage

of Otis's clemency and became arrogant and sulky, increasing the prices of labor one hundred per cent. Many natives left Manila and joined the Insurgent army, and the mood of those who remained was such that Americans feared to trust their lives and properties in their hands.

Collector of Customs, Colonel Colton, having one night for his guest Consul Johnson of Amoy, arose in the morning to find that the valuables and clothing of himself and the consul were stolen, while in his sleeping-room a wash-bowl of water, a towel, and a bolo were left, significantly showing the thieves' intentions had an attempt been made to interfere with them. Spaniards and Americans frequently had their property stolen in the night by servants whose disappearance in the morning gave evidence of their culpability. Instances of attempted poisoning were so frequent that it became a matter of great risk to keep a Tagalog servant.

There were numerous Spanish garrisons throughout the Islands, and the fact that we permitted them to remain unmolested annoyed the Insurgents. General Otis held that pending the signing of the Peace Treaty, all territory outside of Manila was still under Spanish jurisdiction. Six hundred Spanish soldiers were

besieged at Santa Cruz, in Laguna de Bay; Alby was held by a Spanish garrison; also the principal town of Nailu and South Camarines and Nueva Caceras, the provinces of North and South Ilocos, Isabella, and Cagayan were held by the Spanish. Two hundred and fifty crown soldiers were at Marong, and as far as could be ascertained the Spanish garrisons in Cebu, Iloilo, Leyte, and Mindanao still held out. Because our forces had ceased to operate against the Spaniards, the Filipino leaders were tortured with the fear that we would return the Islands to Spain. They failed to realize that we did not cherish the bitter enmity toward Spain that possessed them, nor could they comprehend why, on the eve of an overwhelming victory, we should cease in the prosecution of a campaign that offered assured success. Aguinaldo and the Insurgent leaders were anxious for the absolute annihilation of Spanish power. They did not fear us, but entertained a terrible dread of Spanish methods. "The Filipinos desire to live in peace and harmony with the Americans," wrote Aguinaldo, October 22, 1898, "because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion."

It was very clear that the Filipino leaders

were determined upon independence; were opposed irrevocably to the return of Spanish rule; were willing to allow us to protect them in the accomplishment of their ambitions. They knew what they did not want, but varied in their statements of what they did want.

The outcome of the Peace Conference was awaited with great impatience. Filipe Agoncillo had been sent to Paris to secure a hearing in the interests of the Filipino government. Much to his chagrin he was given no place in the commission.

The Asiatic coast adventurers, clinging to the skirts of Filipino aspirations, profiting in pocket, agitated the press of America with stories of the greatness of Aguinaldo and the fitness of the Filipinos for self-government. The superficial fanatic in the United States took up the cry and demanded for the fledgling government national recognition. "We want facts to strengthen the arguments for your wished-for independence in the coming elections," wrote the president of an American league to Aguinaldo.

On a trip to Dagupan, in company with Mr. Horace Higgins, the general director of the railway, we discovered at Malolos that Aguinaldo had placed a guard of six Insurgents upon the car ahead of us, to "insure our safety," we were

politely informed. Our protectors, however, spent most of their time in watching our actions. At Dagupan I saw several good-sized sailing-ships, war canoes rigged with canvas, and large cascoes anchored in the Dagupan River, flying the Insurgent flag. Miles of track along the railroad had been stripped of the fish-plates, which were taken by the Insurgents and made into crude bolos, or daggers, with wooden or carabao horn handles and bamboo sheathes. Large quantities of telegraph wire had been stolen and wound around bamboo for cannons or used in the extension of Insurgent telegraph lines. Mr. Higgins was powerless to prevent their depredations.

General Whittier, ex-collector of the port, visited Malolos and endeavored to find out precisely what Aguinaldo represented, that he might present his views before the Paris commission. Aguinaldo told him that his people were divided into two parties, those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties were about equal; that he was waiting to see which would have the majority, and in that case would take a position. General Whittier pointed out to Aguinaldo the advantage of American sovereignty. Aguinaldo replied that "the civilized

nations would see that our possessions were not taken from us." General Whittier asked him what he expected of America. "To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held all the country and administered civil offices with its own people." "And what would America get from this?" General Whittier asked. "That would be a detail that would be settled hereafter," replied Aguinaldo. Buencamino, Aguinaldo's chief adviser at this time, told General Whittier he was sure the President was in favor of an American protectorate. Thus the house was divided against itself.

In America a policy was rapidly crystallizing. President McKinley made a tour of the country, delivering speeches and gathering the consensus of opinion of the people everywhere. He became convinced that the sentiment of the country was in favor of the retention of the Philippines. The Americans were imbued with the spirit of the "White Man's Burden," and liked the idea of extending the sovereignty of the republic over a people suffering under the atrocities of mediæval rule. They favored intervention in Cuba, and they were not willing that the flag should be lowered in the Philippines. The victory of Dewey was the pride of every American, and the vast majority was desirous

of extending our domain in the Orient. The sentimentalist and the humanitarian realized the opportunity to free a suffering people from the tyrannies of an unjust government, and the American business man saw opportunities to broaden his commercial relations and control a new and productive field.

As soon as it became evident to the Insurgents that the Americans were opposed to the restoration of Spanish sovereignty, that question ceased to be a factor in the situation. While it became apparent to the American people and the commissioners in Paris that our duty was to retain the Philippines, it became evident that the Insurgents proposed to contest our occupation and demand the recognition of the Filipino republic. The erstwhile lieutenant of the crown forces had become a brigadier general of the Filipino army; the lay-reader of the Spanish priests had clothed himself in the robes of his superior; the law student had become a judge; the tiller of soil and the bearer of burdens had become soldiers of the republic; and the rebel chieftain, who was prolific in his protestations of friendship and gratitude to the "great North American nation," aspired to be the "George Washington of his people."

Despite these declarations, our army remained

idle and extended to the Filipino friendly consideration. Our soldiers were barricaded in old buildings, improvised shacks, or upon the open field; they slept on hard floors and stretched out upon the uncovered ground; they guarded over the property of the insurrectionists and the Spaniard with equal vigilance. Liberty and license as practised by the Old-World invading armies were unknown. Ill clothed, unkempt, and dressed in rough campaign suits, the appearance of the American soldier provoked the contempt of the dapper Filipino general. The Spanish taught them a new word, "Yancos," and they applied it to the American with contempt.

On December 10 the treaty of peace with Spain was signed in Paris, and its terms were soon known to the Insurgent government. The greatest activity followed. A large residence was rented in Manila and the Filipino Club was formed. All prominent Insurgent officials became members. The club worked in close sympathy with the revolutionary government, and while ostensibly devoted to social and athletic diversions, its chief occupation was the promulgation of the doctrine of independence, and the organization of a semi-military league in the city. From time to time our police

unearthed small native and Chinese shops, where, in inconspicuous and inaccessible back rooms, bolos were being made and Insurgent uniforms manufactured. At this time the Spanish generals, holding the southern islands pending the signing of the treaty of peace, released large numbers of native soldiers who had been serving in the Spanish army. These were shipped to Manila, where, finding themselves without pay or means of support, they went over to the Insurgent army, many of these being given important commissions in recognition of their military experience.

The Insurgents in Panay began to make themselves heard. The Spanish force, there, was eight hundred, but over two hundred were sick or wounded. The Insurgents harassed them incessantly, assembling in large numbers across the river opposite Iloilo at Moro, where they were strongly intrenched. The Spanish gunboats commanded the river and checked the attempt on the part of the Insurgents to cross the river and storm Iloilo. Early in December the business men of the city sent a petition to General Otis asking for American protection, stating that the Insurgents were reported to be favorable for annexation. General Otis reported this to Washington, and was instructed to send

troops, but avoid a conflict with the Insurgents. General Rios, however, did not wait for the arrival of our forces, but evacuated Iloilo on the 23d of December and handed the town over to the Insurgents, who immediately took possession. General Miller, who had charge of the Iloilo expedition, took aboard two hundred discharged native crown soldiers, who had been dumped into Manila, and were anxious, they said, to return to their homes in Panay. The act was intended as an expression of kindness on our part to assist a penniless body of men to return to their homes. Had General Miller known that these two hundred soldiers were pledged to Aguinaldo, and that their leader bore instructions to General Areneta, the Insurgent commander of the forces in Panay, to resist American occupation, the destination of these cunning Tagalogs would have been in Fort Santiago. But he was ignorant of the mutinous intent of his guests, and they were landed upon the coast of Panay, near Iloilo, promising to prepare the way for our coming. They disappeared, and promptly joined their brothers in arms, and subsequently caused a great deal of trouble in Panay.

In reflecting upon how the native juggled with our credulity and ignorance, were the

results not so serious it would almost encroach upon the ludicrous. Chattering and prattling in a dozen jargons, their language as incomprehensible as their character, we accepted their protestations and vows of friendship, while they plotted and planned to thwart our intentions. When time shall have healed the wound, it will be the theme for the opera bouffe.

On the 28th of December, 1898, the *Arizona* and *Pennsylvania* anchored off Point Luzaron, thirty miles from Iloilo, and the *Baltimore* and *Newport* entered the harbor. An aide from the Insurgent brigadier, General Delgado, sought an interview with General Miller, and asked him our intentions. Upon informing the Insurgent general that our troops had come to occupy the city, Delgado replied that he could yield nothing without instructions from Aguinaldo. The president of the Insurgent government, President Lopez, further notified General Miller that the people would consent to no foreign interference, without express orders from the central government at Luzon. The leading foreign business men of Manila petitioned General Miller to consider the demand of the Insurgents. Upon learning the conditions and the probable result of forcible occupation of Iloilo, General Otis instructed General Miller,


in accordance with a despatch from Washington, not to be in haste, but to remain in the harbor with his force and await further orders. General Otis transmitted a modified copy of President McKinley's proclamation, December 21, for Miller's instruction. The proclamation was published by General Miller and distributed among the Insurgents and residents of Iloilo. It caused the utmost consternation, and brought forth a tirade of abuse and defiance against the American government.

The proclamation announced that by the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States; that the actual occupation and administration of the entire Archipelago became, therefore, immediately necessary, and that the military government was to be extended with all possible despatch over the entire territory. The private, personal, and religious rights and relations of the inhabitants were guaranteed. Inhabitants, either by active aid or honest submission, who cooperated with the government were promised support and protection, but all others were warned that they would be brought within the lawful rule of the United States. The civil and municipal government were to be

operated by officers, chosen as far as practicable from the inhabitants of the Islands. Arbitrary rule was to be substituted by the mild sway of justice, and the greatest good of those governed was promised. The proclamation was sneered and laughed at, and copies of it were sent to Malolos.

The Insurgents raised their flag over the old Spanish fort, dug trenches, fortified the harbor, sunk cascoes loaded with stones at the mouth of the Talana River, for they were now in absolute possession of the Island of Panay. Foreign vessels continued to trade with Iloilo, took and landed cargoes, assuming all risks, and thus large amounts of money reached the Insurgent treasury. Under the same conditions ships were going and coming from most of the ports throughout Luzon and the southern islands. The crops had been large, and the trade was most profitable to both the foreigners and the Filipinos, who levied duties upon the foreigners and a war tax upon the inhabitants.

Before issuing the President's proclamation in Manila, General Otis counselled with a number of the leading "Pacifcos" and prominent Filipinos of the city. Upon learning from an Iloilo messenger the final intentions of the United States, there arose the utmost confusion



PROCLAMATION OF AGUINALDO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT AT MALOLOS, JANUARY 23, 1899



among the revolutionists, who plainly told General Otis that the document would not be received with favor. The contents of the Iloilo proclamation upset the Malolos congress, and the entire cabinet was overthrown. Mabini regained his power over the deputies, was elected president of the congress, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and proclaimed a policy of independence or death. Theodoro Sandico appeared upon the scene again, and was drawn to the side of the "Irreconcilables" and made Minister of the Interior; Baldomero Aguinaldo was appointed Minister of War; General Trias, Minister of Finance; Gregario Gonzaga, formerly Spanish Attorney General of the Vascayas, was made Minister of Public Works. Aguinaldo and Paterno withdrew to Santa Anna, and the status of the dictatorial president was in durance for some days, for it was said he strenuously opposed the warlike attitude of Mabini. The "Pacificos" were utterly routed, and the military element was in the ascendant.

Mabini, the "Irreconcilable," demanded the recognition of the independence of the Philippines, and announced that he would only release the Spanish prisoners upon the receipt of propositions directly from Spain, which recognized the Filipinos as belligerents. The

friars, he said, would not be released, seeing that they had acted as papal agents during the war, except upon the following conditions: firstly, the apostolic delegate must ask for their liberty in the name of the Pope; secondly, all bills and pontifical decrees granting special privileges to the religious orders must be removed; thirdly, all rites of the secular clergy must be respected; fourthly, no friar may hold any parish, cathedral, episcopate, or diocesan preferments; fifthly, all such preferments to be held by native or naturalized Filipino clergy; and sixthly, rules for the election of bishops must be fixed.

Mabini started out with a high hand. Aguinaldo was given little consideration. Even were he anxious for more moderation, as was generally believed at the time, his counsel was ignored. We began to discriminate between the real Aguinaldo and the composite that had fooled us.

In the midst of this uproar General Otis, January 4, issued a proclamation amending the President's instructions to the Secretary of War. It varied little, however, from the original, issued at Iloilo, and already in the hands of the Malolos government, except that it stated that the controlling element among the Fili-

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pinos would be given civil positions; that considerable of the military force of the Islands would be drawn from the inhabitants, and that the aim of the American government was to eventually give the people as free and independent a government as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.

IX

THE proclamation of General Otis was gratifying to foreign residents and American troops in the Philippines. It assured them that the government was determined to "see the thing through," but as a pacific measure it was absolutely valueless. Conservative business men, long residents of the Philippines, predicted an immediate outbreak of hostilities. The natives tore the proclamation from the walls and trampled upon it. Many of the wealthy Filipinos transferred their property to Spanish attorneys, and thousands of natives left the city to join the Insurgents. The *Escolta* the main thoroughfare of Manila, was rife with rumors that attempts would be made to burn the city and that an uprising of the natives might be expected at any moment. Even the Filipino women declared, in a paper drawn up and signed by a large number, that they would resist the Americans, side by side with their husbands and sons, and would shed every

drop of blood in their veins for the independence of their country.

La Independencia was violent in its abuse of the Americans, and exhorted every man, woman, and child to arm themselves and die for liberty. Spanish sympathizers and half-castes told the Filipinos that Americans sought the Islands to satisfy the greed and ambition of political office-seekers, and that the American people did not favor the subjugation of the Filipinos. Mabini advocated a declaration of war. Former subterfuges that the Filipino army only aimed to defend itself against the crown forces should we turn the Islands back to Spain, were brushed aside, and independence or death was the unqualified demand set forth.

On the day following General Otis's proclamation Aguinaldo caused to be posted in the streets of Manila, and distributed generally, a virtual declaration of war. In this document he reviewed the events, from the beginning, pointed out the assistance his troops had been to our forces, called attention to the action of Admiral Dewey in seizing his launches, protested against the action of General Otis in forcing him to withdraw his forces, reiterated his assertions that consular promises had been given him, referred to our operations in Iloilo

harbor, and concluded by threatening hostilities if we attempted to occupy Iloilo. An official manifesto was published simultaneously, in which Aguinaldo protested against General Otis signing himself the military governor of the Philippine Islands. He declared that he had never by word or writing recognized the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines, but on the contrary, in all his official proclamations had proclaimed the liberty and independence of the Filipinos, and that he solemnly protested against the claims of the United States. "There must be no turning back in the path we have already entered," concluded the manifesto. Aguinaldo then addressed a letter to foreigners in Manila, offering them protection should hostilities occur between the Filipinos and Americans. General Otis ordered Aguinaldo's proclamation torn down and destroyed.

The month of January, 1889, was a reign of terror. The American volunteers, chafing under restraint and taunted by the Filipinos, were difficult to control. The Insurgent newspapers were violent and uncompromising, and accused the Americans of unjust treatment and the American soldiers of indiscriminate use of force against innocent Filipino residents. They complained against the shooting of stragglers who passed

in the vicinity of American fortifications. The native population was between the devil and the deep sea. Terrorized by the Insurgents, and distrusted by the American soldiers, they were in a state of sullen fear. Those employed by Americans were bullied and tyrannized by the revolutionists into leaving their posts, and extortionate demands for money were enforced against every Filipino of prominence. Hundreds of natives were pressed into the Insurgent army, and fearing assassination at the hand of the Katipunans, it became impossible to hire natives to perform the most trifling services. Even the Chinese shared this feeling of terror and huddled together in their quarters, afraid to stir outside of the section of the city where they outnumbered the Filipinos.

It is an open question whether or not the breach between us and the Filipinos at that time could have been healed. Our policy was formulated and announced. Theirs was apparent. We well knew what they demanded. It simply remained to be seen whether they would "see the error of their ways," or whether they would persist in an unequal struggle. President McKinley thought that they would realize our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we could give them good government our

sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. He urged that tact and kindness was most essential at that time, as we had accepted the Philippines from a high sense of duty in the interests of their inhabitants and for humanity and civilization.

He was both right and wrong. The Filipinos refused to see conditions from our point of view, and we declined to acknowledge their claims.

A peace commission was arranged in hopes of arriving at something definite. Brigadier General R. P. Hughes, Colonel James F. Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Crowder were named by General Otis. Aguinaldo appointed Florentino Torres, Enfrasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles. The committees met daily for nearly three weeks. The Filipinos maintained that all territory outside of Manila belonged to the Insurgents by right of occupancy and conquest; that the Filipinos were engaged in a war with Spain just as America was, and that while America had taken Cavite and Manila, the Filipinos had taken the rest of the Archipelago. Colonel Crowder questioned the force of their arguments, and asked them how they could prove that they had captured the territory they claimed.

“We can prove it by seven thousand prisoners,” a Filipino commissioner replied.

The efforts of the commission were fruitless. They were unable to convince the Filipinos that freedom did not necessarily mean national freedom; that self-government did not imply national government; that the recognition of the rights of the Filipinos did not call for a recognition of the sovereignty of the Filipino republic.

The man who supported the Filipino claim with the greatest ability and the most uncompromising stubbornness was Torres. As in the case of Arellano, Torres was one of the first to withdraw from the revolutionists and accept a judgeship by appointment of General Otis. Before the fall of Manila Torres held a judicial position at Cebu, under the Spanish government.

While the commissioners were talking peace, the Malolos congress promulgated, on January 21, the “Constitution of the Republica Filipina.” Aguinaldo promptly transmitted a copy to General Otis, and notified him to the effect that the recognition of the Filipinos’ constitution was the proper method to insure general peace. Article 2 stated that “The Philippine republic is free and independent.” The constitution,

while rather hazy on the question of popular suffrage, was very clear as to the rights of the executive, whose election was to be by the majority of Congress. Separation of the Church and State was specified, and the property of the religious corporations was to be "returned to the state." Personal freedom, the inviolability of home, correspondence, effects, the telegraph and telephone, and the person of the Filipino were guaranteed, also free speech, a free press, and free education. "Arbitrary penalties," "Private laws," "Special tribunals," and "Unearned emoluments" were declared unconstitutional. In many parts the constitution was modelled upon American lines, but was non-committal and general upon points relative to the exact part the people were to take in the elections. "The assembly shall represent the entire nation and not exclusively those who elect them" (Article 34). "It is the prerogative of the President to convoke it, suspend and close its sessions, and dissolve it" (Article 36).

In the Senate of the United States and in some of the newspapers of America there appeared expressions of sympathy with Filipino aspirations. Numerous Americans were opposed to the idea of making war upon a people

who made such a favorable showing. It was contrary to our traditions to oppose a country striving for independence, but it was not at variance with our Constitution to put down a rebellious faction. Expressions of opinion, opposing the course of the American government, were transmitted by Agoncillo, at that time in Washington, and by other revolutionary representatives, to the Hong Kong Junta, who promptly forwarded them to Malolos. Consul General Wildman had repeated evidence of the operations of the Junta and their association with American and English adventurers, but was powerless to take action against them, except in so far as the apprehending of the shipments of arms, in which he largely succeeded.

"We have arms enough in Luzon now," said one of the paid agents of the Junta to a newspaper correspondent. "We are not trying to send any more. Consul Wildman is having all his pains for nothing. Admiral Dewey's ships cannot patrol the whole coast of Luzon."

From a score of sources statements were transmitted to Aguinaldo and Mabini that the majority of the American people were in favor of recognizing the independence of the Filipinos; and that in order to solve the perplexing question our government would sell the Philip-

pires to Germany or Japan or some foreign power, but that in any event the status of the friars would not be interfered with. These were the pitch balls that the revolutionary leaders threw out among the people.

Agoncillo, Aguinaldo's Minister Plenipotentiary, on January 11, 1899, published and submitted a "Memorandum relative to the right of the Philippine Republic to Recognition," addressed to the Secretary of State. Agoncillo stated that the Filipinos, having expelled the government of Spain from the Islands, were entitled to recognition as an independent republic. The plea was not officially recognized by the State Department. Three other commissioners from the revolutionary government appeared at Washington, Dr. Lasada, Juan Luna, and Captain Marti Burges. None of these emissaries, nor their protests against the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, received official recognition by the American government nor the favorable attention of Congress.

It was apparent to every one in Manila that a clash was close at hand; it became evident to the American government that the military commissions appointed by General Otis were inadequate and ineffective. The President therefore appointed a civil commission con-

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sisting of Jacob G. Schurman, president of Cornell University, to be the president of the commission; Admiral George Dewey, Major General E. S. Otis, the Hon. Charles Denby, Ex-Minister to China, and Dean C. Worcester, professor in Michigan University and the author of a work on the Philippine Islands. This commission was instructed to investigate and recommend the best methods to "facilitate the most humane, pacific, and effective extension of authority throughout the Islands." The commission was given no powers other than that of investigation and recommendation, "without interference with the military authorities of the United States now in control of the Philippines."

The appointment of the commission was looked upon by the Insurgents as a subterfuge. *La Independencia* said, "The Filipinos naturally suspect this new attempt to humbug. Both Dewey and Pratt promised us independence if the Filipino republic was stable. The Filipinos are disillusioned. They believe the commission is a ruse to gain time until they have accumulated formidable forces, when America, abusing her strength, will begin a war to ratify her sovereignty."

In the closing days of January the atmos-

phere was charged with rumors. So high was public tension that a dog fight in the streets of Manila one day was mistaken for an uprising, and brought forth a call to arms. A storm was gathering, and every one felt it. Nightly knifing affairs kept the inhabitants at a fighting pitch. Every white man carried a loaded revolver, and most of the natives secreted bolos or knives in their clothes. On the outposts of the two armies constant friction occurred, and shouting and stabbing were resorted to when one party or the other encroached too far upon the neutral zone established between the forces. Privates and officers called out to each other threats and taunts across the neutral zone, and it became evident to every one in Manila that the least spark would start a conflagration.

General Otis was not blind to the conditions, and made preparations to resist an attack. He sent from Manila many of the discharged native Spanish troops which General Rios had brought into the city. The wealthy Filipinos of Manila did not dare to openly ally themselves with the revolutionists, who boasted that they would drive the invaders from the soil, nor did they wish to desert their property. They made a desperate struggle to balance themselves

between conflicting interests. At the end of January not a Filipino remained an outspoken friend of American sovereignty. Our "avoid-a-conflict" policy placed the Americans in a humiliating position. Challenges and insults were hurled at our troops until it was actually believed by the natives that we did not dare fight. Some of the most intelligent of the Manila Filipinos shared the belief, and anticipating our defeat, hastened to Malolos with their valuables for protection. Americans crossing the Insurgent lines were arrested. Newspaper correspondents with cameras were confined in the Malolos convents, and a party of American engineers was detained by Aguinaldo.

Colonel San Miguel commanded the Insurgents to the east of Manila. Facing his troops was General MacArthur's division. To strengthen our position in the vicinity of Santa Mesa, a suburb of Manila, the Nebraskans encamped upon an advantageous rise of ground that commanded the old Spanish arsenal occupied by the Insurgents across the San Juan creek east of Manila. Two guns of the Utah battery were placed in favorable positions. The arrival of the Nebraskans infuriated the Insurgents, and disputes and friction resulted. With our outposts on one side

of the little San Juan bridge and the Insurgents just across the stream, the two forces were placed in close quarters, and both parties were instructed to maintain their positions. Not being able to cross the bridge, the Insurgent colonel, San Miguel, repeatedly permitted his outposts to cross the creek and come over the line of delimitation into American territory.

General MacArthur finally, February 2, sent a letter to Colonel San Miguel, pointing out to him that armed Filipines were infringing upon the neutral zone, and that his command occupied a village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than one hundred yards on the American side of the line, and informing him that the Insurgents were very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. "This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once," General MacArthur wrote. "And from this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary."

Colonel San Miguel wrote an answer in the presence of Major Strong, saying: "In reply to yours of this date, in which you inform me that my soldiers have been passing the line of demarcation fixed by agreement, I desire to say




this is foreign to my wishes, and I shall give immediate orders in the premises that they retire."

It was said in Manila that at this time a telegram was received from Agoncillo by Aguinaldo, saying, "If you want independence you must fight for it." I was unable to verify the rumor, but an American officer assured me he saw a copy of it. Agoncillo, at any rate, had sufficient discouragement at Washington to arrive at such an opinion. Persistent reports were in circulation that an attack would be made on Manila. The Americans were kept in readiness, and orders were quietly given to strengthen various positions in our lines.

Private Grayson of Company D, First Nebraska, on Saturday night, February 4, fired the shot that formally opened the conflict. He killed an Insurgent lieutenant and a private who entered our territory at blockhouse No. 7, at the point mentioned in the correspondence of General MacArthur to Colonel San Miguel. Private Grayson, in an interview, said of this important incident: "About eight o'clock, Miller and I were cautiously pacing our district. We came to a fence and were trying to see what the Filipinos were up to. Suddenly, near at hand, on our left, there was a low but unmistakable

Filipino outpost signal whistle. It was immediately answered by a similar whistle about twenty-five yards to the right. Then a red lantern flashed its signal from blockhouse No. 7. We had never seen such a sign used before. In a moment something rose slowly up not twenty-five feet in front of us. It was a Filipino. I yelled 'halt,' and made it pretty loud, for I was accustomed to challenging the officer of the guard in approved military style. I challenged him with another loud 'halt.' Then he shouted 'halto' to me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. If I didn't kill him, I guess he died of fright. Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called 'halt' and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time. We retreated to where our six other fellows were, and I said: 'Line up, fellows; the "niggers" are in here all through these yards.' We then retreated to the pipe line and got behind the water main and stayed there all night. It was some minutes after our second shots before the Filipinos began firing."

In Manila at the news of the outbreak of hostilities the excitement was intense. The theatres and concert halls were in full blast, and



FILIPINO ENTRENCHMENTS
Built by Spanish Prisoners

SAN JUAN BRIDGE, SANTA MESA
Where the First Shot was Fired



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hundreds of Americans and Filipinos were enjoying the festivities. At the alarm both forces made a rush for their posts. Carriages, street-cars, and horses, irrespective of the owners, were pressed into service. Manager Higgins and his wife of the Manila and Dagupan Railway were in Manila. He succeeded in getting an engine through the lines to his home in Caloocan where he had left his children. Within a few minutes after the first shot the crack of the Springfield and the ping of the Mauser ran along the entire lines. The Nebraskans of General Hale's brigade, under Colonel John M. Stotsenberg, bore the brunt of the first fighting. Yelling and shouting, San Miguel's forces made a desperate attempt to cross the San Juan River and bridge. The Utah battery opened on the enemy's position across the stream and drove them back in confusion. All night the Nebraskans and Insurgents kept up a fearful fusillade across the San Juan creek and bridge. The Filipinos attempted to cross the stream in cascoes, but were forced to retire. They then made a stand in blockhouse No. 7, which commanded an eminence to the left of the bridge, and from there and from the old Spanish arsenal up the Santa Mesa road across the bridge they kept up a hot fire until daylight. In the

afternoon of the next day, Sunday, a detachment of the Tennessees crossed the river a mile to the right of the bridge, and moved upon the left flank of San Miguel's forces, enfilading their intrenchments, driving them into the open, exposing them to the Nebraskans' fire, two companies of which forced the enemy's position at the San Juan bridge, and scattering them in all directions, taking the arsenal after a stubborn fight. The Utah battery shelled block-house No. 7, and the Nebraskans moved up the hill and drove the Insurgents out, chasing them across the open country, up the ravines and over the hills to the reservoir, two miles from the bridge.

The reservoir is located on the brow of a hill, and is a natural fort, high earthworks extending around its entire surface. Resting until Monday at noon, Hale's brigade advanced in a line of skirmishers up to the base of the hill upon which the reservoir is built. The Utah battery took a position commanding the enemy, and sent in a number of well-placed shells which drove terror to the hearts of the Filipinos. Simultaneously the Nebraskans charged up the steep incline under a hot fire, and with fixed bayonets drove the enemy back from the breastworks in confusion. Through the thickets, over the rocks

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and hedges, and pell-mell over the walls of the vaulted reservoir, the Nebraskans plunged with fearful recklessness. Contesting every inch of the ground, the Insurgents gradually retreated, leaving seventy-nine dead upon the top of the reservoir. Following up this position Colonel Stotsenberg, at nine o'clock Monday morning, with a battalion of Nebraskans and Young's battery, started for the pumping station four miles down the Santa Mesa road, along which ran the water mains. The Insurgents opened fire from protected positions, but the taste of American warfare they had the day before made them disinclined to challenge a battle in the open. Two companies of the Colorados took a parallel position in the advance which completely commanded the ridge along which the road ran. Two killed and three wounded comprised the casualties of the day. Arriving at the pumping station, it was discovered that several important parts of the machinery were missing; but so hasty had been the Insurgents' retreat that the plant was not seriously crippled, and the parts were soon found. Several of the native operators came out of hiding, and some were captured. The machinery was soon put in order, and the waterworks was started. The important movement was conducted with a spirit

and fearlessness that astounded the Filipinos and scattered them in fright across the Mariquina Valley and over the hills to Antipolo.

The Insurgent defences to the south of Manila were strong enough, if protected by artillery, to withstand almost any force. Besides six substantial blockhouses closely placed, there existed a perfect network of trenches sunk six feet deep. Back of these ran a continual line of earthworks protecting a deep trench from the bay to San Petro Macati. The Insurgents fairly furrowed the ground with pits, and threw up field works which they considered impregnable. They believed themselves prepared to resist artillery fire, but they evidently did not count upon the close proximity of Dewey's ships. On Sunday morning the *Monadnock* moved over alongside the Malate suburbs, and threw a rain of shell into the enemy's position that put the "fear of God into them," as one private expressed it. General Ovenshine's brigade immediately followed up the naval action and drove the enemy pell-mell out of their fortifications, through Pasay and across the fields and through the jungles and marshes to Paranaque.

Brigadier General Charles King, was stationed to the left of General Ovenshine, reach-

ing to the Pasig River. Two hundred and thirty of the Insurgents opened fire in the vicinity of blockhouse No. 11. Six companies of the Washingtons and the First Idahos, with Hawthorn's battery, consisting of the Astor guns, started across the Santa Anna bridge and the little estuary, a branch of the Pasig, that divided the two forces. The Washingtons plunged into the creek and dashed across the rice fields, but to the left the Insurgents held the old convent of Concordia and the Norwegian Consul's wall-enclosed house. General King ordered the Californias to move on the convent and Consul's house, and with a determined rush, under heavy fire, they surrounded the Insurgents, dislodged them, and they were cut off and chased by the Idahos toward Santa Anna. Two Krupp guns were captured, King's brigade drove the Insurgents out of Santa Anna and pushed on two miles to the walls of Guadalupe and the headquarters of Pio del Pilar at San Pedro Macati. Santa Anna was burned by the retreating Filipinos. The American loss was seven. One hundred and fifty-six Filipinos were buried by our troops the next day.

Colonel Funston gave the Filipinos a sharp chase over the Caloocan to the north of Manila road on the evening of the outbreak. On Sun-

day morning General H. G. Otis's brigade drove the Insurgents out of the blockhouses and advanced through a hard, uneven country, up a gradual slope toward La Loma cemetery and the Chinese church. The Insurgents made a determined stand behind the walls of the old cemetery, and were sending a hot fire into the Third Artillery from the La Loma church. Grant's battery threw shells over the Pennsylvanias, and Utahs, and South Dakotas, as they made a charge through the barbed wire fences and underbrush, and, aided by the Montanas, Third Artillery, and Dakotas, who dashed up the ridge and through the cemetery, fell upon the Insurgents from three sides and drove them out of the church and mud forts, and chased them across the great rice fields toward Caloocan, and up the Novaliches road, until they disappeared in the woods. Our losses in the general advance were about one hundred and sixty killed, and about as many wounded. We buried over seven hundred of the enemy's dead, found on the field.

The following Friday, February 10, General MacArthur's left advanced on Caloocan, the *Monadnock* shelling the Insurgents' positions for thirty minutes. In two hours Funston was in Caloocan, Major Kobbe with the Third Artillery having flanked the enemy with the Kansans and

Montanas, while Major Bell made a daring movement to the right and diverted the Insurgents' fire. The line swung like a great pendulum, and the enemy fell back in confusion, burning the town as they retreated across the fields toward the Novaliches road. Eighty of our men were killed and thirty wounded. Seventy-nine dead Insurgents were found in the field. Our losses in these engagements were twelve officers, fifty-nine privates, and two hundred and sixty-four wounded.

Our lines now extended from Caloocan in a semicircle around the city to Pasay, with a four-mile protruding angle reaching to the pumping station, occupying all the strong positions previously held by the Insurgents, and controlling the Pasig River with the *Laguna de Bay*. In the meantime, on February 9, San Roque, a little nepa-hut town across a narrow neck of land from Cavite, was attacked by Colonel Loper, with a detachment of troops. The previous day, Admiral Dewey, under a flag of truce, gave the Insurgents an opportunity to surrender; but taking advantage of the twenty-four hours allowed, they saturated the principal buildings with kerosene, and at the approach of our men, burned the town and escaped to the hills.

San Roque was the home of the *banderos* (wash-men), and after its destruction a great many army and navy officers were obliged to take an inconspicuous part in the fashionable afternoon parade on the Luneta. As a tribute to the honesty of the *bandero*, however, it is an interesting fact that some days after the smoke of the conflagration had cleared away, and the erstwhile *insurrecto* reappeared at his native town in the dress of an *amigo*, many American officers were treated to a surprise by the return of their apparel neatly laundered. Upon questioning how the miracle was performed, the *bandero* related that when the town was burned he had pitched the wash into the nearest well, where it had remained uninjured and unmolested during the fight and fire.

The Insurgent loss in the week's fighting has been estimated from one thousand to three thousand, but the first figure is probably nearer the truth. The Filipino soldiers showed a great deal of grit and, considering the great odds they fought against, made a hard fight. The American artillery demoralized them, and the flank movements and enfilading tactics of the infantry aroused the greatest consternation among the rebel forces. "No sabe Americano," they cried, as they flew before our advance. The

Filipinos had expended an enormous amount of labor upon their trenches and field works, and relied largely upon the protection thus afforded; but when our batteries dropped shells down among them, they deserted their fortifications like frightened sheep and returned our fire from behind houses, walls, trees, and dense bamboo thickets, as they retreated. Our losses were comparatively small, considering that we had from ten thousand to thirteen thousand men in action, and theirs were equally insignificant, it being estimated that they had twenty thousand men engaged. It was said that the natives carried away many of their dead, which may account for the small number that we found on the field after the battle.

X

ON the evening of the outbreak of hostilities Aguinaldo published a General Order to the Philippine army in which he stated that the American forces were the aggressors, and that he had endeavored at all costs to preserve the friendship of the army of occupation, but summoned by the unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon him by honor and patriotism and for the defence of his nation, calling on God as a witness of good faith and uprightness of his intentions, he ordered and commanded that peace and friendly relations having been broken between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation, the latter would be treated as enemies, with the tenets prescribed by the laws of war. That American soldiers captured by the Philippine forces would be treated as prisoners of war. He sent the proclamation to the foreign consuls in Manila, and to Congress, in order, he said, that it may accord the suspension of the

constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.

On February 5 Aguinaldo issued another proclamation to the Philippine people, calling upon them to resist the attempt of the Americans to make them slaves and defend the sacred interests of the country against our "dastardly intentions."

The outbreak was long expected, and both forces were not without preparation for the emergency.

"On Sunday evening, February 5, the day after the fighting began," according to an interview in a Minneapolis paper of April 24, 1899, with Colonel C. McC. Reeve, provost marshal of Manila, at the time of the outbreak, "General Torres of the Insurgents came through our lines under a flag of truce and had a personal interview with General Otis, in which, speaking for Aguinaldo, he declared that the fighting had been begun accidentally, and was not authorized by Aguinaldo; that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and that to bring about a conclusion of hostilities he proposed the establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies of any width that would be agreeable to General Otis, so that during the peace negotiations there might be no further danger of conflict between

the two armies. To these representations General Otis sternly replied that fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end."

I have found no claim, however, in Filipino papers or documents that Aguinaldo made such a proposition to General Otis. Neither in Buencamino's address to the United States Senate, dated Tarlac, August 20, 1899, nor in Aguinaldo's Authentic Review of the Philippine Revolution, dated Tarlac, September 23, 1899, is there made a claim that he offered to establish a neutral zone and suspend hostilities during the month of February.

Upon this rather interesting and much debated point, the *Manila Times*, which was a very conservative paper, said, February 10, "Official announcement from headquarters states that no duly accredited representatives of Aguinaldo have visited the American authorities. Several Insurgent officers have passed through our lines, presumably to lay their cause before the authorities, but they have brought no direct communication from their leaders."

The Adjutant General of the United States, pursuant to a resolution of the Senate, on April 30, 1900, cabled General Otis for information, asking him whether General Torres came under a flag of truce February 5, 1899,

and stated that Aguinaldo declared that fighting had begun accidentally and was not authorized by him; whether Aguinaldo wanted war stopped and proposed a neutral zone, so that during peace negotiations there might be no further conflict, and whether General Otis implied that fighting having begun it must go on to the grim end. General Otis replied that Judge Torres, citizen, resident of Manila, who served as member of Insurgent commission, reported to him on the evening of February 5, and asked if something could not be done to stop fighting and establish a neutral zone. "I replied," continued General Otis, "that Aguinaldo had commenced the fighting and must apply for cessation. I had nothing to request from the Insurgent government."

The clash with the Insurgents aroused the United States Senate to action. The ratification of the Peace Treaty had been hanging fire, causing uneasiness and uncertainty among the Filipinos, and holding in check the troops in the Philippines. The outbreak cleared the atmosphere and brought the Senate face to face with a new situation. Men who had been opposed to the treaty became its outspoken champions. The consensus of opinion in the Senate was that the delay and opposition to the treaty

had given ground to the belief that America might abandon the Philippines — a proposition that agitated the Filipinos and aroused distrust in the President's proclamation of January 4. The treaty was therefore ratified on the 10th of February, and put an end to this question in the minds of the Filipinos, for they had nothing to hope from the Spanish Cortes.

The situation at Iloilo and Cebu was becoming critical. Foreign merchantmen continued trading with the Filipinos, discharging cargoes and taking away native products, leaving large sums of money and munitions of war. Four days after the outbreak at Manila, General Otis despatched the Tennessee regiment to Iloilo, having sent Lieutenant Colonel Potter on the *Bulacan* with orders for an attack.

General Miller notified General Roque Lopez, the Insurgent commander of Iloilo, and permitted him twenty-four hours to surrender. By way of reply the Insurgents began active work upon their trenches, facing the transports in the harbor. The navy took the initiative, and the *Boston* and *Petrel* sent some shells into the Insurgents' positions; General Miller hastened over to the warship to confer with the captain. The Insurgents replied with a number of charges from an antiquated

cannon. Detachments of blue-jackets from the *Boston* under command of Lieutenant Niblack, and from the *Petrel* under Lieutenant Plunket, promptly landed. A few Insurgents attempted to hold a shore trench, but were easily routed by the marines, who proceeded through the town and hoisted the Stars and Stripes upon the old Spanish fort. The Insurgents under General Pablo Araneta, with about five hundred troops, retired to the old Spanish trenches, built by order of General Rios when he anticipated an attack from Dewey after the taking of Manila. Following out Rios's original plan of defence, the Insurgents saturated the town with kerosene, and setting fire to the American and British consulates and the principal business houses, retired across the Jaro and Maro bridges. The gunboat *Samar* was sent up the river and drove the Insurgents toward the Jaro bridge. The Eighteenth Infantry and the Tennessees landed and fought their way through the burning city, chased the natives into the country, and took Jaro the following day. Iloilo was occupied without loss to our troops, but the destruction of the city by fire was almost complete. The native nepahut section was wiped out, and the leading houses and government buildings were burned

to the ground. Blue-jackets from the British ships *Plover* and *Pigmy* landed immediately after the American troops, and assisted in fighting the fire. The loss by fire in Iloilo was estimated at \$5,000,000, Mexican.

Aguinaldo had not despaired of capturing Manila. Abetted by his friends in the city he planned to give the Americans a surprise, but gossip and rumor in Manila travels with lightning rapidity. Night after night we were apprised of the intentions of the Insurgents to burn the city. Eight-thirty o'clock P.M. was the hour designated for the attack, and promptly at that time for a week we braced ourselves to dodge Mausers and fight flames. General Hughes increased the provost guard, and the Spaniards chattered and gesticulated and kept tension at a high pitch. Windows and doors were blocked with heavy shutters at dusk, and our troops slept on their guns. Along the waterfront at MacArthur's left was a marshy swamp. At low tide about eight hundred Insurgents succeeded in creeping along the beach and secreting themselves in the Tondo district to the northwest of the city. The natives' plan was to set fire to the city in several places simultaneously, and during the resultant confusion the bolo men were instructed to turn

loose and massacre the white inhabitants, while from without the Insurgent troops were to rush into the city under cover of the smoke and fire. The secret service, however, secured what purported to be an order signed by one of Aguinaldo's officers, calling upon the inhabitants to attack the Americans and Spanish, sparing none, exterminating the white population. "The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Anna will begin the attack from without," read the order, "and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out in the street and do their duty. Those at Paco, Ermit and Malate, Santa Cruz and San Miguel, will not start out until twelve o'clock unless they see their companions need assistance. The militia will start out at three o'clock in the morning. If all do their duty, our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men, shedding our blood in defence of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants! War without quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived us! Either independence or death!"

On the night of February 22, a reputable Spaniard notified the Binondo police headquarters that the natives would attempt to burn the

city. At 8.30 the threat was made good, and a fierce blaze broke out in the Santa Cruz district. The native English and German fire departments turned out, and after a three hours' fight succeeded in confining the flames to a few squares. While the facilities of the departments were being taxed to their utmost, three separate blazes were started in the Tondo district, the hot-bed of the insurrectionists. Rockets were sent up, and a call to arms was sounded.

Insurgents were discovered stealthily advancing along the water-front. Soon the Mausers were whistling down the main streets into the heart of the city. The nepa-huts burned like tinder, and the crackle and pop of the bamboo resembled the constant rattle of volley firing. The Tondo police advanced through the fire-scourged streets and drove the Insurgents from behind the brick walls of burning houses and out of the intrenched positions they had made with blocks of stone and railroad iron. The conflagration completely surrounded the Tondo police station, which the Insurgents attempted to capture. They then attacked the Tondo cathedral, used as a police station, and were not dislodged until the next day, when the Americans drove them down the Caloocan road, contesting their retreat from behind stone

intrenchments and buildings. The Insurgents were caught in a trap, for the Twentieth Kansas had gotten around behind them. After a final stand one hundred surrendered and seventy were found dead. A few escaped by swimming the estuaries and crawling across the mud flats to Malabon.

The fire raged all night, and destroyed the largest native section of the city for two miles along the northern outskirts, doing \$1,000,000 damage. The burning of this part of Manila was a matter of public congratulation, as since the outbreak Insurgents had been able to carry on their operations in this exclusively native district and menace our troops and endanger the lives of civilians. Over one hundred Insurgents were killed in the fight, and several hundred captured. While the Tondo fire and fight were at their height, the Insurgents attempted to blow up some of the buildings in town, and a large blaze was started in the Binondo district, a populous Chinese section, near the centre of the city. Many of the buildings were saturated with kerosene, and the fire companies were powerless to check the blaze. The large Filipino market was completely destroyed. Thousands of helpless and homeless Chinamen and innocent native women and children fled

into the public squares of the city, loaded down with bundles and boxes, and huddling in the doors of the churches and behind brick buildings, sought protection from the bullets and the fire.

The morning revealed a most pitiable state of things. The destruction of the native quarters, the nests of insurrection and the pest holes of disease was not deplored, but the thousands of helpless and homeless non-combatants made a sight sorrowful to contemplate. Not content with the night's experience, the *insurrectos* repeated their threat the following day, and every white man in Manila prepared to step into the ranks if necessary. We were well aware that our lines around the city were thin, and that the embarkation of troops for Iloilo had encouraged the Insurgents to action, in the belief that our city guard was insufficient. The American women, with one or two exceptions, were sent to the transports, and the streets were cleared at seven o'clock. All during the evening the crack of the Springfield could be heard around town, for our men were determined that if any shooting was to be done in the future, the Filipinos would not be given the first chance. At nine o'clock fires broke out in Paco and several hundred houses were destroyed, includ-

ing the Paco cathedral. Dynamite was found in some of the buildings, and large quantities of Remington cartridges were seized. An attempt was also made to burn Bilibid prison, and small fires broke out in various sections of the city during the succeeding days, but the provost guard was distributed so effectually that it became dangerous for a native to light a cigarette. Hundreds of suspects were brought into Fort Santiago and searched and imprisoned in the casements of the old wall of Manila or released, according to evidence found. Searching expeditions were sent out through Manila equipped with pick-axes, shovels, and armed with side-arms. Great numbers of bolos, swords, revolvers, and a few rifles were found hidden or buried in various native quarters. Hundreds of Insurgents' uniforms were discovered, showing evidences of being hastily thrown aside, for the *insurrecto* learned the trick of wearing his uniform over white drill, enabling him to change from a soldier into an *amigo* with lightning-like rapidity, which trick they practised with considerable success throughout the war.

Hundreds of Filipinos approached our lines at various points, carrying white flags, usually Filipino shirts flying from long bamboo poles,

and asked to be allowed to return to Manila and pursue peaceful occupations. Many were permitted, after a rigorous search, to return to their homes and families, for which favor they seemed very grateful.

Aguinaldo concentrated a large body of Insurgents, rumored to be twenty thousand in number, under General Luna in front of MacArthur's division to the north of the city, and delivered eloquent orations, appealing to their patriotism and honor to resist the Americans. "Our situation is such that if properly defended, we can make every town and city and village a blazing Moscow," proclaimed the Insurgent chief; "we shall deal our enemies a fatal blow, for if we are compelled to retire, they gain nothing substantial. Thus, as fire proved the destruction of the mighty Napoleon, it may also prove the defect of these alien bands of freebooters, and at the same time demonstrate the means of salvation of our beloved Islands. . . . Our enemies' design being, under the cloak of vague benevolent phrases, to subjugate, plunder and enslave a free and brave people that have done them no harm." The proclamation showered curses upon all Filipinos who were faint-hearted and hesitated to support the revolution, and *blessés*

upon those who served with their heart and their hand the cause of independence.

Malabon was under the guns of the navy, but as large and valuable sugar refineries were located there, the city was not shelled. All along our lines the Insurgents kept up a harassing fire, and instituted a system of guerilla warfare that was very annoying to the Americans who were anxious to advance our lines. Montenegro, the Insurgent commander, opposite King's brigade, made addresses assuring his troops that our forces had advanced as far as they dared; and *La Independencia* exaggerated the American losses and discreetly kept silence upon the Filipino defeats, construing their retreats into tactics employed to better their positions.

A Flying Brigade was organized under Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton, and on March 10 advanced from Guadalupe, swinging along the south shore of the Pasig, and pushing toward Laguna de Bay for fifteen miles, driving the Insurgents out of Pasig, Pateras, and Tag-nig, while Captain Grant on the *Laguna de Bay* did effective work on the river and along the shore, cutting off the enemy's water fleet and preventing further communication across the lake. The movement relieved Anderson's and

King's brigades, which had been under constant fire since the outbreak. At San Pedro Macati and Pasig the Insurgents kept up an intermittent fire, and the resultant casualties had been numerous. General Hale's brigade also suffered from the pestiferous tactics of the Insurgents, and he had been forced to move across the valley toward Taytay and Canita. Colonel Stotsenberg, however, was met by the mayors of both places, who formally surrendered the towns, and Montenegro's forces retreated over the hills to the Antipolo Valley.

Major General Lawton arrived the 10th of March with the Seventeenth Infantry, and the Fourth soon followed. It was expected by every one in Manila that the intrepid Indian fighter and hero of Santiago would be given command of the army corps. General Anderson, however, being relieved from duty by age limit, was advanced to a brigadier general in the line and retired. General Lawton was given his command.

Friction between Aguinaldo and Luna began to cause considerable dissension among the Insurgents. Aguinaldo issued an order in which he proclaimed to the inhabitants that the invading enemy aimed to destroy their liberty and bring them under the heavy yoke of

colonization. It became necessary, therefore, he said, to establish internal order and prevent brigandage and looting which had been carried on in some of the towns. Aguinaldo ordered that assistance to the Americans or gang robbery, rape, and incendiarism would be punished as high treason, but that all offenders who would give themselves up within thirty days from date would be pardoned. Juntas and provincial military commanders were instructed to form vigilance committees for the preservation of law and order.

At Malolos Aguinaldo called a public meeting and addressed the Filipinos. He said that the Americans proposed to subject the Philippine people and take the country for a colony, but that a single shot of indignation, terrible as the thunder of volcanoes, arose to overwhelm this wish to subject the noble Philippine people, and the cry went up to heaven: Dead? Yes. Colonists? Never! for there was an eternal justice which, when it summoned a people to liberty, the empty efforts of earthly powers were unavailing against the immutability of its decrees. "In the war with Spain," said Aguinaldo, "the Philippine people, moved by enthusiasm, transformed itself into legions of warriors determined to do or die, and there arose flutter-

ing banners, beating drums, ringing trumpets; the laborer exchanged his ploughshare for the deadly bolo, the loving husband forsook his adored wife and family, the mother sent forth her son, giving him his weapons and bidding him to conquer or die. Our aspirations, our independence proclaims itself already in Manila. Filipinos, take it, grasp it, and fear not death!"

The main body of Aguinaldo's army and his seat of government were at Malolos, so the Insurgent capital became the objective point of the new move. Retreat to the south by the lake was cut off by our artillery boats. A thorough reorganization of our forces was made preparatory to the invasion of the revolutionary capital.

XI

AFTER the outbreak of hostilities insurrection became rampant throughout the Archipelago. The American force was insufficient to cope with the situation outside of Manila. The Insurgents attacked the Spanish garrisons in all the islands, and General Rios refused longer to leave his troops at the mercy of the revolutionary hordes. Despite General Otis's protests he despatched transports to the southern islands and withdrew the Spanish forces. The natives of Cebu, augmented by a few companies of Tagalogs, sent thither by Aguinaldo, held the Island of Cebu with the exception of Cebu itself. When the Spanish garrison evacuated, the Filipinos took possession of the city. Although inadequately armed, the Insurgents were strong in numbers, and instituted a reign of terror against the priests, who fled for their lives, taking passage at exorbitant rates on trading vessels to Singapore and Hong Kong. The German residents

raised the German flag over their houses and stores, and the English and Chinese dwelt under the colors of Great Britain. The three hundred Chinamen in Cebu applied to the British vice-consul for protection, and, manufacturing a cotton flag in imitation of the British jack, raised it over their houses. On this improvised flag the Chinese substituted yellow, their national color, for the red in the British flag. The natives organized a government, occupied the public buildings, and declared their allegiance to Aguinaldo and the Filipino republic.

Admiral Dewey learned of this state of affairs and sent the *Petrel* to Cebu. After a heated argument the revolutionary government consented to a "provisional surrender," and warned us that we must treat with Aguinaldo, their "legitimate ruler," before they could guarantee the surrender of the entire Island. The American flag was raised, and military government was established, but the natives outside the port did not submit in spirit; they assembled a force of two thousand men in close proximity to the capital, and held the country and mountainous districts.

While these events were transpiring a happy surprise occurred. Señor Aniceto Laçson,

backed by the wealthy native and foreign planters of Negros, upon the evacuation of the crown forces, organized a provisional government, and hastened to Manila, the last of February, tendering the allegiance of Negros to the United States. An American warship visited Negros during the month, and furnishing the provisional government with an American flag, the Stars and Stripes were hoisted over the government building in Bacalod, the 18th of February.

Colonel James F. Smith was appointed governor, and immediately took charge of affairs, utilizing the native troops as police, and establishing municipal governments throughout the Island. The people of Negros seemed proud of their American citizenship, which they claimed from the date of their raising the American flag. Aguinaldo's lieutenants and followers from Panay and Cebu looked with disfavor upon the attitude of Laçson and the people of Negros, and sent delegations to stir up the natives in the interior. The leading newspaper of Negros, while an ardent advocate of the "final aspirations" of the Filipinos, urged the Islanders to accept American sovereignty, as the "Americans were as much interested in their welfare as were they themselves," it said.

General Smith showed marked ability and tact, and though Aguinaldo's emissaries succeeded in securing a following, Smith retained the loyalty and support of the best elements of the Island. Late in March, Papa Issio, the bandit chieftain of the mountain tribes, issued a proclamation calling upon the natives to throw off the foreign yoke, and with three thousand natives, armed with rifles and bolos, established headquarters at the coast town of Paradise, but Major H. T. Sime, with a battalion of Californians, drove them to the mountains.

General Rios refused to leave his troops longer in Zamboango, in the Island of Mindanao, where they were constantly attacked by the Moros, who had been aroused to insurrection by Aguinaldo's emissaries. The crown forces only awaited a favorable moment to evacuate. The Insurgents captured the armament of several of the small Spanish gunboats which lay in the harbor of Port Isabelle. The *Butuan*, a Spanish steamer, was despatched to Mindanao with native crews to take over the gunboats; but arriving there, the crews mutinied and aided the Insurgents in stripping the gunboats of their quick-firing guns, rifles, and ammunition. With this valuable equipment the revolutionists made

it so hot for the Spanish garrison at Zamboango that they eventually had to evacuate under fire, losing their commander in the fight. This gave the whole Island over to the revolutionists.

Conditions at Iloilo, at the end of March, were much improved, though the occupation was restricted to the vicinity of the port. The Insurgents continued to harass our lines, but the severe drubbing they received from General Miller on the 18th tended to lessen their activity. General Miller was retired on the 27th, and Brigadier General Hughes, Provost Marshal of Manila, was appointed military governor of the Visayan district, including Panay, Negros, and Cebu.

Thus a state of war existed in every part of the Philippines. The ratification of the treaty of peace by the Spanish Cortes took away the last prop upon which the Insurgents were leaning. All hopes of securing peace by diplomacy was abandoned. Our soldiers vied with each other to be allowed to participate in the general advance that was planned. Again and again I saw enthusiastic volunteers begging their commanders, with tears in their eyes, for permission to fight the "gugus." Almost to a man our army chafed with anxiety to advance upon the boasting, exasperating enemy.

During the weeks of military inactivity the Insurgents were industriously engaged in strengthening their position. Spanish prisoners held by the Filipinos were impressed into service, and their knowledge of engineering and tactics was utilized by the enemy. The whole front of MacArthur's division from Caloocan to Malolos was furrowed with a network of trenches. The works erected ranged from mere dirt heaps, thrown up as infantry curtains, or adapted rice ridges on the paddy fields, to the dignity of first-class, bomb-proof field-works. The rivers intersecting the country in front of MacArthur were driven with piles to prevent the approach of our artillery boats from the bay. Road bridges were destroyed and the steel girders of the railway bridges were cut.

General Luna was in command of the Insurgents, and was supposed to have ten thousand armed men, including the famous Seventieth and Seventy-first native regiments, formerly of the Spanish colonial force. Our army was augmented by a flotilla of warships and river artillery boats laying off Malabon, ready to throw shells into the enemy's ranks and push up the rivers at their rear and cut off their escape if possible. The surrounding of Polo was the objective of our movement. The action was care-

fully conceived and secretly planned, but we were in an unfamiliar country, crisscrossed by rivers and studded with marshes, — a country much too heavy to admit of such a rapid and sweeping action. Our commanders were dependent upon obsolete and faulty Spanish maps and surveys, and through them were led into difficulties and snares not in our calculations.

On the morning of March 26, MacArthur's division, which extended from Caloocan on the bay to the pumping station on the Mariquina River moved out across the open rice fields. The whole division made a turning movement resembling the sweep of a great scythe moving from right to left, the left being Wheaton's brigade, the right being General MacArthur himself, with the principal artillery force, and the centre of the line being the Third Artillery and Kansas regiment at the junction of which the colors were carried. General MacArthur hoped to move so rapidly that the army would be flung like a powerful arm around Malolos, and that Aguinaldo's forces would be surrounded in Polo. In order not to give the Insurgents on the line of the railway any warning of the movement, General Wheaton, the centre of whose brigade rested on the railway line at Caloocan, was instructed to remain in a stationary position

until events would compel him to advance, so that while he concentrated the forces of the enemy in front of our left wing, — that is, the railroad line, — the main line of the army, the rest of the entire division, would be sweeping in a great enveloping movement. The trouble was, as in most of the other similar attempts to surprise and entrap the Filipino generals, MacArthur's movement was too slow. The Third Artillery under Major Kobbe, and the Kansas regiment under Colonel Funston, which formed the centre of the division, crossed the Tuliajan River under fire in a most brilliant action many hours before General MacArthur and the right wing of the army came up to their relative position in the line, so that the centre of the division had to wait for the right extremity to straighten out its lines.

Meanwhile the always impatient and dashing Wheaton lost patience. The movement was too slow for him, and he swung his brigade rapidly into line with the rest of the army, dashing over the tremendous network of trenches, earthworks, leaving a large number of his men, until his brigade came in touch with the Third Artillery, the centre of his line. General Wheaton planted his artillery on each side of the railway track and began the bombardment of the con-

vent of Malinta, used as an Insurgent fortress, preparatory to the coming of the Twenty-second Infantry and the never-to-be-forgotten charge of that regiment in which Colonel Egbert lost his life.

Egbert brought the Twenty-second across the Tuliajan River through a swampy country. The regiment was marched Indian file until within a short range of two Insurgent forts, from which smoke was issuing, and figures could be seen above the earthworks. Scouts were sent out, and ascertained that the forts were absolutely empty; that the figures were dummies, put there to deceive us; and that the fires were left to give the fortifications a semblance of life. Wooden cannon were also mounted on the ramparts. The railway line was deserted, and it was concluded that the Insurgents had checked their baggage farther north. So Egbert, with two hundred men, advanced across the open field to a little hill in front of the town. Suddenly from the church on the outskirts, seventy yards from our men, came a terrific fire. A hasty retreat was ordered, but hardly had the word been given when Colonel Egbert fell dead, pierced with a Filipino bullet. Major Shields and his orderly had their horses shot from under them, and three privates were killed. Had the Insurgents been

marksmen, the two companies would have been wiped out. "Colonel Egbert never asked his men to go where he would not lead," was the tribute of a soldier of his command, and it is worthy of an inscription on his monument.

In the two days' fight, the first time that a whole division of United States troops pitted a regular action in the open field against the main force of the Insurgents under command of their chief generals, General MacArthur experienced the two principal and practically the only tactically military ideas of the Filipino army. The first idea was the occupation of intrenched positions on the edge of thick woods, with open country in front. This enabled the Insurgents to keep our advancing troops under fire with smokeless powder, while their own intrenched soldiers were invisible, and when our line, by sheer gallantry and fighting superiority, had come within striking distance and charged, gave them the opportunity to slip out of their trenches into the thick of the woods and disappear.

The second idea was to intrench the opposite banks of streams, destroy all road bridges, and compel our force to enter the water and actually cross under a continuous fire from intrenched troops from the other shore at close range. The first idea was developed when MacArthur's main

division crossed the open space in front of the La Loma church, over a space of three-quarters of a mile, and carried the enemy's positions at the edge of the woods on the other side. The second idea was defeated when the centre of our line reached the Tuliajan River.

Memoranda captured from the enemy shows that the Insurgent generals expected to hold our forces for from one to three months by their intrenched positions on the opposite side of the river. The actual delay of the Third Artillery and Kansas regiments at the centre of the line occasioned by this plan amounted to about thirty minutes.

From this time on, all of the Filipino war that is fit to be designated by tactical terms, simply consisted in a series of attempts to repeat these two ideas. But contrary to the traditions of Spanish military science, which is based largely upon fighting from behind walls and trenches, by the audacity with which our lines swept over open spaces and moved upon intrenched positions by simple frontal attacks as well as by the customary flank movements, we utterly upset Aguinaldo's plan, upon the theory of which the whole vast system of trenches and field-works, stretching from Manila up to the Insurgent capital, was organized. The Fili-

pinos never having encountered soldiers like these, who seemed to be utterly devoid of the prudence and cover-seeking carefulness taught in the Spanish military schools, were thrown into confusion. They could fight soldiers, — according to the Spanish idea, — but they were utterly unprepared to fight “fools.”

Otis's brigade fought its way up the railroad and joined Wheaton in a concerted action on Polo. Before leaving Malabon the Filipinos fired the principal buildings and fell back to Polo, where they stayed only long enough to burn the town and railroad station and hasten northward.

At Meycauyan the Insurgents made a stout stand at the railway bridge, but Hale's brigade rushed pell-mell across, and by a hot enfilading fire the Americans slaughtered the rebels in their trenches. Wheaton's brigade was held in reserve, and Hale and Otis pushed rapidly forward up the railroad.

An order of Aguinaldo's was captured commanding all Filipino troops to set fire to towns evacuated, “so that the Americans shall only rule over a dominion of desolation, with crops of cinders alone.” In the same order were two other articles of significance. The first, “All Filipinos who refuse to fight the Americans

must be summarily executed as a warning"; second, "Certain armed bands of marauders are attacking some of our towns in the north; these bands are called upon to come and join our army against the Americans, otherwise we will deal severely with such disloyal Filipinos, as soon as we are finished with the Americans." This order referred to the Macabebes, a tribe of natives who refused to join the Tagalogs, and stoutly held out against the threats of Aguinaldo.

At Marilao the Insurgents astonished our men by making a deliberate attack in an open field, coming out from a bordering jungle. In a line of skirmishes they advanced toward our troops who were waiting eagerly for such an exhibition of courage, and quickly reciprocated by making a rapid charge, driving the Insurgents into a broken retreat and capturing two hundred with arms, killing one hundred. The experience was also costly to us, our losses being eleven killed and twelve wounded.

Without stopping we pushed on to Bocaue and Bulacan; but the towns were in flames and the natives in flight, for the artillery boats were pouring shell into their ranks, and the Insurgents lost no time in retreating toward Malolos. At Guiguinta the same story was repeated.

Horace Higgins, the manager of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad, was a voluntary prisoner with the Insurgents. His assistance to the Americans in the advance on Malolos was inestimable. He prevailed upon the natives not to destroy the railroad bridges, but to confine themselves to tearing up the tracks and hiding the rails. It was largely due to Mr. Higgins's influence that the great iron bridges, of such vital importance to our rapid advance, were left practically unharmed. Colonel Potter of the engineer corps loaded trains with ties, rails, and fish-plates, and was able to replace the track as rapidly as the troops cleared the way. Though the carabao commissary train was left far in the rear, the rebuilt railroad enabled Colonel Brainard to keep the advancing army supplied with plentiful rations.

From Guiguinta to the outskirts of Malolos the American advance was very rapid. Reports had reached General MacArthur that Aguinaldo proposed to make a grand-stand play at his capital, and "do or die."

Around Malolos the whole population had been at work for weeks constructing bomb-proof trenches and field-works. Our scouts reported the extent of these formidable defences, and despite the Insurgents' tendency to draw our

fire, burn their villages and run, we expected a real battle at Malolos. On the morning of March 31 our troops were ready for action shortly after daylight; the Nebraskans and Dakotas having taken some of the "bomb-proof" trenches the day before, several additional guns were brought up by rail from Caloocan, and on Thursday night Young and Fleming's batteries and Davis's Colt gun were placed on opposite sides of the railroad track facing Malolos. On Friday morning for a half-hour these guns opened up on the Insurgent trenches. The Kansans moved forward, expecting at any moment to see thousands of Insurgents appear above the earthworks and let go a terrific fire. Ready to return the compliment the Kansans advanced, nervously fingering the triggers of their rifles, until within fifty yards of the trenches. Then, with a yell, they leaped forward with set bayonets and mounted the earthworks. Not a Filipino was in sight, and the trenches were as empty as open graves. Our men did not hesitate to contemplate their admixed feelings of joy and chagrin, but dashed down the railroad track and into Malolos like a pack of hounds, General Funston at their head, and James Creelman, the famous war correspondent, neck and neck, contesting the honor of being first into the Insurgent

citadel. A company of Filipinos were flying across the square in front of Aguinaldo's palace, and suddenly turned and gave the Americans a volley.

"Give 'em hell, boys!" shouted Funston.


"R-r-rack," was the response.

"Another!" yelled the plucky little Kansan.

"R-r-r-r-rack," rolled the rifles.

"Now for them!" ordered Funston. But the Filipinos did not wait. They dropped bag and baggage and scooted, and when our boys crossed the San Fernando square not a Filipino remained to contest American occupation. The roar and crackle of the burning "palace" and the shouts and chatter of frightened "Chinos" alone told the story of Filipino defeat.

The advance from Caloocan was full of difficulty and peril, but the fall of Malolos will go down to history as just short of an "April fool." The week's campaigning was pregnant with important facts. We had overestimated the equipment, numbers, and fighting ability of the Filipinos. Whatever artillery they had, and we knew of several Maxim and Krupp guns, it was ineffective. Their trenches, though triumphs of engineering skill, well placed and numerous, did not protect the enemy from the shells of our field guns and the charges of



THE CAPITOL OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC AT MALOLOS
Erected in 1895. Captured by MacArthur's Division, March 31, 1899



our infantry. Their organization was faulty, and under fire their troops became demoralized. They seldom attacked in the open, but confined themselves to guerilla methods; and, while surrender was not in their code, they chose to fight, run away, and live to fight another day. The lessons of the movement were valuable to our troops, and of signal importance to our commanders. The enemy, however, did not realize the full significance of his utter defeat, as subsequent events show. He did, nevertheless, exhibit a slight disposition to find out what we offered him to quit. The rainy season was close at hand, and its coming held out possibilities to him and difficulties to us, which he hoped to turn to good account. Aguinaldo took his government aboard Manager Higgins's private car and ran it on a side track at San Fernando.

The Philippine commission, having arrived in Manila, issued a proclamation April 3, assuring the Filipinos that it was the desire of the commission to ascertain from the enlightened native what form of government seemed best adapted to the Philippine people, and that both in the establishment and maintenance of government in the Philippine Islands it was the policy of the United States to consult the

views and wishes, and secure the advice and coöperation and aid of the Philippine people themselves. American supremacy must be acknowledged; civil and religious rights were guaranteed; an honest civil service in which the Filipinos would, to the fullest extent of their ability, be employed; honest administration enforced; public roads and railroads would be promoted; elementary and higher education made possible; and reform instituted in all departments of the government service.

Twenty-five thousand copies of the proclamation were printed in Tagalog and Spanish and posted in Manila and sent into various parts of the Islands. The natives promptly tore it from the walls where it was posted, and Aguinaldo prohibited its circulation in the Insurgent country. The Filipinos of the better class in Manila, who had deserted the Insurgent cause, read it, and responded by conferring with the commission and offering suggestions as to a form of government which they thought would be acceptable to the people; but as these Filipinos had lost their influence with the military faction of the Insurgents, their relations with the commission only brought down the most violent abuse upon their heads. Their association with the commissioners, however, was

not without its effect upon the Manila Filipinos, who began to look with less distrust upon the Americans. The opinion of the English and Spanish residents of Manila was that the proclamation was absolutely valueless as a conciliatory measure, as it asserted the unqualified sovereignty of the United States, and offered no concessions to the Filipino military element.

XII

THE retreating Insurgent soldiers folded their tents like the Arabs, and took everything portable with them in their flight. Occasionally stray copies of their official correspondence and newspapers, however, would be left behind, and from these we gleaned many interesting extracts, not the least amusing of which was the description of our preparations and advance on Malolos. In describing that action the *Republica Filipina* said :—

“The Yankees landed from their warships and began to fortify themselves under cover of pirate chief Dewey’s guns. The swash-bucklers vaingloriously proceeded to flaunt their variegated flag, but the sign of this going up the flagstaff was the signal for our gallant warrior patriots to dash down upon the invaders with uncontrollable fury, and soon the whole Yankee force was in precipitate flight. Their demoralization was complete, and in their headlong stampede they abandoned large quantities

of war material. Our men continued in pursuit of the fugitives right down to the sea-beach, where the enemy tumbled into boats and pushed off in desperate haste. Their wounded were in a horrified plight, for the stampede was so complete that everything was in the dire confusion of a sinfully selfish 'sauve qui peut.' Not a man of all this miserable crowd ever gave a single thought to anything except his overwhelming anxiety to save his own skin, nor would they spare even a single glance of pity for the unhappy wretches who, grievously wounded and powerless to lift themselves aboard the boats, appealed unavailingly for compassion, and despairingly threw themselves in the water by the hundreds, sinking immediately, never to appear again on the surface. Drowned like rats! A horrible spectacle, which moved the hearts of even the strongest hearted among the conquerors, and constrained them to tears! It was a terribly severe punishment for the Americans, though even then inadequate, in view of the innumerable acts of unmitigated savagery committed everywhere by an enemy without a single idea of morality. Fifteen breech-loading rifles and heaps of ammunition were captured, besides much personal property of such a nature as to indicate the existence of deep-

rooted habits of luxurious living, totally incompatible with the stern business of soldiering, especially in a tropical land."

Such extracts as these frequently fell into our possession and supplied just that touch of grim humor necessary to make our campaign seem little less than an opera bouffe. Despite utter defeat the sanguine and imaginative Filipino historian employed his talents in blinding his countrymen to the real significance of the situation.

After we took Malolos, MacArthur halted. General Otis thought the sixteen thousand five hundred available soldiers insufficient to catch the enemy and garrison the towns, for it became evident that the *amigos* who returned to their homes were not to be trusted. One or two attempts to wreck trains, and several attacks within our lines by bolo men, showed that the hostile spirit was not quelled in the breasts of pretended non-combatants. To the south of Manila the Insurgents showed signs of increasing activity, and on the Laguna de Bay the Filipinos kept up a series of operations, where they were in possession of a small Spanish gunboat. Our lines were thin, and it was feared that Pilar might manage to get around to the northeast of Manila and cause serious

trouble. General Lawton, with a strong force, moved across the lake and cleared out the Insurgents and destroyed their fleet of launches and cascoes, taking Santa Cruz and adjacent towns. Although it was supposed that General Lawton would proceed south to Batangas and cut off the Insurgents in the Cavite province, he was suddenly recalled and ordered to concentrate at La Loma and sweep out the country to the east of MacArthur's advance, Aguinaldo having shifted his headquarters toward the mountains and established a large force under General Pio del Pilar to the northeast of Manila, reoccupying undesirable positions and small towns evacuated by us after MacArthur's advance on Malolos. The entire week's campaign in the south was therefore abandoned, and the Filipinos returned to their former positions.

The Insurgents were particularly active to the north, and kept up a harassing fire at our outposts to the east of the railroad line. Aguinaldo made numerous attempts to cut off the railroad, and attack trains between Manila and Malolos. The Insurgents pursued guerilla tactics with a vengeance, and many casualties resulted on both sides.

General Rios sent commissioners through the

lines in an attempt to effect the release of the Spanish prisoners. General Otis offered, through the Spanish commissioners, to exchange the great number of Filipino prisoners that were being fed in the Walled City; but Aguinaldo was aware of the comfortable quarters and good food the natives enjoyed at our hands, and was not disposed to treat with the Spanish on that basis. He would consider but two propositions: money, or the recognition of demands made in previous correspondence with General Otis.

The middle of April, Admiral Dewey sent the *Yorktown* to Baler, a little town on the east coast of Luzon, where for a year a Spanish garrison of fifty men, three officers, and two priests, had held out against the Filipinos. Lieutenant Gillmore and fourteen marines went up the Baler River, and were cut off and captured by the Insurgents. Gillmore and his men were taken over the mountains to San Isidro and compelled to follow the retreating Insurgent army, being imprisoned in convents and kept under strict guard. Gillmore's disappearance aroused the greatest interest in America, and so anxious were the newspapers to get tidings of him and his men, that one publication instructed its Manila correspondent to spend a thousand dollars to reach Gillmore, and

another thousand dollars on cable tolls, to report the interview.

General Lawton's division moved out of La Loma on the 24th of April, rapidly taking a northeasterly course, finding a country ravaged by fire and almost depopulated. Lawton permitted the natives to share the rice that had been kept from them by the Insurgent officers, and thousands came out of hiding and begged for food. The withdrawing of our forces the Insurgents attributed to defeat, and assembled in great numbers at Baliuag. Chief of Scouts Young and Captain Case, of the Second Oregon, fearlessly attacked Baliuag, and crossed the river to Bustos. As our troops were advancing on Bustos, a lieutenant from Colonel Gregorio del Pilar raised a white flag, and Captain Case with three men went out with a flag of truce to meet him. When within a few hundred yards of the enemy, a hail of bullets greeted our men. The Americans dropped from their horses, and Lawton sent out a squad of sharpshooters to cover their retreat. Colonel Summers and a company of the Twenty-second Infantry swung into the town, and the Insurgents took to their heels.

At San Miguel Chief of Scouts Young was shot. Young was an interesting personality, and

one of the most dashing scouts of the Philippine campaign. He is worthy of more than a passing notice. Leaving Corea, where he was Captain of the King's bodyguard, he went to Manila, out of pure love of adventure, and a desire to fight for his country. He soon picked out Lawton as a man to follow. On May 15, Lawton's columns, occupying both sides of the Quingua river, near San Rafael, had reached a point which he considered approximately opposite the town. Anxious, therefore, to ascertain his exact position, and seeing standing near him a civilian, a big, tall, sturdy-looking fellow, he called out, "Here, you! I wish you would go out and bring back a citizen of this place." The civilian was Young, who promptly saluted General Lawton and advanced without a moment's hesitation down the road, disappearing toward the town. Almost immediately Lawton heard three sharp reports of a rifle, and a few moments later Young reappeared striding up the road, carrying two rifles instead of one. "I couldn't get a citizen, General," he said, "but I got a soldier." And passing over a Remington still wet with blood, together with a pouch containing eighty-six rounds of cartridges, he said, "I wounded another, but the other six packed him off." This was General Lawton's

introduction to Young. Lawton knew a soldier when he saw one, and immediately gave Young command of twenty-five scouts, who penetrated the country in all directions, and brought back valuable information and numerous prisoners. After Lawton took San Ildefonso, Captain Case of the Second Oregon, and Captain Birkeheimer of the Third Artillery, were detailed to reconnoitre the enemy's position. Young and his scouts were placed under their command. The Insurgents lay in the hills around the town. The scouts under Young pushed on toward San Miguel, which was occupied by Brigadier General Gregorio del Pilar, with six hundred troops. The fearless little body of scouts approached to within one hundred and fifty yards of the Insurgent outposts. Pilar's men sent a number of volleys toward them, but hiding in the bushes the scouts opened a rapid return fire with the intention of making the enemy believe that the American force was large. As soon as Pilar replied with another volley, Young called to Case and his fifteen companions, "Now for bluff!" leading a sham advance of ten feet, and ordering a rapid fire. The ruse was successful, and the Insurgents fell back. "Now again," yelled Young. Another deploy was made, accompanied by a heavy fire. This time the whole

body of Filipinos deserted their trenches and took to their heels, running pell-mell toward the town. "Keep under cover of the bushes so they can't tell the size of our force, and chase them," Young called out. The nervy little body of Americans rushed through the underbrush, keeping up a deadly continuous fire at the retreating Insurgents, who poured into San Miguel as the whole population was making a dash for the bridge across the river on the opposite side of the town. Hot after them pursued Young, leaping with great strides through the streets, followed by his men. Reaching the opposite side of the bridge, Pilar and his regiment halted and made a stand, while the population flew across the rice fields. Young swung up to the bridge, and turning a moment, called to his men, "Now for it! Give it to them, boys!" At that instant a bullet struck him and he fell. Pilar retreated to the edge of the wood, at the opposite side of the rice field, and Captain Case and his men sent a hot fire after them. Case then rode back for the Oregons to come up and hold San Miguel. Poor Young was carried back to die. Lawton's eye moistened as he saw Young's giant form stretched out before him. Almost single-handed he had scattered an Insurgent regiment and taken a town. "A braver man I


never knew," was General Lawton's tribute to the intrepid Young.

Lawton and Summers pushed on to San Isidro, an important town which was being used as the headquarters of the revolutionary government, but Aguinaldo and his cabinet had evacuated in great haste and escaped to Cabanatuan, fourteen miles north. At San Isidro were found the names of Gillmore and seven of the *Yorktown* men scratched on the walls of the old Spanish prison. Just one month had elapsed from the day Lawton moved out of La Loma. Twenty-eight towns had been captured in twenty-three engagements. Six Americans were killed and thirty-four wounded. "In six days more I think we could have captured the Insurgent government and crushed their army," General Lawton remarked to the writer at the close of that campaign.

The heavy rains and overflowing rivers made further advance through the great Candaba swamp country impossible. It was with the greatest difficulty that Lawton's army could be commissaried. His carabaos died, and his artillery was dragged through the mud and across the streams with the utmost difficulty. The elusive Aguinaldo was always just beyond our reach. He was able to tickle our nose with a straw,

but when we reached out to strike he was gone. Lawton's column was recalled to Manila, and garrisons were left at the principal captured towns. Otis's withdrawal of Lawton was a great disappointment to all of us on the spot. We felt that had he been permitted to send his cavalry after Aguinaldo, the whole Insurgent government would have been caught, for they were unloading their impedimenta at a significant rate, so close was Lawton on their heels.

In the meantime, however, important events were taking place in General MacArthur's line, which consisted of General Hale's and General Wheaton's brigades forming an advance from Malolos northward. At the Bagbag River the first stout resistance was encountered. Where that river joins the Calumpit in front of General Wheaton's brigade, the Insurgents constructed formidable field-works and cut a span of the railroad bridge which crossed the Bagbag. For the first time we were able to bring an armored car into successful action. Mounting it with Gatlings and Hotchkiss guns, we set a swarm of Chinese to work. The Philippine "Chino" was less timid than his Celestial ancestor, and entered into field work with great enthusiasm, acting as litter bearer, exposed to the enemy's fire with apparent unconcern. Upon this occasion the



A GROUP OF AGUINALDO'S GENERALS

I.—GREGORIO DEL PILAR, Aid-de-Camp 2.—MASCARDO 3.—TORRES 4.—PIO DEL PILAR
and Aguinaldo's Body-guard



Chinamen proved particularly useful. They pushed the armored car up to within a thousand yards of the bridge. Our artillery then opened fire and demoralized the natives, who fled from their positions, under the advance of Wheaton, and fell back to the opposite shore of the Rio Grande, where it joins the Calumpit just beyond the Bagbag.

Then arose a military problem that required the strategy of Funston to solve. The Insurgents had utterly destroyed the railroad, hiding the ties and rails, and even cutting deep furrows across the railroad embankment, as well as removing the rails, the ties, and the upper girders from the Rio Grande bridge, the largest structure of its kind in the Philippines.

Funston's exploit at the Rio Grande was one of the most spectacular in the entire campaign. Across the river the Insurgents had the usual field-works, trenches, and, added to their large force assembled there, they had a Maxim gun and a cannon. The river is the largest in the Islands, and at Calumpit is very wide and swift. General Funston evolved two plans of attack; one was to utilize the bridge, and the other was to cross the river at night by means of a raft. Both of these attempts were discovered by the Insurgents, who greeted Funston's men with an

active reception. What he had failed to do at night the little Kansan decided to accomplish in broad daylight on the morning of April 26. Three rafts were hastily constructed. A rope was secured and two daring Kansans chosen.

They were to undertake an exploit that was totally outside of all the tenets of military tactics, — the gamble of an adventuresome mind that offered hardly a chance in a thousand of success. Trembly and White were the fool-hardy Americans who volunteered to swim a raging stream, take across a ferry rope, and fasten it right in the teeth of the enemy. Stripped to the skin, these giant Kansans plunged into the water in broad daylight, within easy firing distance of three thousand Insurgent riflemen whose bullets flecked the water like hailstones. The Kansans and Montanas stationed on the south shore, by a continuous fire, made a "dead line" along the tops of the Insurgent trenches. They pumped their Springfields until their fingers burned and blistered on the hot barrels of their rifles. Through the torrent, under the deafening roar of artillery and rattle of musketry, the fearless American boys splashed and plunged until they reached the muddy bank of the opposite shore up to within speaking distance of the enemy's

trenches. Along under the plane of whirring and whizzing lead the Kansans ran until they found a projecting stump, almost a part of the enemy's earthworks. To this they fastened the guide rope. Two other irrepressible Kansans in the meantime came across in a dugout, and Americans opened fire on the trenches of the enemy, while Trembly and White rolled up mud balls and dropped them over the trenches. The paralyzed Insurgents made a stampede for the opposite side of the railroad embankment.

In the meantime Colonel Funston and fifty Kansans pulled themselves across the Rio Grande on rafts, and joined in the attack. The Filipinos turned their Maxim upon the little party, who were compelled to retreat; but the Insurgent artillerymen were panic-stricken by the terrific fusillade of the Montanas and Kansans, and dragged the Maxim with them over the railroad embankment, Funston and his men giving them hot pursuit. Wheaton poured a stream of troops across the bridge, and the Insurgents were forced to abandon their seemingly impregnable position and fall back to Apalit, where they had a long train of passenger coaches and two engines with steam up, prepared for the flight they evidently anticipated. The demoralized Filipinos crawled in-

side and upon the tops of the cars by the hundred, and the train moved out just as our troops, on a double-quick time, entered the town.

MacArthur pressed on to San Fernando, and occupying that town went into rain quarters, for the flood-gates of the skies were opened and the water came down in torrents.

In some instances, fortified by superb trenches and fighting from perfect vantage-ground, the Filipinos had shown considerable resistance and stubbornness, but it was hardly possible to catch them either in direct pursuit or by flank movements, for they were seldom "surprised" and rarely ever ambushed.

Under the circumstances it is probable that we on the field largely exaggerated the numbers and strength of the Insurgent army, as well as their casualties. Their organization was scattered over a vast territory, and their ability as sprinters made them an elusive and intangible force which harassed and thwarted many well-laid plans. Their tactics were as inscrutable as their natures, and their reckless disregard for their property and their people, whether pressed unwillingly in their ranks or held prisoners by us, convinced us that though considerably removed from barbarism, they were equally distant from a civilized status.

The hot, tropical storms turned the plains into steaming lakes. The rivers overflowed their banks, and the roads were washed out. The health of our troops, much impaired by the hard campaign, began to alarm our surgeons, and the "conditions of the climate," which the Insurgent leaders counted upon to abet their cause, were in fact insurmountable obstacles against further action. During the rainy season most of the Volunteers were returned to America, and several thousand Regulars arrived in Manila to take their places.

XIII

THE rapid invasion of the Insurgent country and the utter destruction of their theories of warfare at last awakened in the minds of many natives a desire for peace. The peasant class and the small trader particularly clamored for a suspension of hostilities. But the war element was in the ascendant. They had money, arms, and ammunition, and carried away with their own importance, they sought rather to mould public sentiment to further their ambitions than to become subservient to the will of the people.

Aguinaldo, more of a patriot, but less of a soldier than Luna, favored "peace with honor." Luna opposed any plan that did not formally recognize the status of the army. His ambition was fired, and independence or death was not a mock shibboleth with him. The Insurgent government was convened at Cabanatuan. Aguinaldo and Paterno despatched a peace commission to the American lines with requests to be

allowed to go to Manila and confer with the American commissioners. What their definite instructions were does not appear, for the personnel of the commission was changed by Luna and Mabini as soon as they arrived at Luna's headquarters. Colonel Arguelles was given a letter by Mabini addressed to the United States Peace Commissioners. The letter stated that the Philippine people had not yet lost its confidence in the friendship, justice, and magnanimity of the American nation, and that they felt themselves weak before the advance of the American troops. A suspension of hostilities and a general armistice was therefore requested throughout the entire Archipelago, to last for three months, in order to consult the opinions of the people concerning the government, and to appoint an extraordinary commission with full powers to act in the name of the Philippine people. "The welfare of this unfortunate country and the triumph of the governing party in the United States of America depend upon the prompt establishment of peace," said Mabini. The letter stated that "while still in pursuit of our independence, the people would not insist upon fighting for its ideal if the Philippine people, through its accredited representative (to be appointed)

should ask for peace and accept autonomy." The communication concluded with a covert threat to apply, in case the request was declined, for foreign intervention.

The commissioners were permitted to go to Manila. They called upon General Otis and asked him in what way, honorable for both governments, hostilities could be suspended temporarily so that the wishes of the people might be consulted, and definitely, so that the era of blood and extermination which had begun in the Islands, "always peaceful and tranquil," might be closed forever.

General Otis replied that only by accepting the sovereignty of the United States the basis of an agreement could be laid down, and that it was necessary that the Filipinos should lay down their arms in token of recognition. In return he offered, in the name of the government, autonomy according to the terms promised by the American commission.

The pride of the Insurgent commissioners was aroused, and they construed General Otis's reply into an assumption that they were disposed to submit, whereas they were "far from being afraid of the advance of the Yankee troops"; on the contrary, "we see in that advance the certainty of obtaining partial, if not

definite, triumphs over those troops," reasoned Arguelles, although the force of such logic is too complicated to understand.

The commissioners returned to the Insurgent capital and reported the result of their interview with General Otis. The reply was prompt. Arguelles brought back Mabini's answer: "Under such conditions," he said, "peace will never reign in this country. Only by recognizing our existence as an independent state a satisfactory solution of the present conflict can be arrived at. If the American government insists upon war, the Filipinos, who are defending their rights and a just cause, will not refuse to accept it. The autonomy offered by the American commission does not satisfy the aspirations of our people who have entered upon the struggle for higher ideals for which they are ready to die."

When Arguelles returned to the Filipino camp he reported that the Americans were tickled by the small triumphs of their arms, and were in no condition to listen to reason.

"The Filipino will struggle, and will struggle again with the Yankee, until the latter is convinced that it is impossible to conquer a people by brute force. The loss of territory does not signify acquiescence and submission of those

who inhabit it, to whom the Yankee is, and will always be, a stranger on this soil. We will never, never bow our neck to the variegated flag of the forty-two stars," said the Insurgent commissioner in an interview published in *La Independencia*.

Aguinaldo threatened to resign, but so potent was his name with the people that both the radical Mabini and the jealous Luna did not dare allow him to withdraw from the Filipino presidency. The only thing, therefore, to do was for Mabini to resign, which he did. In the letter of resignation Mabini said:—

"The actual cabinet, since its formation in January last, has done all that it can do for the welfare of the country, which in its judgment is the independence of the same; but the scarcity of forces, and the limited resources at its command, have prevented the accomplishment of the purpose sought to be obtained, though always guided by dispassionate action and pure patriotism."

Paterno then emerged from his temporary obscurity, but before he actually came into power, an Aguinaldo letter, addressed to his ministers, appeared. It was probably written by Mabini, for it reviewed at length Aguinaldo's associations with the American officials and the

failure to secure recognition from them. "America's friendship," said the letter, "continued so long as it suited their ends, but seeing that the aspirations of this country were gaining opinion in America and before the civilized world, and the ratification of the Peace Treaty found opposition in the Senate, the said government did not hesitate to provoke the conflict which brought on the present war without previous notification or declaration of war.

"Moved by the patriotism of the people and an unwillingness to sacrifice their lives, a cessation of hostilities was asked for, that the people might have time to consider their situation and the propositions made to them by the proclamation of the American commission; but the representative of the American government in the Islands did not find it convenient to accede to the request without previous unconditional surrender, thus spoiling their efforts for peace. By asking the surrender of arms without giving any guarantee but the promise of our liberty, it convinced us that our arms constituted the only guarantee of our aspirations. For the compliance of the promises of the American government it is necessary that they should be consigned either under a formal convention with the Filipino government or in a constitution,

both being confirmed by the Congress of the United States. No such documents exist, nor will the Americans give us time to make such agreements according to custom, so it is evident that they wish to comply with their promises only when it suits their convenience. It would be cruel to submit to discretion and abandon a defenceless people to the mercy of the rifles, which would commit great abuses after we had given up our arms," said the letter. "It would be a dishonor to our army, and a manifest infraction of my sacred duties. I have directed our commissioners abroad to work for the friendly intervention of the powers. By all this you may see that there is no other way except to keep fighting until death, and with perseverance we will triumph in the end, and this will be greater if the obstacles that oppose us are great. Unforeseen events may change in an instant the present condition of affairs." Thus ended the document.

Unforeseen obstacles to Mabini did immediately present themselves. Aguinaldo swung around very rapidly. Luna's friends schemed to overthrow his ascendancy, so he formed a new cabinet. Paterno was named as president of the council; Buencamino, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Severino de las Alas, Interior; Mar-

iano Trias, War; Hugo Ilogan y Lopez, Finance; Aguedo Velarde, Instruction; Maximo Paterno, Post and Public Works; Leon Guerrero, Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. In this list, Mabini's and Luna's adherents are noticeably absent. Paterno issued a proclamation dated San Isidro, May 8, 1899, but for obvious reasons did not appear in type until the 15th of that month at Cabanatuan, to which place the Filipino government and printing office, under the pressure of Lawton, had migrated.

Paterno proclaimed that the policy of the new cabinet was to seek the welfare of the country, and maintain political and individual liberties, and to seek peace under honorable conditions. "We will go to war," he said, "if to save those liberties it is necessary to proceed along the dolorous path of sacrifices; but if those liberties can be obtained in a dignified and decorous way by means of diplomacy, we shall unhesitatingly seek to obtain the cessation of hostilities, because even the most powerful and the greatest nations want peace, for only in peace are to be found the true happiness and prosperity of the people."

Another commission was promptly appointed by Aguinaldo, consisting of Lieutenant Reyes, General Gregorio del Pilar, Gracio Gonzaga of

the dissolved cabinet, Albert Baretto of the revolutionary congress, and Captain Lorenzo Zialcita, A.D.C. to Aguinaldo. They came from Malolos on a special train. The commissioners were in uniform, and were roundly cheered by the Filipinos as they entered a carriage to be escorted by Lieutenant King, of General Otis's staff, to the Palace. After a conference with General Otis, the commission went to the residence of Louis R. Yango, a rich Filipino of Manila, where they held a consultation with Florentino Torres, and Pablo Ocampo.

La Democracia, a Manila Filipino paper, owned by Dr. Pardo de Tavera, published an interview with Gonzaga, giving an account of the commission's interview with General Otis: "General Otis received us with frankness and cordiality," said Gonzaga. "Our principal aim in coming to Manila, has been to ask for an armistice, so that we may take a plebiscite with the object of having a unanimous expression of opinion with regard to the offers the American Philippine commission has made. General Otis, without definitively rejecting our request, contented himself with making a few observations, which prudence forbids me to reveal. I have hopes that peace will be established. I am firmly convinced that it will be an accomplished

fact if the Americans do not show themselves so opposed to the wishes of the army. I have great faith in the Paterno cabinet. It will work for the welfare and lasting progress of the country, even under great difficulties, which it expects to surmount. The Mabini cabinet, of which I formed part, professed a political creed opposed to that of the people."

The commission demanded an armistice and desired a protracted time to secure an expression of the people of the entire Archipelago upon the question of terms of peace and the kind of government they desired. General Otis had little faith in the sincerity of the emissaries, and was of the opinion that though Aguinaldo desired peace the commission had been tampered with by Luna, and did not represent the pacific element of the Filipinos. Several days were spent in arguing with Aguinaldo's emissaries, who were received by the Schurman commission. It developed, however, that the emissaries were without powers and persisted in adhering to demands for the independence. This fact seemed to point to the correctness of General Otis's conclusions that Luna's influence and not Aguinaldo's predominated. Finally President Schurman cabled to Washington to ascertain what definite form of government

could be offered. President McKinley replied that a governor general would be appointed by the President of the United States; heads of departments by the governor general; a general advisory council would be elected by the people whose qualifications would have to be carefully considered and determined, and the governor general would have power of absolute veto, while magistrates and principal judges would be appointed by the President, who desired that they would be chosen from the natives or Americans or both, according to their merits.

The terms were transmitted in writing to the emissaries, who returned to the Insurgent lines. We were soon notified that the stipulations were rejected.

General Otis was of the opinion that the commission was a ruse to gain time and enable the Insurgents to recuperate their scattered forces and patch up their internal differences.

The opinion of General Luna at this period sheds some light upon the situation, and shows clearly his position. As Luna was the real military leader of the Insurgents, and controlled the largest part of the army, his influence and domination was supreme, and, even presuming Aguinaldo and Paterno sincere in their desires for

peace, it is doubtful if they could have turned the tide of Luna's influence. Simultaneously with the conferences of Aguinaldo's emissaries in Manila, Luna caused to be published and distributed his policy and views of the situation. The document is, therefore, important, showing the split in the revolutionary ranks, and confirming, as it does, the opinion of the American commission that the Aguinaldo and Paterno faction was not in position to compel the Insurgents to lay down arms, even had they desired peace at that price. Luna's article is dated May 20, and in part is as follows:—

“The Filipino people want independence, and I will sustain the cause of my country until the last resource is exhausted, thus fulfilling the oath I made to the flag. Calmly and without exaggeration I sincerely confess that it is better to die on the field of battle rather than accept any domination. I said this before the war, and I repeat it now. All the generals with whom I have been in communication are of the same opinion, Tinio, Makabulos, Concepcion, Mascardo, Pilar, and Torres. Those of the south hold views still more advanced. The military as well as the civil party will not lay down arms, nor will they accept autonomy. I am profoundly convinced of the truth of what

I say, because in a sort of plebiscite I have asked the people if they wanted autonomy. Do you know what they answered? 'Long live Independence! Down with Autonomy!' This was the answer of eight central provinces whom I have addressed. I have repeatedly addressed people who were flying from the enemy. 'Are you discouraged? Do you want peace? Return to your homes.' And they — women, old men, and children — answered me: 'We have begun the struggle for independence, we will continue it. We prefer to lose all rather than submit to the rule of those who annihilate and destroy us. They say that we are discouraged?'

"I do not believe that they can say that. Since the twenty-third of April until the fourth of this month [May], when I left them very reluctantly, my troops have fought with an enthusiasm which I admire. I have had one-fifth of my generals and officers wounded, two commandants and five officers killed. Well, ask them if they are discouraged. In Mexico, in Dolores, and in Kalulut, after Pulilan, Bagbag, Calumpit, and Apalit, I believe that the enemy has convinced himself that our faith in resistance is the same. The places we have abandoned do not signify anything in Luzon.

See only the map of these Islands, and you will convince them that the ground we have lost does not amount to a hundredth part of the whole territory. We are frugal, and our frugality, added to the provisions which the people give us, is an important factor. We have a vast tract of uncultivated country. Let everybody work, some of the men on the battlefield, others in cultivating the soil, the women and children in making bandages and clothes, and attending the wounded and comforting them, in making cartridges, if possible, and then we shall attain our ideal.

“With regard to the anti-Imperialist League, this is my opinion. If they are sincere, God bless them and their humane sentiments! but it is necessary to remind you of one thing. General Merritt, in his proclamation of the 13th of August, 1898, said, ‘The United States declare to be the champion of oppressed peoples, and will not take an inch of Filipino territory.’ Compare these words with what is now taking place, when at San Juan del Monte the American soldiers opened fire upon our troops, thus commencing hostilities. I detest war, I hate it; but for the independence of the country it is necessary to accept it. The Americans have fought to defend theirs. In the bottom of

their hearts they understand why we are fighting. The League demands that we should lay down our arms, — a thing impossible to do ; and what faith have we in America, in Congress, or in the anti-annexationists? How can we believe in them after what has occurred? Our arms are our only means of defence. If we surrender them we shall be at the mercy of the conqueror, and we shall have no other remedy but to accept their conditions.

“Very often I ask myself if it is not another mistake. America wishes to show to the world that she desires to enter upon peaceful negotiations for the sake of humanity, but at the same time she asks for the impossible — disarmament. Her conditions not being accepted, a more energetic step, an act of force to annihilate us would be justified before the world. I wish I were mistaken as I am not a politician, but it is necessary to see far ahead.

“A continuation of the campaign will finally bring us victory. You must take into account that we have not yet begun. The Spaniards know what is guerilla warfare, and what means thirty thousand or forty thousand armed islanders, frugal and long-suffering. We shall cause more casualties by surprises and ambushades than by serious defence, without counting that

intermittent fever, dysentery, and other illness will produce a greater number of losses among the enemy.

“Our victory will not consist in the victory of our arms; it will be gained by our tenacity and by our armed attitude. I calculate at \$150,000 gold the daily expenditure of the Americans for their army and navy. Each day that passes is a victory for us whose wants are few, and two defeats for them, — namely, one defeat for losses caused by the climate, and the other an economical defeat.

“It is not true that the people are not for us. It is a solemn lie. All the Filipinos are with us. I wish they [the Americans] would arm them; then we may be convinced. They all flee, they all abandon their homes. Why? Not because they are not on our side. Give them rifles, pay them all, and we shall soon see what will happen.

“Continue to defend our ideal without debasement and without faint-heartedness, advocate always the cause of independence, and preach to all to be tenacious, not to be frightened, to work and to struggle with faith. Ours will be the victory. Justice and Right which are on our side will triumph. Let there be no other cry but this, ‘Long live Independence!’”

The foregoing encompasses the peace discussions, and should settle the controversy upon the real attitude of the revolutionists during and immediately after our general advance to San Fernando and San Isidro. While the Filipino leaders were bickering for armistices, they made strenuous attempts to recuperate their scattered forces, and buoy up, by means of lying reports, the confidence and support of the population. These reports form an interesting chapter in revolutionary literature.

XIV

ALTHOUGH the testimony of thousands of refugees who came voluntarily to the American lines made it evident that the agrarian part of the population over whose territory we had passed were discouraged and disheartened at the results of war, and anxious to return to peaceful occupations, yet we were aware that to a large extent the Filipino leaders were able to retain the loyalty of the masses. It was said that the Insurgent military faction held the people by the force of arms in a state of terror and subjection.

But there were more potent influences at work than force; one of these was official information published in *La Independencia*, the Insurgent organ, which followed the fortunes of the revolutionists. Its utterances were accepted by the people as gospel. It reached all official headquarters, and circulated extensively among the people throughout the Archipelago. It was the only Insurgent paper

published in Luzon, and it was always issued from Aguinaldo's headquarters. When he and his staff retreated, *La Independencia*, with its few fonts of type, and its old Franklin hand-press, was packed into a carabao cart, and dragged along. This printing outfit was of vast importance to the "paper" republic. Had we been able to capture the Insurgent printing outfit, I think the "government" would have perished of ennui.

Always at a safe distance from the firing line Paterno, Mabini, Aguinaldo, or one of the cabinet ministers, spread into type the gospel of revolution, and circulated it broadcast throughout the Archipelago through the columns of *La Independencia*. These ardent revolutionists realized the influence of anything "in type," and employed their little outfit to the full limit of its possibilities. Aside from the publication of official documents, the presentation of "news" was interesting. The press censor, Colonel Thompson, who garbled American despatches at Manila, was a paragon of accuracy compared to the man who edited the "despatches" for *La Independencia*. That worthy was a whole staff of reporters, censor, and purveyor of news in himself. He fed the popular imagination, and filled the deluded Tagalog with tales of the


triumph of Filipino arms, and the defeats of the enemy, until it must have appeared that there was hardly an American left alive in the Philippines. Nothing but disaster and loss pursued us, according to the war news of *La Independencia*. We committed outrages and wantonly destroyed property. Palanca, the Chinese consul at Manila, was in league with us, and furnished us spies. We assassinated women and children. We evacuated positions, and were dislodged by the valor of Insurgent troops. We attempted to make landings from our ships and were defeated. We retreated at San Luis, and were frustrated in our attempts to capture the government at San Isidro. We were ambuscaded at Angeles and disbanded our troops and fled. We were repulsed with heavy loss at San Isidro, and the town was occupied by the Insurgent Colonel Padilla. We were drawn out of San Miguel de Mayumo and utterly routed from the province of Nueva Ecija. We lost cartloads of dead at Bakalor and Santa Rita, and left great quantities of rifles, revolvers, and "projectile cannons" on the field. At Candaba we fell into ambush, and lost our ammunition and convoy. We fled terrified out of San Fernando, pursued by General Concepcion and his valiant troops. Again we lost "six

wagon-loads" of dead in a disastrous action before Carmen, Dolores, and San Augustin, and General Makabulos defeated us at Bulacan. We beat a hasty retreat at Baliuag, and were pursued to Candaba. We devastated villages and burned towns as we fled. At Mexico we "suffered a set-back," and though we fought at times stubbornly, it was "without any effect whatever" upon the Insurgent lines.

At Angeles, June 10, the Secretary of the Interior telegraphed to the commanders, provincials, and governors, of Luzon, that "Yesterday our army, under the command of the captain general-in-chief, recaptured the towns of San Fernando de la Pampanga."

The Insurgent organ for months kept up this strain of information. During its entire publication, of all the copies I have seen but two defeats are recorded against the Filipinos. The telegraphic news and reports of the commanders with remarkable unanimity confirmed stories of defeat and disaster suffered by the American troops.

Added to this potent influence at work upon the native mind, writers of equally imaginative style were contributing reports from Manila, the southern Islands, and Hong Kong. One of the most graphic examples of this style of



AGUINALDO'S HEADQUARTERS AT BIACNABATO AGUINALDO'S HEADQUARTERS AT CAVITE
Where Compact with Spain was made, December 24, 1897

Granted by Admiral Dewey



fiction came from Iloilo, describing the success of the Ilongo soldiers in repulsing the Americans. "We propose to put things in their right light," says the correspondent to his Luzon compatriots. "The American battalions, having formed in order of battle, advanced upon our position at Sambag. On arriving at a certain distance from the place in which we had taken up our position of defence, they commenced a vigorous attack by a telling discharge of musketry. The Ilongo soldiers whose bravery is known to all, remained cool in their posts without answering the fire of the enemy. This calmness doubtless accelerated their advance, trusting in the security of the result. But it was not thus. Our braves, in obedience to the orders of their chiefs, started to execute a highly strategic plan; breaking the fire, falling back, and beating a retreat, they finally abandoned their two lines of intrenchments. The Americans fell into the trap. At a distance of five hundred metres our artillery, which until now had been quiet, instantly commenced to belch forth fire and shell upon the American phalanx, causing utter disorder among them, those who survived the disaster flying in every direction.

"The Yankees in their flight abandoned more

of their wounded than they took to their bloody hospital, and some three hundred to four hundred rifles with their accoutrements and munition, all of which fell into the possession of our men. Those who took part in this memorable battle were the troops under command of Lieutenant General Roque Lopez and Colonel Augustin Solis, both of them valiant and daring soldiers, to whose skill and ability can be attributed this complete and brilliant victory of the Philippine arms."

Between Manila and the Insurgent capital constant communication was kept up. The line of transit was known as the "grapevine" telegraph, but its course and base were not located by our troops. In fact, so stealthily was the system of information carried on, that a courier was seldom apprehended, and letters rarely fell into our possession. The Manila sympathizers told the Insurgents that the "Yankee soldiers" were sick and disgusted with the war, and many feigned illness in order to keep out of battle, and that trains arrived constantly "filled with dead and wounded, loaded into the cars, one upon each other in heaps." Also, that only five per cent remained of the American troops which had operated in the north, and that Otis had received a tele-

gram from Washington in answer to a request for more men, — telling him to manage as best he might this Philippine affair, but as to sending more men, "God forbid!"

"As to McKinley," says another Manila correspondent, "nothing is known here about him; there are not even telegrams that say anything about him, or indicate that he is even in this world. I, on my part, wish no man harm, but I do wish God would call him to his sound senses, and cause him to abandon this vale of tears; or at least to retire from office for the sake of his health."

"It is truly curious to observe," writes still another sympathizer, "the works which various organizations in America are undertaking ostensibly for the pacification of these Islands; and to note their pretexts for excusing the conduct of their government against us."

From Cebu, Negros, and all the Visayas, Insurgent officers wrote glowing accounts of their achievements. A single extract illustrates the trend of the information sent to Aguinaldo's camp.

"Our glorious flag has always floated over these Islands, with the exception of those ports held by our enemies, Iloilo, Cebu, and Bacalod," says the writer from Cebu. "No one ought

ever to doubt our patriotism. Good news comes from Negros. Dumaguete, and many towns where there are no American garrisons, have hauled down the American flag and hoisted that of the Philippine republic, and even in Bacalod itself an uprising is feared. Seventy police, armed by the Yankees, fled with much ammunition and some muskets. It is judged that the annexationist policy of Laçson, Luzurriaga, and other traitors is not likely to grow in Negros, for the people's eyes are opened. The provost of Cebu is making every effort to get our provincial council to accept American sovereignty; but the patriots who are in front of the government have roundly refused, replying that they could not take any steps without the knowledge of the central government of Luzon."

Is it any wonder that the natives reading such tirades against us, such pictures of our inhumanity and brutality, took sides with their leaders and believed the accounts of the glorious victories and "marvellous military valor" of the Insurgent army? But the war news and correspondence was but a part of the tactics employed by the Filipino politicians to bolster up the Insurgent cause.

XV

THESE were critical moments within the revolutionary ranks. The peace and war elements were at variance, and the sentiments of the people grew apace. The Aguinaldo printing bureau was taxed to its utmost to issue the vast amount of eloquence employed to hold the people loyal. Had they once made a stampede, the revolution would have ended, but the leaders fired the Tagalog by false hopes and misleading promises. Given their own way these care-free, untutored peoples would have fallen back into their old ways with utter indifference to the government that ruled them, so long as it protected their lives and property and did not interfere with their religion and filch them of their earnings. Independence to them was a chimera. A word strange to their ears and unknown to their comprehension. But having once sounded the cry, the half-caste leaders struggled to preserve their positions and make good their boasts.

To uphold their assertions and infuse courage in the breast of the native, Aguinaldo and his supporters grasped every straw that floated on a wanton breeze of public opinion. The Junta at Hong Kong was the chief supply bureau and the agency through which most of the information, gleaned from the outside world, was transmitted to the revolutionists. Every letter, every speech, and every article that contained a word of commendation, encouragement, or sympathy in America, France, or New Zealand was gathered in by the Insurgent clipping agency and rushed to Aguinaldo.

When General Lawton said, "If I am shot by a Filipino bullet, it might as well come from one of my own men, because I know from observations, confirmed by captured prisoners, that the continued fighting is due to reports that are sent out from America," he knew that every word advocating rights of the Filipinos to independence found its way and was republished in *La Independencia*. He was aware of the purposes to which the Filipino leaders put the speeches and articles of the anti-expansionists.

The half-castes were playing a desperate game. With a great force of American troops driving their army to flight, and forcing them back to the mountains, the position was difficult enough.

But added to this, they had to contend with the divided sentiments of their own people, who began to have a dim realization of the hopelessness of the struggle, and to suffer great hardships from the loss of their families and the destruction of their homes.

It was at times a difficult task for the leaders to retain the loyalty of the inhabitants, and it required the combined ingenuity of Paterno, Aguinaldo, and Mabini, together with a dozen lesser satellites who comprised the itinerant government.

Sentiment in the United States was not unanimous upon the Philippine question. The policies of two great parties were in a state of formation. Imperialism, so-called, or anti-imperialism were the campaign shibboleths. Leagues were formed, pledged against the policy of the administration. Very few realized that the Filipinos, as a nation, were unschooled in the arts of civilization and were incapable of maintaining a national government. Americans naturally felt much sympathy for a people who protested that they were fighting for their independence, and some, more radical than others, instituted an aggressive campaign against the retention of the Philippines.

This agitation grew and manifested itself in many ways, the anti-expansionists taking up the

cudgels of the Filipinos against the administration. The demonstration, while the prerogative of any American citizen, was, by the Filipino leaders, construed as a revolutionary movement. The Filipinos were not born under a republic. They never knew the right of free speech. They therefore were unable to realize that an American could be a patriotic citizen, and yet differ from the policy of the administration in power. Thus they enormously magnified the importance of the anti-expansion movement, and even construed it as a state of war, publishing upon two occasions reports that certain states were in rebellion against the McKinley administration, because of his attempts to subdue the Philippines by force of arms. The fact that an anti-expansion league was formed in the United States was circulated among the natives. They were exhorted to stand firm, and never recede from their demands. A telegram was forwarded to the Insurgents by Agoncillo, from Paris, which informed them that the anti-annexation party increased day by day, and that the campaign in the Philippines was considered a great failure. Other cablegrams were industriously transmitted by Agoncillo, quoting utterances in America that favored the cause of the Insurgents.

The Filipinos knew that they had champions in the United States Senate. They were thoroughly posted upon what was going on in America, and in their official organ published at great length “A Senator’s Opinion,” which was cabled them by Agoncillo, from Paris. The speech was delivered on the floor of the United States Senate, and was an attack upon the “Imperialist” party. To quote from *La Independencia*, “The senator foretells the dire results and misfortunes of his country, if the labors of the anti-annexation league do not break down the Imperialist party.” The article then proceeds to give the “exact words” of the senator, to wit:—

“It is a criminal work which certain individuals in the actual government of the United States are doing. Such a fit of madness as has attacked President McKinley and his cabinet has never been seen before. Instead of conducting the country through the rows of peace and honor, they are leading her through a rough path that leads to ruin and destruction. We have fought with Spain because she represented barbarity and despotism. We declared war against Spain in defence of the rights of humanity. We have apostatized our intentions. Ambition and ‘rattle-brain’ are threatening the safety of our republic and its virtues. We are

edging day by day nearer to the pit of perdition, and must fall therein if Imperialism does not retreat and turn back into the true and old path. The Filipinos are fighting to-day for their independence, just as the United States fought for hers against England. Instead of assisting them to honorable ends, this government is seeking to reduce them to slavery. In a little while we will be calling for more troops. We are following the course of European nations. We are building up a great standing army. We cannot continue this sort of thing. The Philippine Islands will be our ruin. We need impossible force to subdue them, and we are neglecting our internal affairs in order to occupy ourselves with those distant Islands. Public opinion ought to pronounce an anathema upon the policy of McKinley, and abandon him in his stupid ambition for conquest and expansion."

Hardly greater encouragement to the Filipinos' hope for independence could have been given by the fiery Mabini or the eloquent Paterno.

The Insurgent leaders felt that they had little to hope for from the party in power in America. So they espoused the other alternative, and told the natives that there was a great party in the United States which would over-

throw the administration and get in control of the government. "Cleveland has been put in the front ranks of the anti-annexationists to fight against the government," said *La Independencia*, "and common sense prompts the Democrats to work in behalf of the Filipinos, and thus avoid the censure of other nations and their ultimate intervention in some form or another, and avoid also the disgrace and discredit of their country."

The desertion of Tavera, Torres, and Arellano, and their friendliness to the Americans, agitated the revolutionary leaders, who feared the influence of their example upon the people. In fact, the action of these advanced Filipinos was not without effect upon the natives, who recognized them as the leading Filipinos of Manila. Aguinaldo, therefore, in order to "explain matters," caused to be published an article in *La Independencia*, which said that, "though Señor Arellano is one of those engaged in compiling the laws [for the Americans], he is certainly making slow work of it, and takes several days upon each article. The fact is he is 'gaining time' so as to leave unmolested the true effect of the war."

La Independencia was an important factor, indeed. What would the Filipino leaders have

done without their printing office? Had it not been for those few fonts of well-worn type and that venerable hand press, the unenlightened native, homeless and destitute, shorn of his property and bowed down with grief, would never have known that "the decadence of Yankee power was foreseen"; that the downfall of the McKinley government was assured; that Manila was converted by American trickery into a breeding hole of political nondescripts, plunderers, and criminals; that to live in towns taken by Americans was impossible; that plunder was the order of the day; that in short, "wherever the Yankees are, disorder, anarchy, and immutability prevail."

Destitute and forlorn, hungry and half naked, the credulous population read these things, and, awed into wonderment and adoration at the profound knowledge of their intrepid leaders, followed blindly and gave their all to the cause, while their half-caste leaders lived in comparative luxury, and not infrequently in extravagance and immorality.

Day after day the revolutionary publication put forth "authentic facts" and "important events" culled from the Hong Kong papers, from the telegraphic despatches, and received by cable from the industrious Agoncillo. To re-

publish them would be but to repeat, in another form, the arguments already given.

The revolutionists were encouraged by every flattering gust of sentiment. They mistook political opposition to the administration for direct encouragement. At least they so accepted the action of the various leagues in America and the policy of the Democratic party. The words of Mr. Bryan, the Democratic leader, found their way into the Insurgent organ and were construed to arouse great hopes in the breasts of the defeated and discouraged Filipinos.

But one by one their dreams were shattered. The dual occupation of Manila had been defeated. The "recognition of part of the rights of a friendly people" had been denied. Foreign intervention had not been forthcoming. The opportunity to "take a plebiscite and ascertain the final desires of the people" had failed to secure an armistice. The two allies, the rainy season and sickness among our troops, cited by Luna, did not come to their rescue. And now, as a last resort, they clung to the hope of McKinley's defeat, and the triumph of the party of anti-annexationists. Surely theirs was a pathetic struggle, but unfortunately we had found indulgence and kindness construed as

weakness and fear. It was too late to repeat the experiment that had before failed so utterly. Kindness and generosity they might expect, but our sovereignty must first be enforced. General Luna was too able a man not to realize the futility of the struggle. "America represents a colossal giant Goliath, with muscles of steel, deadly weapons and artifices of war, and immense resources for prolonging the contest," he said. And yet he concluded, "We are compelled to maintain the honor of our country." The trouble with Luna was, his ideas were hopelessly Spanish.

"Our real campaign has not yet commenced," he told his people. "With the guerilla system, which is the most practicable, and the pouring rains which will add to the difficulties and obstacles, it is certain that our arms will prosper rapidly and powerfully, recapturing from the hands of our enemies the land we have been forced to evacuate."

Just one more reference to the arguments presented by the Insurgent leaders, and I will close this phase of the question.

The argument in question was very prejudicial to us, and engendered in the breasts of the natives a deep distrust. I cannot better explain its nature than by a quotation from a published

article in *La Independencia*. "A very convincing proof of what may be our lot at the hands of the Americans," said the Insurgent organ, "can be reckoned from the condition of affairs that actually exists in the states of North and South Carolina with two million negro inhabitants, who are so ill-treated that they have not even a voice nor a vote in the elections; and to better complete their cruel work, two white Americans, revolvers in hand, are stationed at the door of the City Hall or Assembly, and any negro who enters the door to assert his rights is a dead negro. Americans profess to advocate the equality of men and races — but for them there are whites and blacks — the former enjoying all the rights of men and citizens, the other only certain rights. The one occupies all the governmental positions and administrative offices. The others are their subordinates, — indeed, even their slaves; they dare not aspire to dignity or to high station, for if they do they surely will be subjected to humiliation, and insults, and vicious treatment. They are considered in every way inferior and worthy of no more consideration than a dog in the streets, or a horse which resists his master.

"To war then, dear brethren! To war! The

God of battles in whom we have placed our trust and hope will help us.

“The invading army is choked by internal strifes and international bickerings, their volunteers are fighting without enthusiasm, and solely to fulfil the military duty which compels them to fight. In the very heart of this same great American nation there is a large political party demanding the recognition of our sacred rights; and it is the Divine Providence that is watching over the justice of our cause.

“Advance! Filipinos! The Sun of Victory shines for us!

“Viva the Philippine People!

“Viva the National Independence!

“Viva the Army of Liberty!

“Viva Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the Republic!”

It is evident what were the influences that contributed to inflame the native mind against American sovereignty, and fortify the Filipino diplomat with a tangible argument to justify his uncompromising attitude toward the United States. It will thus be seen how the official organ played an important part in the revolution, turning defeat into victory and magnifying the importance of every opinion expressed in the United States that could be used to

influence the people; for in Spanish colonies newspapers have an almost official status, and the deluded native had been taught to believe anything "in print" as gospel, hardly less inspired than the Bible.

On June 12, 1899, one year from the birth of the Filipino republic, and after nearly six months of continual defeat at arms, the revolutionary government convened at Angeles and celebrated with great pomp and ceremony the first anniversary of independence. Undaunted by the fact that the troops had been driven from every position fifty miles north of Manila, and ten miles south and east, they jubilantly celebrated their success and their independence. Upon this occasion Aguinaldo made his last public speech to the assembled people. It is an interesting example of Tagalog eloquence and a valuable record, as it shows the absolutely uncompromising attitude of Aguinaldo and his belief in the final triumph of Filipino independence. I therefore republish it in full, as a fitting close to a chapter on the fuel that fed the flames:—

**“ ADDRESS PRONOUNCED BY EMILIO AGUINALDO,
12th JUNE, IN THE TOWN OF ANGELES AT
THE COMMEMORATION OF THE NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE.**

Gentlemen:— We assembled to-day to commemorate a happy day for the Philippine people, the greatest event in our political evolution; the first anniversary of the proclamation of our independence, which took place in Kawit, on this same date in the year which has but just passed,— 1898.

“ ‘Free and independent Philippines’ was the first cry of this people, who in yearning for liberty, through love of justice, and the exercise of their own rights, made a great rush to witness in Kawit, this highly patriotic demonstration, the commencement of a new era of progress, and benefit for our adored country; and it was precisely to show to the entire world the unimpeachable facts of our most legitimate aspirations fixing the starting-point of our political march and sealing our acts with the stamp of our glorious ensign.

“ The first triumph of our efforts was on May 28th of the same year; three hundred Spaniards under the command of Commander Pazos succumbed to the sharp fire of a small group of our untrained soldiers who were attacked in open field. Since that time our people have not rested nor tired; entire detachments of Spaniards have surrendered to our troops, and from day to day the people have been gaining their freedom.

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“On 12th June, 1898, Cavite, Bataan, Batangas, Morong, and Laguna declared themselves independent from Spanish dominion, and the opportune moment arrived for the events with which you are already acquainted; we hoisted for the first time, floating gayly and majestically in the wind this tricolor flag, the ensign of liberty, the symbol of our freedom, device of our faith ever constantly in the attainment of our unique ideal. See, here you have it! waving its clear folds which reflect in splendor the rays of the sun of liberty; behold it! Contemplate it! How beautiful, is it not? This symbolizes the virtue of our men of knowledge, the bravery of our soldiers and the peace of the home.

“Filipina! dear daughter of the ardent sun of the tropics, committed by Providence to the care of illustrious Spain, be thou not ungrateful, acknowledge her, salute her, who was your mother, who nursed thee with the sap of her own culture and civilization; thou hast sought independence, thou hast emancipated thyself from her, but cherish in heart the memory of more than three centuries in which thou hast lived under her uses, her language, her customs. It is true, she wished to stifle your hopes of independence, ay! in the same manner that a mother refuses, op-

poses, resists forever, separation from the daughter of her womb. But the joyful hour came. In the great book of the destiny of man the Supreme Creator signalled the birth of a people, and by divine mission thou hast achieved in His strength the sacred and inalienable right to liberty and independence. The flag that has been raised by a people worthy of the best privileges and enjoyments of liberty, and which assures our independence, we are obliged to defend at all times, even unto death ; let us give courage and abnegation without limit, and even sacrifices that be necessary, and to-day, that we are provoked and brought to fight, let us go forth with our eyes fixed upon this ensign of the sun and the three stars, which signify to us our dearest ideals. Let us go forth to the fight against America, a nation powerful in elements of war and rich in resources ; although we can count only upon the valor and self-denial of our soldiers and the patriotism of the Philippine people ; the contest is an unequal one, but no matter. Justice and right are on our side ; for it is known the American people are opposed to annexation. Who can doubt that after we have demonstrated by positive actions our ability for self-government, or rather 'a government of the people by the people,' this same nation which

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to-day appears to manifest a strong greed in its efforts to possess our territory by means of war, this same nation will be the one to offer us the olive branch, recognizing our independence.

“We have never hidden our hopes; we have announced before all the nations, calling the Almighty Creator and ruler of the Universe to witness that we desire nothing more than our independence, and in seeking that we do not waver one moment. We could very well accept the autonomy which America offers us—but what could we do with it, if from beginning to end we want independence, the sum total of the aspirations of the people, according to an unhidden inevitable law marked out by the Supreme Creator? If we accept it, in order that afterward to fall by force of arms under the sway of American sovereignty—which we believe the autonomists through perfidy and knavery are attempting—we cannot accept it, we do not want to be traitors, but to show ourselves frankly and sincerely—nothing more. We persist in our idea which is the one legitimate and noble aspiration of a people who want at all costs to preserve national honor cleansed of all spot or blemish, pure as crystal, ‘having a high polish, without a streak, without a flaw,

without a stain,' and there will not be a single Filipino who would be an autonomist. Those who seem to be (as the people say they are), are nothing more than conventionalists who fear to lose their riches, as the war seemed to menace such loss.

“Filipinos! Let us be constant! faithful! Let us bind more strongly the cords of unity, and end the conflict crying Viva la Independencia! Viva la Union de los Filipinos! Viva el ejecito Libertador! [Long live Independence! Long live the Union of the Philippine people! Long live the Army of Liberation!]”

XVI

THE "paper" hostilities were carried on during the rainy season and formed a period of unwritten armistice in the north. But to the south of Manila the Insurgents under Baldomero Aguinaldo made several attempts to break our lines. Across the Maraquina River, opposite the Pumping Station the Insurgents were particularly active. They planted a gun on a hill commanding the mouth of the Pasig, where it takes its rise in the Laguna de Bay, and harassed the movements of our lake and river launches.

General Lawton took command of the division of our army, facing the enemy's position to the south, and organized an enveloping movement to trap the Insurgents in the vicinity of Antipolo and Marong. General Hall was sent out with a brigade of twenty-five hundred men the 3d of June. He crossed the Maraquina Valley, sending one detachment along the base of the mountain and one over the

crest toward Antipolo. Colonel Truman moved out of the Pasig and crossed the valley to Taytay, driving the Insurgents over the hills. The soft, rain-covered ground and the pelting midsummer sun conspired to tax the strength of our forces to the utmost. The field carts sank to the hubs and the artillery was dragged across the loamy soil and up the mountain side, through the dense tropical jungle, under the greatest difficulties. The Insurgents, commanded directly by Pio del Pilar, for a time contested our advance, but, seeing the closing trap planned to hem them in, flew over the hills and escaped to the mountain fastness of San Mateo and Boscoboso. Hundreds of our men were prostrated by the heat in those two burning days, but the casualties were only four killed and eighteen wounded. Hall's brigade proceeded to Marong, on the lake; but the natives fled, and our artillery boats shelled empty houses and vacant streets. Antipolo, Taytay, Canita, Teresa, Morong, Binangonan, Angono, and a dozen nepa-hut villages were captured or surrendered as our troops advanced. The natives, burdened with their belongings, fled to the mountains, only to return under white flags the next day and be restored to their homes and property.

Mud-bespattered, travel-stained, and sore-footed, Hall's brigade dragged itself wearily back to Manila on the 8th of June. A garrison was established at Morong, but its occupation proved useless and it was abandoned, and our troops removed to Calamba, across the lake.

Directly southeast of Manila, Baldomero Aguinaldo's forces under General Trias gathered in large numbers. Several attempts were made to treat with Trias, who was governor of the province, but tension became strained after the failure of the Aguinaldo peace emissaries, and Lawton in command of Wheaton's and Ovenshine's brigades planned a move southward. At Imus was an Insurgent arsenal and powder factory, and so near to Manila was Paranaque that the Filipinos had been able to enter the city at night and smuggle arms and supplies to the Insurgent army. General Wheaton moved out of Guadalupe, and General Ovenshine advanced from his position at Pasay. The troops pressed forward through the bamboo and over the rough ground for three hours before encountering the enemy. Ovenshine's brigade met the first resistance while nearing Paranaque. Wheaton's troops encountered a strong force at Taguig. The whole country

proved to be a network of trenches, which were cleverly placed along the crests of rolling ground and on the opposite sides of streams. The terrific heat of the June sun caused havoc among our men, and over six hundred were prostrated in the day's advance. Ovenshine's brigade occupied the attention of the Insurgents in Paranaque, and Wheaton swung around to the left, hoping to cut off their retreat.

The natives quickly divined our plan and attempted to escape, but the American warships lay along the bay and opened a fearful shelling beyond Paranaque, checking their retreat along the coast. Paranaque, Bacoor, and Zapote were levelled to the ground, the great churches were destroyed, and the shore huts wiped out of existence. The natives fell back to the Zapote River. Lawton advanced across a marshy country toward that stronghold, but sending a detachment of the Twenty-first Infantry toward Zapote found the Insurgents heavily intrenched across the bridge along on the river banks. Our men had only one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition. The Filipinos sent a terrific fire across the river, and our ammunition was soon exhausted. Major Starr rushed out to the beach, while the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Infantry were slowly coming up with a mountain gun, and

“wigwagged” the *Monadnock* for assistance. Lieutenants F. R. Payne and G. B. Bradshaw were sent off in launches with about one hundred marines, and a Colt machine gun landed at the mouth of the river and held the Insurgents in check three hours until the reënforcements arrived. The Fourteenth, the Twenty-first, and the four guns of the Sixth Artillery approached along the dikes, down the bank, and straight for the bridge. The enemy sent a fearful fire into our ranks, and opened up with their big smooth-bore gun, a relic of the Spanish army. Our men gradually advanced, while Payne and Bradshaw sent a hot enfilading fire down the Insurgents’ trenches; and their gallant action effectually prevented the slaughter of our little body of the Twenty-first Infantry. For two hours the Filipinos stuck to their positions, holding out until our artillery was within thirty-five yards of their trenches. They then destroyed a span of the bridge, and made it impossible for our troops to cross the river. Hotchkiss guns were brought into play, and the Insurgents were forced to abandon their positions. A number of our men plunged into the river, and swimming across, jumped upon the trenches and scattered a few remaining natives, who quickly followed their fleeing comrades to the jungle,

despite the fact that the previous day every one of them had sworn upon a crucifix to die rather than surrender Zapote to the Americans. Eleven Americans were killed and forty wounded in the Zapote fight. Over two hundred dead Insurgents were found in the trenches and on the field; hundreds of wounded were carried away.

After the battle nothing was seen or heard of the Insurgents for four days, when the mayor of Imus, Valentin Leano, rode into the American lines and offered to surrender the town. His proposition was accepted by General Lawton, but it was found that all he could give over were the buildings and a brass band; the population had fled. The mayor wished to celebrate the entrance of the Americans into Imus with music, but General Lawton thought the musicians could do better service attached to the baggage train.

General Wheaton cleared out the country as far as San Francisco de Malabon, and southward to Des Marinas, at which place the Insurgents displayed very active guerilla tactics, killing some of our skirmishers, but offering no combined resistance. At Imus several hundreds of pounds of powder were destroyed and several thousands of rounds of ammu-

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nition, besides great quantities of empty cartridges.

After operations ceased in the Cavite province thousands of dejected, half-starving natives flocked back to their homes; and to relieve their pitiable condition, Captain Coudert, of the commissary department, was ordered to distribute twenty thousand rations to the inhabitants of Las Piñas and Paranaque. The scramble for the rice and canned roast beef was one of the most amusing episodes of the war. Upon hearing of General Lawton's generosity the mayor of Imus drove into camp in his carromatta, and begged a supply for his town. His gig was loaded down, and he disappeared. Natives came from all over the country to take advantage of the opportunity, and it was a grim travesty upon our generosity when, some days later, many of the empty cans were found in the Insurgents' trenches farther south. Our army canned beef also was displayed and offered for sale in the little tiendas the natives set up in Paranaque and Imus. Our soldiers enjoyed the joke of buying back from these thrifty little Tagalog shopkeepers, beef that our government had meted out gratuitously. The *mue pauvre Filipino* turned out to be very closely related to the *mucho amigo* type, taking

advantage of our philanthropy. The people returned to their towns, and newly built nepahuts soon gave the battlefield a look of life and habitation. The Paranaque campaign opened up a large territory in the immediate vicinity of Manila.

The American commission was very anxious to make experiments in local administration, and the foreign residents of Manila, as well as the friendly Filipinos and American business men, were clamoring to have civil government established. So General Lawton and Professor Worcester, accompanied by Major Edwards and Lieutenant King and several Filipinos who had surrendered in the Paranaque campaign, made a trip to the towns in the vicinity of Manila, notifying the natives of the intention, on the part of the United States government, of establishing a local government, made up of their own people. General Lawton and Professor Worcester explained to the Filipinos that the taxes assessed would be placed in the hands of their own officials and used to pay school-teachers, build roads, and keep up the government they established. Though the Americans were received with suspicion, the natives gave way to the offers of our officials and appeared to concur heartily in the scheme. An election

followed, and Filipinos were elected mayors of Paranaque, Las Piñas, Bacoor, and Imus. The Filipinos seemed much pleased with the arrangement, and greeted the American officials with bands of music, and held celebrations and festivities in their honor. Other local administrations were established at San Pedro Macati, Malabon, and towns within our lines.

For a time the native governments seemed to be successful; but Aguinaldo's emissaries soon stirred up discord, and several of the mayors were found to be plotting with the Insurgents and turning over taxes and supplies to the Filipino army. They were put under arrest, and military authority restored.

The time was hardly ripe to place the power of civil administration into the hands of those so lately in arms against us. The natives were so disturbed and excited by warfare in other parts of the Islands, and so thoroughly misled by reports of Insurgent victories, that they proved very difficult to restrain, and numerous plots and devices were unearthed revealing their conspiracies with the Insurgents. In some cases, however, the local governments were successful, and still exist. General Lawton believed that in the end this method would conquer the natives; and by garrisoning the towns

and preventing outside influence and interference, the people would come to understand that the system we offered them was practically a self-governing one.

In Manila an attempt was made to place the judicial affairs in the hands of the Filipinos. The leading natives formed an organization and published a paper which advocated the acceptance of American supremacy. Its editor was Dr. Pardo de Tavera, formerly "Director of Diplomacy" in Aguinaldo's cabinet at Malolos. Tavera was outspoken in his allegiance to the United States, and as a result his life was threatened, and he was denounced by the Insurgent organ as a traitor. He and his associates, the Rosarios, Arellano, Torres, and others, held frequent consultations with the Philippine commission, and drafted a form of government which they thought would be suitable to the Filipinos. On June 3 the supreme courts were established, with Cayetano Arellano president. Manuel Araullo was appointed president of the civil branch. Associated with him were Gregario Araneta and Lieutenant Colonel Crowder. Raymundo Melliza was appointed president of the criminal court, associated with Ambrosio Rianzares, Julio Llorente, Major R. W. Young, and Captain W. E. Birkheimer. The city attorneys

were Florentino Torres and Dionsio Chanco. The Spanish code of procedure and existing laws were recognized. A month later an order was issued permitting any properly licensed lawyer taking the oath of allegiance to the United States "without mental reservation," to practise in the courts. An Insurgent pamphlet issued at Tarlac descanted rather sarcastically upon the newly appointed judges:—

"Touching the reorganization of the court of Manila," says the pamphlet, "your newspapers, commenting upon these office-holders, attribute to them the profoundest wisdom, well-known honesty, indefatigable zeal, discretion, skill, etc., all of so superlative a grade as to lead one to infer that you were capable to govern not only the Philippines, Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Australia, and Corea, together with Japan and the Dominions of the Celestial Empire, but the entire terrestrial globe in all its geographical and hydrographical dimensions. What do you think of such contradiction? Does it not mean that all logic has flown from you at the first shot from the American squadron? Or that the Philippine people must look upon nothing but your capability, for you are no longer Filipinos but Americans at heart? In the first case the people must look upon you with com-

passion, in the second as enemies, and in neither case ought they to pay any heed to you at all; for he who tramples upon logic, and is an enemy of the country, is not worthy of notice, much less he who subjects his country under the yoke of foreign domination."

On June 5 all the civil and criminal courts were reestablished throughout Manila, with judges and district-attorneys drawn almost exclusively from the native lawyers, formerly connected with the Spanish administration, and latterly with the revolutionary government. In a legal sense, therefore, all matters pertaining to the public peace and private property were in the hands of a civil administration composed almost entirely of Filipinos. The newspapers and Americans at Manila pleaded for the establishment of American law, and openly denounced the Spanish law, maintaining that it gave little protection to those outside of official circles. Its existence was also, said the opponents of its reestablishment, one of the chief reasons that continually incited the natives.

The revolutionists were furious over the action of the Manila Filipinos, and brought every power and influence they possessed to harass and intimidate them. A "Green Book" was issued, directed at the Filipino "traitors"

and the "servile and false democrats" who are aiming to bring the Philippine people under the government of a foreign nation. "If we want to continue to live in Manila," says the "Green Book," "in addition to all that has been demanded we must take, without mental reservation, an oath to give up our native land for the benefit of the Imperialists."

The document accused the Filipino judges of eagerness to gain prestige and live a life of ease at the expense of the bondage of the people and their inalienable rights. The argument presented was that the Manila Filipinos proclaimed by their actions that they are not capable of self-government, and yet General Otis calls first upon them to obtain the establishment of government. "Between the supporters of the revolution and the contestants the ratio is 99,999 to 1," says the "Green Book." "Who, then, are the people? We, or you? Previous to war your voices filled the legislative courts of the Philippines. Then you were ministers, directors, plenipotentiaries, senators, counsellors, and you entered upon your offices upon oath to recognize and defend the independence of the country. If you felt yourself then capable to govern the country, why not now? If you swore to the office, knowing you were incapa-


ble, you deceived Aguinaldo and the Philippine people; and if you deceived them, what right have you now to demand from them that which they have created?"

The "Green Book" was a terrific arraignment of the Filipinos who accepted judicial and civil positions at the hands of General Otis. Every invective known to language was hurled at the ex-revolutionists. The book was suppressed in Manila, but all who cared to see it had no trouble in getting a copy. Its influence was small, though it aroused to anger the men it denounced, and widened the chasm between the Insurgents and the Manila Filipinos. As a specimen of Tagalog literature Aguinaldo's "Green Book" was a masterpiece, cunningly written, eloquently expressed, vituperative, and abounding in that peculiar anatomical and religious fervor characteristic of Tagalog literature.

While these events were taking place in Manila and the South, the Filipino leaders of the North were engaged in deadly rivalry. The friction between the war and peace elements came to a climax which resulted in what appeared like a cold-blooded plot on the part of Aguinaldo to rid himself of Luna. Luna was ordered to present himself at Cabanatuan, to confer with the president of the repub-



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lic. On the 5th of June he, in company with Buencamino, arrived at the Insurgent capital. Luna presented himself immediately at the "presidency," but was informed by Aguinaldo's aide that the president had gone to review his troops. Luna suspected a ruse, and demanded admittance. Being again refused, a fierce struggle ensued in which Luna was run through with a bayonet by the guard who, after he fell, pulled out his revolver and shot Luna twice as he lay prostrate on the floor of the presidency. Colonel Roman, Luna's aide and friend, drew his sword upon the assassin, but was shot dead, his body falling across that of his chief. Panic ensued, and the assassin and guards ran for their lives. Aguinaldo appeared upon the scene and expressed deep sorrow. The next day a mass was held, and with great pomp and show of sorrow Luna and Roman were buried side by side. Aguinaldo did not attend the funeral, but sent a message of condolence to Luna's mother, placing himself immediately at the head of Luna's division. It was the tragic end of two of the most brilliant Filipinos in the revolutionary ranks.

Directly after the assassination of Luna, Aguinaldo, to show his valor and regain the confidence of Luna's troops, planned and exe-

cuted an attack upon San Fernando, nearly surrounding MacArthur's headquarters. Just before daybreak on the 16th of June, the Insurgent rockets were sent heavenward in all directions, and the roar of cannon and the clatter of musketry began at the outposts. The Iowans, Seventeenth Infantry, Kansans, and Montanans made a rush for the enemy, for bullets began to sing down the streets. Aguinaldo had planned the attack well, torn up the railway and cut the telegraph wires; but before the furious onslaught of our troops, the Insurgents fled like wild geese, and by breakfast-time there was not a Filipino soldier within gun-shot. After the battle our troops buried nearly one hundred dead Insurgents; not an American was killed. It is therefore interesting to read the report of the attack as sent out by the revolutionary officials, as follows:—

“The Minister for the Interior has telegraphed to the provincial chiefs, as presidents, and the governors of the various towns: ‘Yesterday San Fernando and Kingua were recovered by our troops under the command of the captain general.’ Upon this feat *La Independencia* remarks:—

““Our telegraphic service finally gave us the account. As will be seen from same, the troops

achieving such wonderful glory (which events will without doubt have great moral effect upon our enemy) were led by the honorable president of our republic, the gallant hero of Cavite, birthplace and cradle of Philippine liberty. If as a public man, Emilio Aguinaldo is worthy of the love and respect of our people, he is no less worthy of such, as a self-sacrificing patriot and military leader. His ardor of yesterday is still alive, his glory and praises are not yet at an end, he continues to reproduce them with the same splendor as of old. All praise to such a brave leader!''¹

The Macabebes were a source of constant irritation to the Insurgents. They persistently refused to join the revolutionists, and resisted the Tagalogs, who repeatedly attempted to intimidate and dislodge them from their strongholds. Over a hundred of these valiant little fellows trooped into San Fernando and begged that the Americans send over a garrison and occupy the town. Major Bell was despatched with a scouting party, and upon arriving at the village was given an enthusiastic welcome. The church bells were rung, and the population turned out

¹ When Aguinaldo was captured, some two years later, he said, in an interview, that he had never taken part in or personally directed an engagement.

to receive the American troops. Five Tagalog prisoners, held in durance vile, were turned over to Major Bell. The ordnance of the Macabebes consisted of one Mauser rifle, twenty Remingtons, a number of revolvers augmented by an organized force of two thousand bolo and spear men. They begged for an American flag, offering hostages to prove their loyalty. From this body of fighting material were organized several companies of scouts, who proved their ability and fealty by very effective coöperation with our troops upon numerous occasions in the northern campaign. These men were practically of the same blood and same training as the Tagalogs, but showed that they were able to think and act for themselves.

Jolo, the capital of the Sulu Archipelago, had been occupied on May 19 by a detachment of the Twenty-third Infantry under Captain Pratt and Lieutenant Hagadorn, the Spanish garrison leaving upon the arrival of our troops. In July Brigadier General J. C. Bates was sent to Jolo to arrange a treaty with the Sultan, presenting him with \$10,000 silver, and offering him and his *datos* (lords) salaried positions under the American government. Late in August General Bates successfully accomplished his mission, drawing up a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu,

Dato Rajah Muda, Dato Attik, Dato Kalki, and Dato Joakanain, recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the Sulu Archipelago. The treaty respected the rights and dignities of the Sultan, and his *datos* and the religion and customs of the Moros. Free trade with the islands of the Archipelago was agreed upon; all crimes committed by natives were to be punished by the Sultan; the offences of Americans to be under American jurisdiction; slavery was permitted, but slaves were given the right to purchase their freedom at the "usual market value,"¹ and the United States agreed not to sell the Archipelago without the consent of the Sultan, who was guaranteed \$250 per month salary, the *datos* to receive from \$15 to \$75 per month, Mexican money.

But in the outlying districts of Negros, in Cebu and in Panay the bandits, *insurrectos* and Tagalogs united and continued to resist our military occupation.

On the 31st day of August Aguinaldo and Paterno issued decrees ordering the release of all American prisoners, and commuting the sentences, by one-third, of Filipino "culprits." The

¹ Just two years after the treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, this oriental potentate, enlightened by American influences, abolished slavery.

decree was issued, said Paterno, in celebration of the third anniversary of the uprising of San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Rosa, Caloocan, Cavite, Novaleta, and Balintawa, "the first cry of liberty of the triumphant revolution against Spain." A month later fourteen Americans were turned over to General MacArthur's command at Angeles. General Wheeler went on to meet them, and was the first American to welcome them back. The prisoners said that they had been well treated, been fed on chicken, beef, pork, fish, bread, vegetables, and all the fruit they could eat, and had been given twenty cents a day for tobacco. "They treated us like kings," was the remark of one of the men.

The testimony of the released soldiers, both at that time and subsequently, until our troops drove the Filipino army pell-mell into the mountains, was creditable to Aguinaldo's command.

It is true, however, that some imprisoned Americans suffered considerable hardship, as in the case of Albert Sonnichsen, who was for ten months a captive. His own narrative of that thrilling experience testifies that it was due to the brutality of individuals rather than through the orders of Aguinaldo that he was forced to endure privation. He was cared for when sick and permitted much liberty, and in

many cases shown exceeding kindness. His story reveals many creditable characteristics of the Filipinos, and considering the fact that he was a prisoner of war, having entered the lines under an assumed nationality, and arrested as a spy, his captivity was made comparatively endurable.

Aguinaldo made another attempt, on October 1, to secure "peace with honor" and independence. General Alejandrino, Colonel Salina, and Major Ortiz of the Insurgent army, went to Manila under flag of truce, and renewed the request for a joint official commission to meet and treat upon the questions at issue. General Otis refused to consider such a proposition. After visiting around town and being cheered roundly by the natives, the emissaries returned to their camp. The visit of the Filipino officials aroused the natives in Manila, and a feeble attempt at an uprising occurred; but it was snuffed out by the police before it assumed dangerous proportions.

President Schurman, of the Philippine commission, on the *Bennington*, visited the southern Islands. The work of the commission was very valuable. They met and talked with hundreds of Filipinos of all classes, listened to their points of view, entertained them, and studied their

needs and peculiarities. That they were not more effective in pacifying the Insurgent element is due to the complications of the situation. The natives were bent on independence, and influences more potent than any that could be brought to bear upon them by the commission were encouraging them in the hope of attaining the goal. General Otis did not sympathize with the commission, and frequently remarked that "they had no status." Their powers were advisory and limited, which perhaps is the reason why their efforts at conciliation were not effective with the natives, who soon learned that General Otis, and not the commissioners, was the power that could treat officially with them. The work of the commission, therefore, as an intermediary board was of little effect outside of Manila. Their investigations and studies of Filipino character and affairs contributed a valuable chapter to Philippine history, and paved the way for legislative action and public enlightenment.

One who has not lived in the Philippines can hardly appreciate the ferocity of the rains in May, June, July, and August, and even September. An ordinary shower, such as occurs daily in Luzon, in the wet season, would be called a "cloud-burst" in America. In Manila

the streets become canals, and though the native, who wears a limited amount of clothes, does not mind it, the American finds the soaking atmosphere and flooded ground a serious matter. The railroad undergoes an annual inundation, and in some instances its entire bed is washed out for miles; telegraph poles disappear, and small bridges succumb to the floods, while the Pasig, which sweeps down from Laguna de Bay, at an average speed of four miles an hour, becomes unnavigable, and the rice paddies and low river country become a vast lake. Sixteen inches of rainfall is the record of forty-eight hours, according to a memoranda of one year I have in my note-book. The average rainfall during the rainy season for the last dozen years is seventy inches. This is a record to inspire the wholesome respect of the foreigner, though the native of the Philippines does not seem to be disturbed greatly over it.

The Insurgents counted upon the rainy season as an effective ally; but while it did call a decided halt in our operations, the American soldier did not take to high ground or relax in his duty. He met the harassing tactics of the Filipino, and showed that he was able to keep his gun from rusting and his powder dry, as long as he preserved his health.

General Otis, in October, had at his command 905 officers and 30,578 regulars; 594 officers and 15,388 volunteers with additional troops en route from America, which would bring his command up to 2,051 officers and 63,483 men. With this force in the Islands there was no further excuse to delay a general campaign. The period of rains and typhoons was largely over, and the summer heat gave way to the cooling breezes of the fall season. Although the temperature averages 80°, the heat of the dry season does not rack the body and engender malaria, dysentery, and typhoid, prevalent in the rainy weather.

The Insurgents kept our lines busy both to the north and south. At San Rafael and Porac they attacked our troops. Near Angeles they derailed a train, killed and wounded several of our men, and attempted to prevent our work in rebuilding the railroad.

Near Imus and Bacoor they attacked General Grant's lines, and it required a strong force of seventeen hundred men under General Schwan to fight over again the territory to San Francisco de Malabon and Des Marinas in the Cavite province. The Insurgents returned to their old position at Zapote bridge, and reoccupied their trenches. The fighting was almost continuous

for two weeks. Zapote had to be fought over again. The programme was much the same as that pursued by General Lawton in June. At Angeles, the Insurgents vigorously attacked our outposts, indifferent to the fact that we had over four thousand men there. At Maycauyan they pursued the same tactics, cutting the telegraph wires and tearing up the track.

The minor attacks brought our commanders to a realization of the useless loss of life and time, and hurried the preparations for a vigorous campaign to sweep the entire north of Luzon and crush the Insurgent government and annihilate its army. Aguinaldo's attitude was as uncompromising as ever; and to apprise us of his intentions and arouse hope in the heart of the Filipino, he issued what I think is the last proclamation that the fugitive Insurgent printing office delivered to the public. In this document he said:—

“In America there is a great party that insists on the United States government recognizing Filipino independence. They will compel their country to fulfil the promises made to us in all solemnity and faith, although not put in writing. For this reason we must show our gratitude and maintain our position more resolutely than ever. We therefore pray to God on high that the great

Democratic party of the United States will win the next fall election, and that Imperialism will fail in its mad attempts to subjugate us by forced arms. There are, moreover, some Americans here in the Philippines who have joined our side because they disapprove of the war which Mr. Atkinson calls 'criminal aggression,' and these Americans, when offered the chance to return to their camp, have declined. We do not want war against the United States. We only defend our independence against the Imperialists. The sons of that mighty nation are our friends and brothers."

XVII

WE had proven to our own satisfaction that it was impossible to entrap the Insurgents. A plan was therefore formulated — a great encompassing movement which would occupy every port and every valley in the north of Luzon and stretch a cordon of soldiers across the great central plains, to prevent escape southward.

In October, 1899, the Americans controlled the situation in the provinces of Manila, Cavite, Morong, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan, — not a very large portion of the map, but the most populous and wealthy section of Luzon. To the north lay the great central plain, the wild, mountainous district and the rich tobacco valleys of the Cagayan. The Manila and Dagupan Railroad penetrated the fertile valley of the Rio de la Pampanga to the important Gulf of Lingayen, and its occupation was of the utmost strategic importance. General MacArthur's division was chosen for this task. Directly in front of him

for seventy miles were populous cities and towns, and at Tarlac was the seat of the revolutionary government.

To the east of the railroad line is the great Candaba swamp, and along the foothills of the southern Caraballos, beyond the swamp, stretches a fork of the Rio Grande, fed by innumerable streams plunging down from the mountains into a wide grazing country. The old Spanish government road and telegraph line snakes along through Nueva Ecija province, and crawling over the Caraballo passes into the Cagayan Valley and on to Aparri, the northernmost part of Luzon. This was the trail General Lawton was directed to follow.

On the Gulf of Lingayen, one hundred and twenty-three miles from Manila, is the town of Dagupan, the terminal of the railway and the chief Insurgent port of the Island. Taking a swing southward and then shooting around and up, parallel with the coast ten miles offshore, is the river Agno, taking its rise in the mountains to the north on the west coast, beyond which extends a broken plain, cut up with rivers and streams to Vigan and Loag and Cape Bojeador at the extreme north. From Dagupan, traversing the coast country, is the state road and telegraph line. To land at Dagupan,

sweep this country, and occupy the ports on the west coast was the mission reserved for General Wheaton. It was a grand strategic movement, encompassing a vast territory, characterized by a topography as wild as the Rockies and inhabited by millions of natives ranging from the cultivated Tagalog to the naked Igorote.

The American officers and soldiers were anxious for the work, and the great nation across the Pacific listened at the ticker with bated breath and expectant ear. No man knew the force of the Insurgent army. Estimates ranging from fifty thousand to two hundred thousand were current. Months had elapsed from June 12, 1898, when the revolutionary congress met at Malolos and proclaimed independence or death. A dozen ports in Luzon had been made depositories for arms and ammunition, for among all the rumors that reached our ears none had come that indicated a lack of funds among the Filipinos. Smugglers and filibusters, Juntas and sympathizers had bobbed between Singapore and Yokohama like shuttles in a machine, buying and shipping arms and ammunition on all available routes; and if ever a people had an opportunity to equip themselves and show their mettle, the Filipinos had the chance. The entire population was under the

domination of the Insurgent army. The wealth of the rich natives, the hidden treasure of the monastic orders, revenues from the sale of natural products, and the individual fortunes of Filipinos at home and abroad, all contributed to their coffers. Never in the world's history was a native force of armed soldiery in better condition to resist an invading army. The majority of their officers had seen service under Spanish generals, and had fought in the revolutions of 1897-1898. They were in possession of a large share of the territory and, accustomed to a rice, fruit and fish diet, they were abundantly provided for. They were fighting, on their own soil, a war for independence. The Americans, therefore, prepared for strong, systematic and skilful opposition. Guessing at the strength of the Insurgent army ceased to be popular. So our fall campaign was planned on a gigantic scale. Again and again Aguinaldo had eluded us and slipped from our well-laid trap. We did not propose to be again fooled. Our campaign embraced closing in on every port to the east, west and north of Luzon, and shutting off of all possibility of escape southward. Troops of cavalry and companies of Macabebe scouts were sent out to scare the game from its covey, while the onward rush of

the artillery and the "hike" of thousands of feet closed up the avenues of escape.

General Young with a provisional brigade advanced upon Arayat on the 12th of October. The fight was short and decisive, as the three hundred Insurgents quickly retreated under the hot fire of Captain Bachelor's battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. The Filipinos attempted to use their cannon, but one burst from an overload, and the other fell into our hands. The Insurgents hastily retreated toward Magalang. Farther up the Rio Grande another batch of Insurgents were driven from their trenches, and made haste northward into Nueva Ecija.

Lawton and Young's flying brigade, which stretched from the shadows of Mt. Arayat, across the plain of Pampanga, and down the Rio Grande, joined MacArthur's at San Fernando, and completed the line across the valley to the hills of Mabanga. Just off the cloud-capped coast of Luzon, Wheaton's brigade sailed northward for Dagupan.

The movement of the troops in the vicinity of Arayat made the Insurgents very uneasy. They began active demonstrations all along the lines, making a display of desultory shooting in order to fall back to better vantage points, or

keep us inactive until providence, politics or "Old Probability" should intercede in their behalf.

At daylight, on the 16th of October, they massed in the vicinity of Angeles, which General MacArthur held, and commenced a heavy cannonading from their Krupp guns. The shells poured into the town and struck with considerable effect, killing and wounding several of our men. Lawton commenced his formidable march through the marshes and jungles of the Nueva Ecija province. True to his reputation as "El General de la Noches," he began the advance at midnight. Lawton's object was to hasten across the eastern part of Nueva Ecija province, and swing around the base of the Baler Mountain, and cut off the retreat of the Insurgent army over the Caraballo passes, while MacArthur, Wheeler, and Bell drove them from their valley strongholds, and forced them back into Lawton's clutches or cut them off by Wheaton's battalion. General Young, of Lawton's column, advanced on San Isidro on the 19th of October, and dislodged Pio del Pilar and his forces. A supply station was established at San Isidro, accessible from Manila or Calumpit by water.

Under sealed orders, on the 6th of November,

General Wheaton's brigade proceeded on the *Sheridan* and *Francisco Reyes* to the Gulf of Lingayen. Three gunboats accompanied the expedition. Great precaution was exercised to deceive the natives, and every package aboard the transports was marked as if destined to a southern port.

Aguinaldo was supposed to be at Tarlac, where he was last heard of attending the graduation exercises of the "Tarlac University." Eight scholars are said to have taken degrees conferred under the patronage of Aguinaldo, "who was present, attired in his full-dress uniform as a captain general."

In his presidential palace at Tarlac, before decamping, Aguinaldo and his Congress held a public meeting. Dated October 28, 1899, *La Independencia* published an announcement of the event as follows: —

"GRAND MEETING. There will be held the day after to-morrow in Tarlac, and in the presidential palace, a grand meeting, at which will be rendered thanks to celebrated citizens of the United States who have given their support to the Honorable President Aguinaldo.

"Invitations to the meeting have been circulated in all the provinces, in order that represent-

ative dignitaries may be present in sufficient number to give to the occasion the importance which it deserves. Too much patriotic enthusiasm cannot be aroused to make this meeting the success it should be."

In the same paper, which is the last gasp of the Insurgent organ, the editors announced that in the preceding thirty days the Yankees had lost 4893,—1804 killed in battle, 120 from disease, and 2969 from wounds. The greatest losses for a single day being given as 105 killed, 201 wounded, and 6 dead in the hospital.

Wheaton's expedition anchored off San Fabian, near Dagupan, on November 7, and at its approach the Insurgents sent a hail of Mausers from their trenches on the beach. The *Samar* and *Callao* shelled the enemy's positions, and several companies of the Thirteenth made a dash from the landing launches and cascoes, and in an hour the Insurgents broke ranks, and were chased by Captain Howland and twenty men across the lagoons, and back into the jungle. The unarmed natives of San Fabian literally fell at General Wheaton's feet in apparent ecstasies of delight over the arrival of the Americans. Major Buck with a battalion of the Thirteenth, reconnoitred the vicinity of

San Fabian on the 8th, but it was not until the 9th that our forces met the enemy. Major March on the 23d met a strong resistance while moving toward Dagupan, but routed the enemy without loss on our side. On the 10th Major John A. Logan, leading an advance against San Jacinto, where was a strong force under General Tino, was killed. Logan was at the head of his column, but while stopping a moment to succor a wounded man, fell pierced by a Filipino bullet. The Insurgents routed by Logan were the rear guard of Aguinaldo's army, who, according to Buencamino, his secretary of state, captured on the 21st, were making in hot haste for the north, two thousand strong. A letter from General Tino, subsequently intercepted, stated that his loss was two hundred killed and wounded, and that he had had enough, and was going to make for the hills. Six enlisted men were killed, and Captain Green and eleven of his command were wounded. Eighty-one Insurgents were found dead in the trenches, and the balance retreated under the furious fire of the Thirty-third.

Our troops were hot on Aguinaldo's trail. Spanish prisoners were escaping by the hundreds. The Insurgent printing office, and \$75,000 in silver were captured, also twelve thousand rounds of ammunition, large quantities of

supplies, and thousands of uniforms, discarded by Filipinos that they might turn *amigo* upon our approach.

Wheaton's force pressed on through the mud and marshes, despite typhoons and rains, and crossed the Agno Valley toward the Caraballo Mountains, meeting considerable resistance at Pozzorubio.

Lawton's division, regardless of the terrible conditions of the old Spanish mail road, the dismantled and destroyed bridges and the marshy lowlands, pushed on with wonderful rapidity.

MacArthur in the meantime moved along the line of the railway, taking Bamban, where were a considerable number of Insurgents who had employed their time in destroying railroad property. Colonel Bell, with seven men of the Thirty-sixth, and Captain Hawkins, with ten men of the Fourth Cavalry, made a daring reconnoitre, and succeeded in getting to the rear of over a hundred Insurgents in a trench. Bell and his eighteen men charged upon the surprised natives and killed their captain and eighteen men. Each American brought down his man. The survivors ran for their lives, though six of them were made prisoners.

But where was Aguinaldo? Deerington's

scouting party had joined Young's Cavalry at San José on the 11th, having scoured the intervening country. The next day a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry left San José and penetrated the passes of the Caraballos near Carranglan, the old Spanish telegraph station and the last town of any importance south of the Caraballo Mountains. Aguinaldo's main force, with General Tino and Gregorio del Pilar, made a rapid flight through the gap between Wheaton's lines and Young's advance, pushing up the coast toward Cervantes, while a regiment of Insurgents scaled the Caraballo passes and intrenched themselves at Bayombong.

Owing to heavy roads and constant rains our movements were much impeded, and the wily chief slipped out of our neatly set trap.

General MacArthur's division continued its advance without much opposition. Tarlac and the towns along the railroad to Dagupan were occupied without great resistance. The rumored thousands of Insurgents had disappeared, and the bland natives welcomed our arrival with brass bands and much bowing and affected or real humility.

Colonel Bell, on November 25, with the Thirty-sixth and one company of the Thirty-third, surprised and routed Generals Alejan-

drino and San Miguel, who were fleeing to the mountains west of Mangataren. Bell succeeded in getting a number of their rifles, one three-inch Krupp gun, one Maxim, and one Hotchkiss.

General Young hastened across the Benquet province to San Fernando on the coast north of Dagupan, and on the 23d proceeded to Namacpan, receiving supplies from the *Samar*, and continuing a rapid chase after Aguinaldo.

On the 24th of November two hundred marines under Lieutenant Commander McCrackin landed from the *Oregon* and took Vigan without resistance. A few days later Major March arrived up the coast with the Twenty-third Infantry and garrisoned the town.

Detachments of Lawton's column continued over the mountains to Bayombong, and on November 28 Lieutenant Munro, in command of fifty troopers of the Fourth Cavalry, captured Bayombong, the mountain retreat which was supposed to be Aguinaldo's objective point. General Canon of the Insurgent army surrendered without a fight to Lieutenant Munro.

Tino's force scampered over the mountains toward the Cagayan Valley. On the 4th of December Lieutenant Colonel Parker's garrison at Vigan, consisting of a company of the

Thirty-third Regiment, and one hundred and fifty sick men were attacked by eight hundred Insurgents. The natives rushed into the town and fought in the streets, but were driven back after an almost hand-to-hand encounter, eight Americans being killed and three wounded. General Young pursued Aguinaldo, who was rumored to be at Cervantes fleeing toward Bontoc, a populous mountain town at the headwaters of the Cagayan River. The natives received Young with bands of music, and welcomed the Americans, protesting that the Insurgent rule had been hateful and oppressive. After sweeping through the Abra Valley, Young arrived at Vigan.

Hare and Howze's columns, returning from a forced march north of Vigan and at the headwaters of the Abalut River, on December 18 rescued Lieutenant Gillmore and his party, where they were found abandoned by the Insurgents. Lieutenant Gillmore said of his rescue:

"The Filipinos abandoned us on the night of December 16. We had reached the Abalut River near its source that morning, and the Filipinos rafted us over. We then went down the stream along a rough trail, guarded by a company of Filipinos. That night we were separated from this guard, and another company,

armed with Mausers, was put in charge of us. I suspected something, and questioned the lieutenant in command.

“He said: ‘I have orders from General Tino to shoot you all; but my conscience forbids. I shall leave you here.’

“I begged him for two rifles to protect us from savages, adding that I would give him letters to the Americans, who would pay him well and keep him from all harm. He refused this, however, saying that he would not dare to comply. Soon afterward he left with his company.

“We had seen some savages in war paint around us, and we prepared to fight them with cobblestones, the only weapons that were available to us. The next morning we followed the trail of the Filipino soldiers, feeling that it was better to stick to them than be murdered by savages; but we could not catch up with them. Then I ordered the men to build rafts, in the hope of floating down the river. It was a forlorn hope, but I knew the river must empty into the sea somewhere. I was so weak myself that I did not expect to get out, but thought some of the men could.

“On the morning of December 18, while we were working on the rafts, the Americans came toward us yelling. One of the men shouted,

'They are on us!' He was lashing a raft of bamboos. I, however, knew it was not the yell of savages, but the yell of Americans. The rescuing troops thought we had Filipino guards, and called to us in English to lie down so that they could shoot the Filipinos. That was the finest body of officers and men I ever saw.

"While we were in the hands of General Tino's men he issued an order that any person aiding an American by food or money should be treated as a criminal. One citizen of Vigan, Señor Vera, was probably killed for befriending us.

"We would have starved but for the kindness of some of the presidents of the towns and some of the Filipino colonels, but others treated us brutally. Whenever there was a prison we were kept there. When there was no prison they would lodge us in a convent. We suffered greatly from want of exercise as well as lack of food."

March's battalion abandoned the pursuit of Aguinaldo on the 15th of December, his command having been depleted twenty per cent. by the climate and lack of food. Aguinaldo escaped, flying over the mountain trails from Baguet. General Concepcion surrendered to Major March, and six hundred Spanish prisoners

were released. In March's perilous undertaking he encountered in the Caraballo Mountains at Tila Pass, the Filipino Thermopylæ, the forces of General Gregorio del Pilar, who had built formidable forts on the rocky ledges. After several daring charges up the zigzag trail, the Americans routed the Insurgents and killed the audacious little General Gregorio del Pilar, who, though a mere boy, was one of Aguinaldo's most trusted brigadiers. Aguinaldo's wife and child were found in the pass, abandoned by the flying Insurgents.

Young proceeded north to Loag, which was occupied by the navy; Batchelor's command pushed on from Bayombong, through the Cagayan Valley, and was relieved by the *Newark* at Aparri, that place, including the province of Cagayan, having surrendered to Captain McCalla, United States Navy, on the 11th of December.

The Filipino Junta at Hong Kong published a declaration stating that the Insurgent government of the Philippines had been changed to a dictatorship, to continue hostilities against the Americans exclusively by the methods of guerilla warfare, and that the Filipino army was split up into small bands, the troops taking an oath before separation that they would fight until their country's rights were recognized.

These guerilla bands attacked our railway

guards, harassed our outposts, and gathered in strong force under General Pio del Pilar at San Mateo, the old Insurgent stronghold eight miles from Manila. General Lawton was relieved of his northern command, his division having scattered into separate columns, engaged in scouring the country. Early in December Lawton organized a movement against Pio del Pilar; and while engaging the enemy, General Lawton followed directly behind the firing line across an open rice field facing the Insurgent trenches. His towering figure was familiar to the Filipinos, and as he crossed the open field one of his staff warned him that the Insurgents were shooting at him. Lawton only replied with a grim smile, continuing to give orders and direct the advance. But poor Lawton! San Mateo was the Waterloo of his spirit, for it went out like a snuffed candle as he stood fearlessly exposed, doing his duty as a soldier, regardless of the bullets pecking the ground around him. He fell back into the arms of his aide, Lieutenant King, and died a commander on the field, facing the enemy in battle, a Filipino bullet piercing his body.

Lawton was the greatest campaigner in the Philippines, a hero and soldier whose name adorns the page of American history. Lawton never lost a fight. He was the terror of the

Indian marauders of the northwest, and the "general of the night" whom the Filipinos feared with superstitious dread.

General Lawton's body was taken to America and interred in Arlington. The American people, by public subscription, presented \$100,000 to his widow, as an act of spontaneous gratitude.

The closing of the year 1899 found our troops in every part of Luzon but the south. Parts of Cebu, Panay, Negros, and the entire Jolo archipelago were under our control. The fall campaign had driven the Insurgent army to the mountains, and Mabini and Buencamino were our prisoners. Aguinaldo, Paterno, and the revolutionary ministers disappeared into parts unknown, and three thousand Spanish prisoners, abandoned by Filipinos and captured by us, were returned to Manila. But in spite of the onward march of our troops; in spite of a hundred defeats and not a victory; in spite of the superiority of our army, our equipment, and our tactics; in spite of argument, unwritten armistices, and the generous treatment of their families and relatives and prisoners, and the preservation and restoration of their property, the employment of their people in civil and military capacities, and in the face of disaster and death, they remained uncompromising and

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defiant, their government annihilated, their army fugitives, and their people poverty-stricken and bowed down with the sorrows and misfortunes of war.

Our relations toward the Filipinos and their character had not materially changed. History was repeating itself, and the immortal lines of Kipling summed up the balance sheet:—

“The blame of those ye better;
The hate of those ye guard. . . .
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.”

XVIII

THE year 1900 saw probably the largest scouting force in the field in pursuit of a fugitive government in all history. That government succeeding in dodging the combined vigilance of ten thousand American regulars for over a year. During that period, outside of all garrisoned ports there existed a reign of terror. The renegade army scattered. "Manœuvre in flying columns and in guerilla bands," ordered Aguinaldo. They carried out the first part of the instructions precipitously. The second they pursued with a vengeance. It was no longer an army we fought, but a hostile population, who hid their arms at our approach and shot at us as we departed.

Aguinaldo refused to become reconciled. He wrote to some of his Manila friends, soliciting their advice. The advice was invariably against a continuance of his hopeless campaign, — advice that was influenced by Americans, if not absolutely dictated. Aguinaldo undoubtedly realized the fact, and stubbornly persisted in

his course. "I have sworn that as long as life lasts," said Aguinaldo in a letter to Benito Legarda at Manila, "I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines."

General Otis seemed to be unable to put down the insurrection or quell the spirit of the Tagalog. He requested to be relieved, and was succeeded in command by General MacArthur.

A spirited campaign was instituted in the north in pursuit of Aguinaldo, who kept up a courier communication with his renegade soldiers, leagued with the wild forest tribes and marauding bands in every part of the Archipelago. Though at our approach they would disappear like mosquitoes in the daytime, upon our withdrawal they swarmed back, intimidating their own people into submission.

Even in the proximity of our army posts, where Americans attempted to engage in commercial operations, life was not safe. We could not trust the *pacificos*. Given the least excuse, and a gun or bolo, they would drop their work and offer a fight.

An enterprising American attempted to farm a plantation in the hemp districts a few miles from an army post in Nueva Caceras. No sooner had he gotten a couple of hundred of

Tagalogs at work than one morning they all disappeared. In fact the little town was utterly depopulated with the exception of the planter, his overseer, and a few native women. After several hours of vigilant inquiry, it was learned that one of Aguinaldo's couriers had arrived, reporting great victories in the north, and urging the entire village to rebel and swoop down upon the little American garrison. Promptly, the overseer, who was a half-caste, left for the jungle, where he discovered his workmen holding an animated conference. His appearance caused surprise, but no violence was offered, and he plainly told them that they would be perfectly helpless to resist the Americans without arms, — not even bolos. It seemed this aspect had not occurred to them, so they all meekly followed the overseer back, and before noon were peacefully at work as if nothing had occurred to disturb their serenity.

General MacArthur adopted the one policy necessary to pacify the Archipelago. He followed the plan long previously favored by General Lawton. He established permanent garrisons in all the principal towns of the Islands. He divided the territory into districts, and appointed military governors over these divisions. He instructed the governors to es-

establish civil governments made up of the best element of native administrators, and protect them in their functions, as well as make life safe throughout the districts, and convince the Filipino that we had come to stay; that we proposed to let them control their local affairs as rapidly as they showed a friendly disposition and sufficient capability.

The plan had the elements of success. The natives were anxious for peace. They had had a taste of revolutionary government, and they had found it a great tax upon their resources and patience. They had been compelled to support in their houses Spanish prisoners, and contribute from their scant savings funds to the Insurgent army. For a time this taste of home government had not been obnoxious, but the increasing burdens put upon them by the military faction soon marred the charm of independence, and they showed little disposition to resent our occupation. The local mayors of captured towns clamored for office under American sovereignty, so we accepted their oaths of allegiance, and sorting the sheep from the goats distributed appointments and perfected their faulty civil administration. It was a policy that proved very effective, and gradually won over the better classes of the population.

It was slow work, however, for Aguinaldo's guerillas were not idle. Our outlying army posts were attacked constantly, and our engineers and civil functionaries, engaged in repairing bridges and building roads, had to work with their guns within reach. Often, too, these guerillas were successful. In many cases they ambuscaded our supply trains and captured ammunition and tinned goods. They fired upon trains on the Manila-Dagupan Railway, and swooped down upon villages, terrorizing the inhabitants and carrying away loot.

To our knowledge the Insurgent force still possessed between eighteen and twenty thousand rifles. "As long as they have arms they will fight," said the captured General Concepcion. "When you've got their rifles, then, and only then, will the revolution be over." Concepcion was largely right. So we were obliged to hunt out the scattered bands one by one, and separate them from their arms and ammunition. This we proceeded to do, but it was like hunting for needles in a haystack. The wild and mountainous nature of the country made the task a difficult one. General Young in the Cagayan Valley sent out detachments of cavalry and scoured the country. The natives received them cordially, but volunteered no information.

They appeared profoundly ignorant of the whereabouts of the guerillas, and perhaps they were, but it is probable that they were not. Nevertheless we found them, and from time to time captured or killed these incorrigible "ladrones." General Kobbe in the southern provinces of Albay, Sorsogon, and the islands of Samar and Leyte had an equally difficult task. These people were supposed to dislike the Tagalogs; nevertheless they showed a fighting spirit, and Kobbe had to hunt out the insurrectionary element and annihilate them before he could establish responsible civil authority. In the absence of guns they fought with bolos and even bows and arrows. We began to understand why the Spanish would never permit these people to even possess a table knife.

In the Camarines General Bates found less difficulty, although forced to assert his authority by gunpowder. In north Mindanao General Bates was favorably received. A dozen towns were occupied without firing a shot. Aguinaldo's influence had waned. In fact it had never been strong in Mindanao. The general situation, however, was discouraging. We had sixty-five thousand soldiers scattered throughout the Archipelago, and we needed more. From every military governor came calls for an addi-

tional force. The natives at large did not love us. They persisted in refusing to see our beneficent intentions, and contested our occupation with what little force they could muster, — just enough to make life unsafe and trade difficult, if not impossible. Wherever our soldiers were, the ladrone made himself scarce; but out of our reach with his single rifle he terrorized the people within shooting distance. With an insufficiency of troops at our command, it was a slow process to catch, kill, or disarm him.

Finally General MacArthur, June 21, issued an order granting “amnesty with complete immunity for the past and absolute liberty of action for the future” to all Insurgents who would within ninety days renounce all connection with the insurrection and take the oath of allegiance to the United States. Thirty pesos were offered for each rifle brought in by those who wished to take advantage of the opportunity. Paterno, who had been captured, and was in Manila, suggested the terms, and the proclamation was not without effect. But the rifles were not forthcoming, with the exception of some battered and useless carbines of ancient Spanish make. Subsequently the time limit was extended, and a number of prominent insurrectionists took the oath of allegiance, and

others followed, several thousand in all. Besides Paterno, Pio del Pilar, Buencamino, and Montenegro, Pantaleon Garcia was captured and held under surveillance in Manila. The capture of Garcia was accomplished through a picture which accompanied an article I published in *Harper's Weekly* some months previous. Garcia was hiding in the house of a friend in the town of Jaen. Some American soldiers were told of his whereabouts, and surprised him with a call while he was yet in bed.

"What is your name?" asked Lieutenant Day, who commanded the expedition.

"Pedro Gonzales," replied the man in bed, at the same time handing out a visiting card upon which that name was printed.

Lieutenant Day pulled down the blanket, looked at the man's face, and compared it with the picture from *Harper's Weekly* which he carried.

"Pantaleon Garcia!" he exclaimed with conviction.

The Insurgent general meditated a moment. Then he replied in a tone of resignation, "Si, Señor."

The bedclothes being pulled down, revealed Garcia in uniform under the blankets. He was sick, and greatly appreciated the American

rations and beer which he received after being driven in his own carromata to General Funston's headquarters.

One by one we gathered in the revolutionists. Mabini too was captured, but Mabini refused to be reconciled. He could not resist continuing his paper warfare; and taking advantage of the comparative liberty we gave him, he wrote several magazine articles, in which he showed his unconquerable hostility. The poor old cripple was given a cell for his violation of his liberties, and subsequently deported to Guam with Pilar and a number of other incorrigibles.

Aguinaldo was allowed to swing around his circumscribed circle, and very little was done to strike him down. He was caged, and our exertions were particularly directed in pacifying the inhabitants and reconciling them to American sovereignty. It was slow work while the Insurgents infested the foothills and terrorized the valleys, but our efforts gradually bore fruit.

Native police were organized; and the local governments were instituted wherever we could keep a garrison within call. We rebuilt public buildings, constructed roads and bridges, and cleaned up the towns devastated by war. By these tactics of general reformation we succeeded in dividing the house against itself, and

making some trusted allies and friends among our former enemies.

The President's new Philippine commission, headed by Judge W. C. Taft, and including Dean C. Worcester, Luke W. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses, arrived in June, 1890, and formulated and established provisional and local governments as rapidly as possible.

For a long time little heed was given to Aguinaldo. It was a question of open controversy whether it were better to capture him or let him escape. We were in the middle of a political campaign, and the excitement of the contest in which expansion and anti-expansion became the principal controversy, for a time made our policy in the Islands a delicate question. In the meantime the school system was perfected and enlarged, the perplexing church and land problems were grappled with, and all things pertaining to establishing American authority in the Philippine Islands were placed in the hands of the commission, Judge Taft being practically the first civil governor of the Archipelago, administering affairs with great ability.

The "war" was over before the year 1901 saw birth. Fighting, however, continued, but Judge Taft made great progress in civil affairs.

And that after all was our goal. Manila took on a new aspect. Business opened up and the city was turned into an up-to-date colonial capital. Filipinos of merit were given official positions, and not only the courts were placed in their hands, but the policing of the city and the minor affairs of government. Political parties were formed, and new hopes and aspirations took the place of dead issues in the minds of the pacified Filipinos.

Aguinaldo spent the year in hiding and making vain attempts to reorganize his vagrant army. Very few proclamations saw the light of day. We had gathered in the "brains of the revolution," captured their few fonts of type and their battered press. The "paper" republic was finished, and all that remained was Aguinaldo, stripped of his verbiage makers, driven into hiding, and cut off from his scattered bands of ladrones.

It was not until February, 1901, that his actual hiding-place was discovered. The clew was in the shape of a letter from Aguinaldo commanding his cousin, Baldormero Aguinaldo, to send him four hundred armed men, the bearer to act as a guide to the same. The order was in cipher, but among other effects captured at various times a copy of the Insur-

gent cipher was found. The Insurgent courier was convinced of the error of his ways (though by exactly what means, history does not reveal) and offered to lead the way to Aguinaldo's place of hiding. Here was an opportunity that suggested an adventure equal to anything in penny-awful fiction. It was just the kind of a dare-devil exploit that appealed to the romantic Funston. It was something out of the ordinary for a brigadier general to leave his command and turn into a scout, but Funston was irresistible. He formulated a scheme and asked General MacArthur's permission. It was impossible to refuse the daring adventurer, the hero of the Rio Grande, anything, so Funston set to work, imitating the peculiar handwriting of Lacuna, the Insurgent officer to whom Aguinaldo's communication referred. Some little time previous to the capture of the Tagalog courier several of Lacuna's letters were found, together with Aguinaldo's cipher code. Having perfected Lacuna's signature, Funston wrote two letters on February 24 and 28, acknowledging Aguinaldo's communication and informing him that he (Lacuna) was sending him a few of the best soldiers in his command. Added to this neat forgery General Funston dictated a letter which was written by an ex-Insurgent attached to his

command, telling Aguinaldo that the relief force had surprised and captured a detachment of Americans, taking five prisoners whom they were bringing to him because of their importance. This ruse was employed to explain the presence of the five Americans : General Funston, Captain Hazzard, Captain Newton, Lieutenant Hazzard, and General Funston's aide, Lieutenant Kitchell, who were to accompany the expedition.

Seventy-eight Macabebes, hereditary enemies of the Tagalogs, were chosen by Funston to form the body of the command. These fearless and hardy natives fell into the scheme with a vengeance. Three Tagalogs and one Spaniard were also invited. The Macabebes were fitted out in cast-off Insurgent uniforms, and the Americans donned field-worn uniforms of privates. Three days' rations were provided, and each man was given a rifle. The *Vicksburg* was chosen to take the daring impostors to some spot on the east coast near Palanan, where Aguinaldo was in hiding. Arriving off the coast at Casigman, some distance from the Insurgent-hidden capital, the party was landed. Three Macabebes, who spoke Tagalog fluently, were sent into the town to notify the natives that they were bringing additional forces and

important American prisoners to Aguinaldo, and request of the local authorities guides and assistance. The Insurgent president readily consented, and the little party, after refreshing themselves and exhibiting their prisoners, started over the ninety-mile trail to Palanan, a mountain retreat on the coast of the Isabella province. Over the stony declivities and through the thick jungle, across bridgeless streams and up narrow passes, the footsore and bone-racked adventurers tramped, until their food was exhausted, and they were too weak to move, though but eight miles from Aguinaldo's rendezvous.

A messenger was sent forward to inform Aguinaldo of their position and to beg for food. The rebel chieftain promptly replied by despatching rice and a letter to the officer in command, instructing him to treat the American prisoners well, but to leave them outside the town. What better condition could the ingenious Funston have himself dictated? On the 23d of March the party reached Palanan. Aguinaldo sent out eleven men to take charge of the American prisoners, but Funston and his associates succeeded in dodging them and scattering themselves in the jungle until they passed on to meet the Americans whom the Insurgents were notified were left behind.

Immediately joining his command, Funston ordered his little band of dare-devils to march boldly into the town and present themselves to Aguinaldo. At the Insurgent headquarters they were received by Aguinaldo's bodyguard, dressed in blue drill uniforms and white hats, drawn up in military form. The spokesman so completely hoodwinked Aguinaldo that he did not suspect the ruse. In the meantime the Macabebes manoeuvred around into advantageous positions, directed by the Spaniard, until all were in readiness. Then he shouted, "Macabebes, now is your turn!" whereupon they emptied their rifles into Aguinaldo's bodyguard.

Aguinaldo and his immediate staff retired to the interior of his house, but the chieftain was a "Demigod," an "Invulnerable," no longer. His *anting-anting* failed him. One of his own people, a Tagalog, Halario Placido, seized him around the waist, as he attempted to escape, and called upon him to surrender. "You are a prisoner of the Americans," said the ex-Insurgent to his former chieftain. The Americans joined in the skirmish, and two of Aguinaldo's staff were wounded, but escaped, the treasurer of the revolutionary government surrendering. The rest of the Filipino officers

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got away. Aguinaldo accepted his capture with resignation, though greatly in fear of the vengeance of the Macabebes. But General Funston's assurance of his personal safety set his mind easy on that point, and he calmed down and discussed the situation. He was greatly cast down at his capture, and asserted that by no other means would he have been taken alive, — an admission which added all the more to Funston's achievement, for Aguinaldo's was a difficult and desperate case, and demanded extraordinary methods.

General Funston and his party returned with their prisoners to the *Vicksburg*, which lay off the shore awaiting the signal, and the revolutionary government and its chieftain was put aboard the American warship, and in due time landed at Manila.

XIX

AGUINALDO, after two years of warfare, was a prisoner. He had made us a very expensive campaign. It took the lives of four thousand American boys to establish American sovereignty. How many more, wasted by fever and broken with hardships, will be added to the list, time and the pension list alone will tell. Commissioner Evans estimates roughly 40,000 beneficiaries will be added to the pension roll through Philippine casualties.

Then there is another bill Aguinaldo is responsible for. It amounts to several hundred millions of dollars. The American people will pay this, — in fact they are paying it every time they sign a receipt or send a telegram or execute a legal paper. This account will be open for some time.

On the other hand the campaign has been expensive to Aguinaldo's countrymen. Up to June 14, 1901, our reports show that 11,346

rifles were captured or surrendered, 80 field pieces, 3000 shells, 700,000 rounds of ammunition, 20 tons of gunpowder and 408 bolos. These figures must comprise but a small proportion of the war munitions of the Insurgents, 31,415 of whom have been captured or surrendered. It is impossible to estimate their loss on the field, but one officer has estimated it at one-sixth of the population, which would be over a million. Treasure to the amount of several millions has also been captured from time to time.

General Funston brought Aguinaldo to Manila. General MacArthur found him a man of some ability. We did not clap him into a dungeon or boil him in oil. We wanted his spirit, not his flesh. So we did not send him to Guam. We gave him roomy quarters in the "Palace," and provided for his comfort with the constant attendance of a few stalwart American boys — with guns. We gave him a secretary, an interpreter and a typewriter, and told him that the opportunity had arrived for him to undo some of the harm for which his name was responsible.

Strange to say, these considerations did not turn his head. He accepted them gravely. He pondered much. He talked seldom. Did he

pose? Possibly; it is his way. But he thought hard.

Cayetano Arellano was sent to visit him. Arellano was an old friend; a compatriot in the great days at Malolos, when the Republica Filipina was, as Aguinaldo said, "an established fact." Arellano is an old man, wise and sagacious; a great lawyer, as lawyers go in Manila. At one time he argued a republic into being. He became His Excellency the Attorney General, of Aguinaldo's cabinet. He prepared the constitution of the republic. It was a clever document, too. It provided for everything but the one thing we might expect in a republic — universal suffrage. Arellano is now our friend. In fact he is His Honor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Why not? He was educated in Madrid. He studied international law in Paris, and he worsted General Otis in a legal controversy over the right of the Filipino government to hold as prisoners friars who held benefices and who had fought among the Spanish volunteers.

So again Arellano advised and Aguinaldo acted accordingly. He turned right about face with an honesty of purpose that won him the indulgence of his new-found country. He accepted the situation and wrote a proclamation

to his people. He called upon them to accept American sovereignty. He deplored their plight and predicted a better future. He was surprised at the humanity and kindness of American policy. He was delighted with the progress we had made in conciliating the people; in our treatment of them and in our employing them in civil and military functions.

Then he sat down and signed a letter. It ran as follows :—

“MALACANAN PALACE, MANILA, April 19, 1901.

“I believe I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar with the progress of the war. The lessons taught with a full meaning, and which have recently come to my knowledge, suggest with irresistible force that a complete termination of hostilities and lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippine Islands.

“The Filipinos have never been dismayed at their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along this path to be impeded by an irresistible force, which,

while it restrains them, yet enlightens their minds and opens to them another course, presenting them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by the majority of my fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust, and believe that under its protection the Filipino people will attain all those promised liberties which they are beginning to enjoy. The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace. So be it. There has been enough blood, enough tears, and enough desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by a desire to serve our noble people, which has thus clearly manifested its will. So do I respect this will, now that it is known to me.

“After mature deliberation, I resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones enjoying the liberty and the promised generosity of the great American nation.

“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the Philippine Archipelago, as I now do and with-

out any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine!

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

So, at last, after two years of bloody warfare, after losing thousands of our brave boys, after killing thousands of his people, devastating the country, and spending millions of dollars, we have convinced Aguinaldo of the futility of his ambitions and of the honesty of our intentions. But have we? I am not a prophet. The infallibility of man is a gamble.

Yet Aguinaldo is doing well. His name is powerful. He wrote other letters. The result was a general scramble on the part of the Insurgents to surrender and be forgiven. For a year we had been capturing rifles, one by one. Under the potent influence of Aguinaldo's name they were laid at our feet by the hundred, and it is only a question of time when we shall have them all. True, there is yet fighting to be done, but the tulisanes and ladrones exist in all Far Eastern countries. They terrorize half of Formosa. In the form of pirates they infest China. Even in the Malay states they make life uncomfortable. In the Philippines they inhabit the mountainous districts, and we shall

be hunting them for some time to come. But the revolution is over. The Philippines are ours in fact. They have been expensive, but they will be valuable. They will be valuable in many ways. First, if the high ideals that at present govern the course of our action continue, they will become a fruitful object lesson in the promotion of civilization both at home and abroad. If we show to the world that native races can be governed to their own preservation and without military oppression, we shall open a new page in history. England has accomplished much along these lines in India, but she has done it at the expense of countless millions of poverty-stricken inhabitants. She has weakened rather than strengthened the caliber of native intellect. She has raised the standard of effort among the few to the degradation of the many. She has not done this with malice prepense. It has been the result of a purely commercial policy.

In the Philippines we are making a new experiment. We are reversing the method. Law and order first. Freedom of thought, speech, and action second. Education and religious toleration third. Commercialism last. That is our propaganda. In a word, Humanitarianism, — a product of latter-day government.

Shall we succeed? I think so. We have many advantages to begin with. We have a religious people, a people who have been cradled in the Christian Church, and reared in the school of discipline. That is quite a start.

Then, too, we have a mixed race, for the blood of the Filipino is strengthened by the infusion of foreign elements. We have the Spanish Mestizo, the Chinese Mestizo, the English Mestizo, and the Japanese Mestizo. This Mestizo element, for good or bad, is at least full of possibilities. Rizal was a Mestizo. Arellano is a Mestizo. Tavera is a Mestizo. Paterno is a Mestizo. Buenacmino is a Mestizo. Luna was a Mestizo. I could name a hundred others; leaders in the rebellion, men of wealth, ability, and education. I do not believe with the archbishop that because these boast of being "high and mighty" they are entirely devoid of common sense. I do not believe that they are simply overgrown children, who, by mimicking civilization, think they have reached the utmost heights of culture.

The cultured Filipinos, it is true, are in the minority, but the masses are not wanting in virtues. The native is no sluggard in thought. He has shown that he has a mind. He learns, quickly, good as well as evil. Under favorable conditions he is easily influenced.

He quickly takes on the manners of his superiors. Given good surroundings he will be good. Among bad surroundings he will degenerate. His mind is not deeply cultivated, but with a generation of good government he will rival the Japanese. He possesses a marvellous memory. He is stoical in demeanor, but beneath his imperturbable exterior he feels deeply and thinks quickly. His morality is peculiarly Oriental, but higher than the race that governed him for three hundred years. He loves his home. He idolizes his children. Is this an animal trait?—then we are all animals. He is cruel, but who taught him cruelty?

Naturally simple and industrious,—as industry goes in equatorial latitudes,—these eight millions of people possess possibilities that a just, humane, generous, and tolerant government will develop into virtues that will be an example to the colonial powers of the world.

I will not descant upon the commercial possibilities of the Philippines. For two years we have had the facts drummed into our ears. Statistics of imports and exports and natural products are easily within the reach of any one who will send a postal card to Washington.

The dream of the Tagalog is over, but the reality will discount the dream. A Filipino

republic would have developed into a Mestizo despotism. The time was not ripe for national independence. Japan is not an analogous argument. Japan is in a different latitude. Japan is but the evolution of China's intelligence, arts, and commercialism. Japan possessed a highly organized government before Marquis Ito went to England and imbibed western civilization. What the Tagalogs might have done in the centuries to come it is impossible to imagine. Their experience with the white man developed the fighting rather than the industrial spirit within them.

But from the ashes of defeat will spring the true liberty and development of the Filipino. The freedom that he has clamored for, bled and suffered for during three hundred years, will be granted him; for wherever floats the American flag these attributes of human progress have always triumphed. If, in the future, they do not follow the flag, the fault will be ours, not theirs.

APPENDIX


THE "ASSURANCES" TO AGUINALDO

(See page 79)

AFTER Aguinaldo, Pio del Pila, and Sandico were put aboard the *McCulloch* by Consul Wildman, they were taken to Captain Hodgson's cabin, where Mr. Wildman gave them a final talk in the presence of Lieutenant Caldwell, Admiral Dewey's secretary, and Mr. John Barrett, ex-Minister to Siam, who accompanied the expedition. Mr. Wildman told Aguinaldo that he was undertaking a mission at his own risk; that the *McCulloch* was a small craft and if overhauled and captured by a Spanish cruiser the Americans could not promise to exact the same considerations for him that might be extended to them; that upon arriving at Cavite he would be given every friendly assistance, but he was to understand that the adventure was not instigated by the government of the United States, nor was he to understand that any promises were extended to him for his people or himself. One pledge, however, was

demanded, and that was that he should place himself and his forces under the orders of the Admiral or the commander of the United States army. To this Aguinaldo replied in the affirmative, promising faithfully to hold himself absolutely under the orders of the American commanders should they so desire. Bidding the little Tagalog chieftain good-by, and wishing him success, Mr. Wildman, Lieutenant Caldwell, and Mr. Barrett left him and returned to the city, while the *McCulloch*, which lay off Kow-loon in Chinese waters, steamed away for Cavite.

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