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<img src="https://cdn.kahimyang.com/resources-11/marcos-1959-senate-campaign-sm.webp" alt="Marcos 1959 senate campaign" loading="lazy"/>
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(Congressman Ferdinand E. Marcos during his campaign for Senate seat in 1959)
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FM used that stint and his status as a war hero to run for Congress in 1949, which he won with 70 percent of the votes. During the campaign, FM declared: 
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"Elect me a congressman now, and I pledge you an Ilocano president in 20 years." 
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Notice that FM underlined his Ilocano identity in relation to his national political ambitions.
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FM's rise in the early 1950s was attributable to the patronage of President Quirino, who was dogged by corruption issues. Seagrave portrayed FM as Quirino's man in Congress in some of these illicit transactions.
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Albert Celoza wrote of how a young and influential FM in the 1950s used his congressional position to "establish good relations with graduate officers from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) and junior officers." Celoza also quoted then House Speaker Jose B. Laurel's observations concerning a large number of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) enlistees and officers from the Ilocos region. Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. noted in the late 1960s that the AFP was being "Ilocanized" as part of FM's broader designs.
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Manila Times columnist Rigoberto Tiglao wrote about the expansion of the AFP during the martial law years (from 60,000 troops in 1972 to 250,000 by the end of 1975) and how this institution became Ilocanized. This was particularly true of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) where 18 of the 22 generals were Ilocanos. The PC's Metropolitan Command, in charge of Manila, was also predominantly Ilocano.
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Did FM harbor thoughts of declaring martial law as early as the 1950s? Were these moves leading towards that end?
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It is clear, however, that in the context of the political instability enveloping Southeast Asia - and the whole of Asia - after World War 2 because of decolonization and the Cold War, control over the military was crucial for any politician aspiring to reach the highest echelons of power. A young FM was ambitious but so were dozens of others. The only difference between them were foresight, strategic planning, and FM's ability to actualize his ambitions.
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Seagrave likewise paints FM the congressional leader of the 1950s as a thug, but even so the Ilocano connection persists:
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"It was widely believed among his congressional peers that he (FM) had ties to an Ilocano murder syndicate that included senior officers in the Constabulary, gangsters, smugglers, triads and teams of professional hitmen. He was linked, as Quirino had been, to Congressman Floro Crisologo, the warlord of Ilocos Sur, whose private army used flame-throwers to settle arguments."
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FM was elected senator in 1959 and became Senate minority leader in 1960, then Senate president in 1963 and president in 1965. Seagrave views this as part of FM's agreement with then Vice President (and former congressional colleague) Diosdado Macapagal, who was running for president in the 1961 elections under the Liberal Party banner, "to take turns backing each other on the way to Malacañang." FM eventually crossed over to the rival Nacionalista Party and challenged Macapagal in the 1965 elections.
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Ferdinand Marcos rise to power, his Ilocano roots and connections